Circles of Solidarity: The National Contexts of Diversity and Redistribution in Developed Democracies by Yakter, Alon
Circles of Solidarity: The National Contexts of Diversity and
Redistribution in Developed Democracies
by
Alon Yakter
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
2018
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Robert J. Franzese, Jr., Chair
Professor Anna Grzymala-Busse, Stanford University
Associate Professor Robert Mickey
Professor Stuart N. Soroka
Alon Yakter
ayakter@umich.edu
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6971-2741
c© Alon Yakter 2018
To Dafna
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and mentorship of many col-
leagues and friends. First and foremost, I am grateful to the four members of my doctoral commit-
tee. Rob Franzese, my dissertation chair, provided me guidance and mentorship since my very first
day at the University of Michigan. Thanks to Rob I learned not to shy away from big questions, to
think about politics as a large and complex system, and to approach data with a well-thought the-
ory. I was also fortunate to learn the basics of quantitative analysis in Rob’s legendary, and at the
time harrowing, POLSCI 699 course. Much of what I know about empirical research owes to that
class, although I also blame Rob for my increased use of probabilistic language in conversations
with puzzled family and friends.
Anna Grzymala-Busse helped me think about the project since it was just a vague idea and
showed an unparalleled ability to flesh out and focus even the most confused and half-baked
thoughts. I often left our meetings with an entirely new perspective on the project and, more
generally, on how to articulate research questions, organize an argument, and approach rich quali-
tative data. Rob Mickey has always made himself available to read my work, give comments, and
talk through it with great insight, a broad perspective, and an astounding knowledge of the disci-
pline. Rob is also one of the kindest people in the department and has always made sure to check
in about everything academic and non-academic. When Dafna and I just moved to Ann Arbor, he
and his wife Jenny immediately invited us to Rosh Hashanah and have since helped us feel closer
to home, and to that we are grateful. Not long after my project took form, I was excited to learn
that Stuart Soroka has joined the University of Michigan. Since joining my committee, and despite
working on an astonishing number of projects at any given moment, Stuart was always happy to
iii
meet and offered invaluable substantive and methodological advice.
This dissertation was generously supported by funding from several institutions and fellow-
ships, including the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies at the University of Michi-
gan, the Jean Monnet Graduate Fellowship in the University of Michigan’s Center for European
Studies, the Dissertation Writing Institute in the University of Michigan’s Sweetland Center for
Writing, and the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy. I am also grateful to Marc Swyngedouw
from the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO) at the Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven and to Spencer Piston from Boston University for providing access to their survey data. I
presented parts of the dissertation at the University of Michigan’s Comparative Politics Workshop
(CPW) and Political Economy Workshop (PEW) and in conferences organized by the American
Political Science Association (APSA), the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), the
Council for European Studies (CES), and the Politics of Race, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consor-
tium (PRIEC), where I benefited greatly from participant feedback and comments.
While developing this project, I was privileged to study and work with an impressive and
inspiring group of faculty members. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Michael Shalev, my M.A.
adviser at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who provided guidance and encouragement when I
was still deliberating whether to follow an academic path. When I just started the master’s program,
I already decided to write a philosophical thesis about sexual harassment laws. My plans changed
drastically after taking Michael’s seminar on the Israeli welfare state and finding myself engrossed
in this topic. This dissertation, in many ways, started in that class. After arriving in Michigan, Bill
Clark, Mark Dincecco, Scott Greer, Mai Hassan, Allen Hicken, Pauline Jones, Mika LaVaque-
Manty, Brian Min, Noah Nathan, and Iain Osgood provided valuable advice about my research
and the academic profession. I am particularly grateful to Mark Tessler for being a true mentor in
both research and teaching, as well as one of the kindest and most cheerful people I have met. The
department’s staff over the years, especially Elise Bodei, Kathryn Cardenas, Nicole Rutherford,
and Kimberly Smith, were always helpful and successfully accommodated my tendency to stop by
their offices instead of sending an e-mail.
iv
I was fortunate to spend the last few years in the company of brilliant and caring fellow graduate
students, far too many to mention all by name. Thank you to Jennifer Chudy, Charles Crabtree,
Eli Feiman, Jennifer Frentasia, Diana Greenwald, Maiko Heller, Ben Lempert, Denise Lillvis,
Albana Shehaj, Carly Wayne, and Nicole Wu for many chats about research, life, and everything in
between. Outside of Michigan, Noam Gidron, Lior Sheffer, and Tomer Ullman provided comments
and kept virtual company on a regular basis. I am particularly grateful to Anil Menon, who, in
addition to being a friend and a colleague, kindly agreed to read and comment on all parts of this
dissertation.
Finally, I would not have completed this dissertation if it was not for my family. My parents,
Meir and Ronit, and my three sisters have been a constant source of unconditional love and support
unencumbered by distance and time zones. Two and a half years after arriving in Michigan, and
exactly two weeks after passing my major preliminary exam, Iddo was born. His kindness, humor,
and intelligence have been a grounding and invigorating force in everything that I do. Coinciden-
tally, about two weeks after I will have defended this dissertation, barring unexpected surprises, his
younger brother will join us. To our excitement and to the frustration of the ultrasound technicians,
he already seems to share quite a few traits with his older sibling. Last, but certainly not least, are
my endless gratitude and love to Dafna, my wife, who agreed to join me on this journey; and quite
a journey it has been. I cannot imagine the last few years without her love, support, compassion,
and wit. I dedicate this dissertation to her.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Three Incomplete Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 The Argument in Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Methodological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II. Circles of Solidarity: A Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Basic Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 From Preferences to Redistributive Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Testable Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
III. The Heterogeneous Effect of Diversity: Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis,
1980–2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Key Explanatory Variables: Diversity, Inequality, and Segregation . . . . . 28
3.3 Premises: Class Conflict and Regional Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4 Redistributive Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5 Conclusion: Lessons and Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
vi
IV. Race, Intergroup Inequality, and Redistribution in the United States . . . . . 58
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Economic Inequality and Intergroup Relations in the US . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Intergroup Relations and Redistribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Conclusion: Lessons from the American Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
V. Language, Regional Segregation, and Redistribution in Belgium . . . . . . . . 93
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Geography and Intergroup Relations in Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3 Intergroup Relations and Redistribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4 Conclusion: Lessons from the Belgian Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
VI. Language, Interregional Inequality, and Redistribution in Spain . . . . . . . . 129
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.2 Intergroup Inequality, Segregation, and Group Relations in Spain . . . . . 133
6.3 Intergroup Relations and Redistribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.4 Conclusion: Lessons from the Spanish Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.1 Summary of Main Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.3 Avenues for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
1.1 Ascriptive Diversity and Three Measures of Redistribution . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Two-Dimensional Social Space by Income and Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Circles of Solidarity under Different Cleavage Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Circles of Solidarity with Both Intergroup Inequality and Regional Segregation . 22
3.1 The Ascriptive Identity Fractionalization (AIF) Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 The Relationships between AIF, Intergroup Inequality, and Regional Segregation 33
3.3 The Conditional Effect of Ascriptive Diversity on Perceptions of Class Conflict
and on Regional Identification as a Function of Inequality and of Segregation . . 37
3.4 The Conditional Effect of Ascriptive Diversity on Overall Public Social Spending
as a Function of Inequality and of Segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Public Social Spending by Type of Program: Coefficient Plot of Interaction
Terms from Error-Correction Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 The Conditional Effect of Ascriptive Diversity on Effective Redistributive De-
centralization as a Function of Inequality and of Segregation . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1 Share of Blacks by State, 1860 and 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Income and Wealth Gaps Between Blacks and Whites, 1774–2016 . . . . . . . . 62
4.3 Distribution of Whites’ Opinion on Blacks and on Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Whites’ Opinion of Blacks Over Time, 1990–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.5 Perceptions of the Causes for the Socioeconomic Position of Blacks, 1986–2016 . 67
4.6 Regional Identification: Country Coefficients from Logistic Regression . . . . . 71
4.7 Support for Income Redistribution by Race, 1978–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.8 Support for Redistribution by Type: Country Coefficients from OLS Regressions 79
5.1 Belgium’s Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2 Shares of French and Dutch Speakers by Province (Excluding Brussels), 2016 . . 95
5.3 Income (2015) and Employment (2016) by Arrondissement . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.4 National Pride: Country Coefficients from OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.5 National and Subnational Identification by Region, 1979–2014 . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6 Class Conflict: Country Coefficients from OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.7 Support for Redistribution: Country Coefficients from OLS Regressions . . . . . 116
5.8 Confidence in Social Security by Region, 1990–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.9 Confidence in Social Security: Country Coefficients from OLS Regression . . . . 117
5.10 Support for Social Security Decentralization by Region, 1995–2003 . . . . . . . 119
viii
6.1 Language and Wealth in Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.2 National versus Regional Identification, 1980–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.3 National versus Regional Identification by Region Type, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.1 Density Plots of CAGR Values for Intergroup Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A.2 CAGR Trend over Multiple Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
ix
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
2.1 Summary of the Theory and Empirical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Perceptions of Class Conflict: Multi-Level Linear Regression . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Regional Identification: Multi-Level Logistic Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Definitions and Sources of Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Overall Public Social Spending: Error-Correction Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5 Unemployment and Sick-Pay Coverage and Employment Protection Legislation:
Error-Correction Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.6 Effective Redistributive Decentralization: OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.7 Relative Income Inequality Reduction after Taxes and Transfers: Error-Correction
Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Positive Feelings toward the Poor: OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Geographical Identification by Unit, 1994 and 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Preference to Increase/Decrease Government Spending on Welfare Programs by
Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Support/Opposition to Tax Breaks and Eligibility Requirements by Race . . . . . 81
4.5 Support for More Federal Spending on Different Needs: OLS Regressions . . . . 84
4.6 Support for Different Tax Breaks: OLS Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.7 Primary Welfare Programs by Key Attributes, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1 Intergroup Distance by Region, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Interpersonal Trust: OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3 Support for Redistribution by Region, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Support for Different Types of Redistribution by Region, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5 Support for Social Security Decentralization: OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.1 A Typology of ACs by Identity and Wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.2 National Solidarity: OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.3 Interclass Solidarity: Logistic Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.4 Redistributive Preferences by Type, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.5 Support for Social-Service Decentralization: Logistic Regression . . . . . . . . . 154
6.6 Opposition to Interregional Redistribution: OLS Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
B.1 Public Social Spending by Program Type: Cross-Class Needs . . . . . . . . . . . 176
B.2 Public Social Spending by Program Type: Lower-Class Needs . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.3 Unemployment and and Sick-Pay Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
x
B.4 Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
B.5 Relative Income Inequality Reduction after Taxes and Transfers . . . . . . . . . 180
C.1 Alternative Specifications: Error-Correction Model Adjustments . . . . . . . . . 183
C.2 Alternative Specifications: Lagged-Dependent Variable (LDV) Model . . . . . . 183
C.3 Alternative Specifications: Cross-Sectional Model (Between-Effects Estimator) . 184
C.4 Alternative Measures of Intergroup Inequality and Regional Segregation . . . . . 184
xi
LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX
A. Test for Stability of Intergroup Inequality Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
B. Full Presentation of Truncated Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
C. Alternative Model Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
xii
ABSTRACT
In recent years, as many Western democracies have been facing growing racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious diversification and tensions, the social policy implications of these cleavages have come to
the fore. This dissertation explores how ascriptive diversity—heterogeneity in ethnicity, race, re-
ligion, or language—shapes income redistribution amongst and between different identity groups
in developed democracies. The common consensus among social scientists asserts that diverse
countries are less solidary and thus maintain smaller welfare states than homogeneous ones. How-
ever, the data reveal unexplained variation in the aggregate redistribution levels of similarly diverse
democracies. Furthermore, additional research, which focuses on individual-level behavior, finds
that intergroup relations depend on the contextual environment, particularly socioeconomic in-
equality and geographic segregation between different identity groups.
Addressing this gap, I propose a new theoretical framework that explains how complex social
structures, particularly inequality and geography, shape income redistribution between ascriptive
identity groups in democratic societies. I argue that greater ascriptive diversity suppresses redistri-
bution only and insofar as it is reinforced by either higher intergroup inequality or higher regional
segregation. Each of these factors, however, fractures national solidarity along different social cat-
egories and, subsequently, creates different redistributive preferences and outcomes. When identity
groups are highly unequal socioeconomically, better-off identity groups can minimize intergroup
redistribution through regressive and exclusionary welfare policies that underprioritize the needs of
the poor. By contrast, when identity groups cluster in different parts of the country, their members
can minimize intergroup redistribution by decentralizing national welfare programs to the regional
level. Hence, these factors determine both the extent to which ascriptive diversity dampens redis-
tribution and whether it would result in more regressive or more decentralized policies.
xiii
My empirical analysis corroborates these expectations using a multi-method approach. First,
I analyze cross-sectional time-series data from 22 democracies over a period of 31 years and find
broad empirical patterns that fit my expectations. All else equal, democracies with higher ascrip-
tive diversity invest less in redistributive programs when their various identity groups are more un-
equal and/or more regionally segregated. The conditional effect of class and geography, moreover,
correlates with different sets of outcomes as predicted by my theoretical framework. Intergroup
inequality suppresses investment in programs that target lower-class needs and deems cross-class
programs more exclusionary. Intergroup regional segregation, by contrast, implicates all types of
national programs and correlates with higher redistributive decentralization. Second, I analyze
three representative case studies in greater depth: The United States, Belgium, and Spain, each
illustrates ascriptive diversity under a different configuration of class and geography. The three
cases provide additional support for my hypotheses, place the different theoretical components on
a single coherent continuum, and contextualize them in richer and noisier settings. Moreover, they
add important insights about the underlying mechanisms that link preferences and policies and
about the implications of long-term changes.
My dissertation, therefore, improves our understanding of the complex relationship between
ascriptive diversity and social policy. In doing so, it also ties together separate disciplinary discus-
sions on these issues and contributes new theoretical and empirical insights on the roots of existing
policies and on future developments in growingly diverse democracies.
xiv
CHAPTER I
Introduction
When the Star-Belly Sneetches had frankfurter roasts
Or picnics or parties or marshmallow toasts,
They never invited the Plain-Belly Sneetches.
They left them out cold, in the dark of the beaches.
They kept them away. Never let them come near.
And that’s how they treated them year after year.
– Dr. Seuss, The Sneetches and Other Stories
Many democracies have been facing growing immigration inflows and rising racial, ethnic, and
religious tensions in recent years. Against this background, the various policy implications of
higher ascriptive diversity—heterogeneity in racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities—
have gained renewed public and scholarly attention.1 One of the key issues in this debate concerns
the way that different ascriptive groups redistribute resources among and between themselves. As
one non-academic doctor, Dr. Seuss, wonderfully portrayed many decades ago, ascriptive differ-
ences can buttress intergroup resentments and unwillingness to share one’s income, or smoked
sausages, with out-group members who look, pray, or talk differently. Such discord and unequal
access to resources carry grave implications for the wellbeing, social cohesion, and the quality of
1The term “ascriptive diversity” borrows from Rae and Taylor (1970, 1), who use it to define a class of “ascriptive
or ‘trait’ cleavages such as race or caste” that “determines the ‘heterogeneity’ or ‘homogeneity’ of a community.”
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democracy in developed societies. Therefore, a better understanding of the redistributive implica-
tions of ascriptive diversity is important both as we look back at the roots of existing policies and
as we anticipate future developments in growingly diverse democracies.
In this dissertation, I focus primarily on the relationship between ascriptive identity cleavages
and interpersonal redistribution through the welfare state, one of the primary channels through
which income is redistributed in modern democracies. Welfare policies determine how tax rev-
enues, levied from the income and assets of some citizens, are transferred to other citizens in the
form of social services or cash benefits. Redistributive policies can vary by their goals, types of
benefits, and the criteria by which they are awarded: some pool payroll contributions to provide
insurance against common risks such as aging or disability, others provide universal services for
all citizens, and still others provide means-tested assistance for the weakest strata of society. These
policies, accordingly, can vary significantly in their overall structure and in the purposes and inter-
ests that they serve.
These redistributive priorities are neither impartial nor exogenous. As part of the democratic
game, they are set by elites and voters representing the preferences and solidarities of different so-
cial groups. In these social structures, ascriptive identities form particularly potent group markers
given their inherent and relatively rigid nature (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rae and Taylor, 1970),
their central role in in-group coordination (Bates, 1983; Fearon and Laitin, 1996), and their cul-
tivation by political actors (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2004). Indeed, different studies have shown
that ascriptive identity cleavages influence economic development and democratization (Easterly
and Levine, 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005), intergroup conflict (Fearon and Laitin,
2003; Wilkinson, 2008), public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Habyarimana
et al., 2007), party system structures (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Clark and Golder, 2006),
and voter behavior (Chandra, 2004; Huber, 2012). This dissertation examines the nexus between
ascriptive diversity and redistributive policies: how do members of different ascriptive identity
groups redistribute income among and between themselves in developed democracies?
2
1.1 Three Incomplete Answers
1.1.1 The Macro-Comparative Angle: An Empirical Puzzle
The current research on ascriptive diversity and redistribution offers several separate, and in-
complete, answers to this question. The first body of work focuses on macro-level cross-country
differences in redistributive policies. For a long while, researchers of contemporary welfare states
paid little attention to the influence of ascriptive identities, focusing instead on class as the primary,
and often only, relevant social cleavage. Thus, redistributive outcomes are often explained by coun-
try differences in the income distribution of otherwise-identical voters (Meltzer and Richard, 1981;
Moene and Wallerstein, 2001), the political power of the left (Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 2003), and the institutional constraints within which class-based
actors operate (Hicks and Swank, 1992; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2006).2
In recent years, however, more attention has been given to the redistributive implications of
ascriptive diversity. Using macro-comparative data, this more recent literature finds a negative cor-
relation between ethnic and linguistic diversity and public investment in welfare programs (Alesina
and Glaeser, 2004; Sanderson, 2004; Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ortı´n and Weber, 2009). Higher ascriptive
heterogeneity, the logic goes, fractures national and class solidarity and suppresses redistribution
levels compared to more homogeneous societies.
The empirical support for this argument has drawn predominantly from the United States,
where the salient racial divide is linked repeatedly with reduced public services and social pro-
grams at all levels of government (Quadagno, 1994; Lieberman, 1998; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly,
1999; Brown, 1999). Alesina and Glaeser (2004) offer the most comprehensive comparative adap-
tation of this claim, maintaining that higher racial and ethno-linguistic diversity explains much
2There is a small handful of references to ascriptive identity cleavages in this literature, yet mostly as a factor
operating in the background. Stephens (1979), for instance, notes that ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity undermine
the cohesion of labor organizations that promote welfare state expansion. Using a similar logic, Romer, Lee and Van
der Straeten (2007) argue that anti-immigration sentiments strengthen right-wing parties and thus indirectly undermine
redistributive policies. Some attention was also given to the effect of religion on welfare states, primarily through
Christian-Democratic parties (Huber, Ragin and Stephens, 1993; Van Kersbergen and Manow, 2009) and religious
networks (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006; Huber and Stanig, 2011). However, this discussion analyzes religion as a set
of values and not as a contentious social cleavage.
3
of the historic gap between the American and European welfare states (for similar findings, see
Sanderson, 2004; Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ortı´n and Weber, 2009). They further argue that ascriptive
cleavages precede and explain the emergence of class politics and electoral institutions, two pri-
mary factors underlying redistributive policymaking. The notion that ascriptive diversity weakens
redistribution has since become a common premise among comparative political scientists, sociol-
ogists, and economists.
Although widely accepted, however, this straightforward theoretical prediction has mixed em-
pirical support, particularly in developed democracies (for a comprehensive critique, see Pontus-
son, 2006). Several studies, for example, argue that the negative correlation between ethnic diver-
sity and redistribution loses its statistical power when the sample is limited to Western countries
and with a more careful consideration of other economic, political, and demographic differences
(Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Others show that relative changes in the share
of foreigners matter more than their overall share of the population (Soroka et al., 2016).
Recent descriptive data confirm this empirical tension. Figure 1.1 plots three different measures
of redistribution levels against an index of ascriptive identity fractionalization in 19–22 OECD
democracies.3 Panel A displays public social spending in 2011 as a share of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), Panel B presents the relative reduction in income inequality before and after tax and
transfers in 2011, and Panel C showcases the combined generosity of key social security programs
in 2010 (Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto, 2014). The fitted lines show the negative linear correlations
between ascriptive diversity and each of the three aspects of redistribution.
On average, as the dominant macro-comparative argument expects, homogeneous countries
spend more than heterogeneous ones on social programs, reduce a greater share of inequality, and
offer more generous social security entitlements. However, the plots also reveal a heteroskedas-
tic pattern: whereas homogeneous countries tend to cluster together more closely, heterogeneous
ones vary more broadly by all three redistributive measures. This tendency is illustrated with the
matching box-and-whisker diagrams, which split the samples in half and plot the variation within
3The operationalization of this index, which integrates multiple data sources and identity dimensions, is discussed
in more detail in Chapter 3.
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Figure 1.1: Ascriptive Diversity and Three Measures of Redistribution
each subgroup, as well as each subgroup’s coefficient of variation (CV). Thus, the accepted notion
that ascriptive diversity suppresses redistribution seems correct but insufficient. Why does higher
heterogeneity in ascriptive identities dampens redistributive outcomes in some cases but not so
much in others?
1.1.2 The Micro-Behavioral Angle: Local Contexts and Preferences
Several clues about this puzzle can be found in a separate literature that explores the micro-
behavioral foundations of ascriptive diversity. Focusing on individual attitudes, this body of re-
search finds that ascriptive diversity in itself is not a sufficient cause for intergroup tensions. Rather,
the national and local contexts within which identity groups interact can moderate or exacerbate
their prejudice and solidarity.
Two prominent factors stand out in this literature. The first is inequality. Theories of group con-
flict postulate that intergroup relations worsen when out-group members threaten the relative social
5
and economic status of one’s own group (Key, Jr., 1949; Blumer, 1958; Glaser, 1994). Group threat
can stem from cultural differences or historic legacies (Forbes, 2004; Bowyer, 2009), but also, more
commonly, from socioeconomic inequality. According to this work, economic differences between
different identity groups increase intergroup competition over limited resources, induce out-group
stereotypes among richer groups, and intensify feelings of alienation among poorer ones (Bobo and
Hutchings, 1996; Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000; Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi, 2002; Gay, 2006; Baldwin
and Huber, 2010). Intergroup inequality, in turn, raises the chances of ethnic voting and civil wars
(Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Gubler and Selway, 2012; Huber and Suryanarayan,
2016) and weaken democratic stability, economic development, and public goods provision (Bald-
win and Huber, 2010; Houle, 2015; Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), particularly
in developing regions.
Intergroup inequality also implicates redistributive preferences. Multiple political-economic
models posit that higher intergroup inequality should lower individual willingness to transfer re-
sources to out-group members due to wider social distance, increased threat, and differing eco-
nomic needs (Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Lind, 2007; Shayo, 2009; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011;
Alt and Iversen, 2017). Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence that real or perceived socioe-
conomic differences between ascriptive identity groups weaken popular support for redistribution,
particularly among members of richer groups (Gilens, 1995; Branton and Jones, 2005; Finseraas,
2012; Burgoon, 2014; Morgan and Kelly, 2016; Alt and Iversen, 2017). The bulk of these findings,
however, examine general support for redistribution as the primary outcome of interest. Analyses
of actual policies are scarcer and focus more narrowly on immigrant access to welfare benefits
(Razin, Sadka and Swagel, 2002; Sainsbury, 2012; Koning and Banting, 2013).
The second factor influencing intergroup relations is geographical. The influential Contact Hy-
pothesis postulates that intergroup prejudice worsens when different identity groups are segregated
and do not come in regular contact. According to these studies, the lack of regular interactions with
out-group members solidifies distorted perceptions of the latter and increases in-group bias. Con-
versely, intergroup hostility can be diffused when different identity groups intermingle, particularly
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if they share equal social status and common goals and are supported by institutions and norms of
cooperation (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Brewer and Gaertner, 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp,
2006, but see Paluck, Green and Green, 2018).
This research tends to focus on intergroup prejudice as the key outcome, but more recent studies
have shifted their gaze to the broader policy implications of intergroup contact. Several compara-
tive studies find that geographical segregation undermines cooperation and trust between ascriptive
identity groups (Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, 2008; Semyonov and Glikman, 2009; Uslaner, 2012;
Kasara, 2013; Enos, 2018), increases support for discriminatory policies (Kinder and Mendelberg,
1995), and weakens democratic norms and government performance (Alesina and Zhuravskaya,
2011). The implications for redistributive outcomes have not been examined directly, although
newer works hint at a negative relationship. First, at the individual level, lack of contact is shown
to lower one’s willingness to share profit with out-group members (Enos and Gidron, 2016). Sec-
ond, at the policy level, relatively homogeneous districts that experience high rates of immigration
tend to show lower public support for redistributive policies (Eger, 2010; Dahlberg, Edmark and
Lundqvist, 2012; Schmidt-Catran and Spies, 2016) and decreased levels of local redistribution
in practice (Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008; Jofre-Monseny, Sorribas-Navarro and Va´zquez-Grenno,
2016). These findings too, however, are limited to individual preferences or to local policies.
1.1.3 The Regional Angle: Interregional Inequality and Redistribution
Additional insights into the redistributive implications of inequality and geography can be
found in yet another set of studies that focus on interregional differences and institutional de-
sign. Specifically, a subset of this literature argues that economic inequality between different
geographical regions undermines interregional solidarity and leads to more decentralized redis-
tribution, whereby regional and subnational actors gain more autonomous authority over welfare
policy at the expense of the central government (Wibbels, 2005; Beramendi, 2012). Geographi-
cally decentralized systems, in turn, tend to produce lower income redistribution due to their high
number of institutional veto points and potential races to the bottom (Peterson and Rom, 1990;
7
Huber and Stephens, 2001; Rogers, 2016, but see Volden, 2002). These theories, however, con-
sider interregional conflict outside the context of ascriptive identity politics. As such, they focus
primarily on economic interests rather than social distance, solidarity, and intergroup tensions.
In summary, past research offers several incomplete answers on the relationship between as-
criptive diversity and redistribution. Unfortunately, these discussions seldom speak to one another.
Yet, once integrated, they provide several useful insights. Ascriptive diversity, we know, tends
to have a negative effect on redistributive outcomes, although this average trend includes unex-
plained variation . We also know that intergroup relations, solidarity, and willingness to share
resources weaken in certain socioeconomic and geographical contexts. My main argument pulls
these strands together and proposes a fuller theoretical and empirical framework to consider the
relationship between ascriptive diversity and redistribution.
1.2 The Argument in Brief
How, then, do ascriptive identity cleavages influence redistributive policy in developed democ-
racies? I argue that higher ascriptive diversity does tend to suppress income redistribution, but
this influence and its precise policy implications are conditional on intergroup inequality and re-
gional segregation. When identity groups are part of different socioeconomic classes or clustered
in separate parts of the country, national solidarity fragments more readily to narrower circles of
solidarity formed around ethnic, racial, linguistic, or religious identities. Specifically, intergroup
inequality and regional segregation reinforce in-group bias and differentiate identity groups along
additional social categories. Ascriptive diversity, accordingly, requires either of these contexts to
dampen national solidarity and, with it, redistribution levels.
Class and geography, however, shape redistributive preferences and outcomes differently. In-
tergroup inequality differentiates identity groups along class lines. Consequently, they deepen class
conflict between rich and poor identity groups and split redistributive preferences accordingly. As
a result, better-off and politically stronger identity groups would attempt to minimize intergroup
redistribution by prioritizing the needs of the middle and upper classes, underinvesting in poli-
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cies that target poorer identity groups, and restricting the latter’s access to broader benefits. The
outcome, therefore, would be a more regressive and exclusionary welfare state.
Intergroup regional segregation, by contrast, structures in-group solidarities along regional
lines. In this case, regionally segregated groups would prefer to limit redistribution to in-group
members by using geography, not class, as a differentiating category. As a result, they would
promote policies the devolve redistributive programs to regional units at the expense of a robust
national system. The outcome, therefore, would be a smaller and more decentralized welfare state.
Inequality and geography can also operate side by side. When different identity groups are
concentrated in unequal regions, richer identity groups would prefer more regressive and more de-
centralized interregional redistribution. Poorer identity groups, meanwhile, would face conflicting
pressures given their exclusive regional identities on the one hand and their reliance on income
from other regions on the other. The result, therefore, would involve both more regressive and
more decentralized redistribution levels compared to other cases.
In summary, I argue that ascriptive identities constrain income redistribution as part of larger
social structures that include other dimensions and cleavages. These contexts not only facilitate the
influence of ascriptive diversity on redistributive policymaking, but they also shape the boundaries
of social solidarity and set redistributive policies that reflect these boundaries. I present my theo-
retical framework in greater detail in Chapter 2, including in-depth discussions of my key premises
and scope conditions, expected outcomes, possible mechanisms, and testable hypotheses.
1.3 Methodological Approach
Chapter 3 to 6 test my argument empirically using a multi-method approach with both a large-
n analysis and three in-depth case studies. There are several perspectives on the proper use of
mixed methodologies. One approach assumes that all research methods answer the same questions
using the same inferential logic (e.g., King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). According to this view,
multiple methods should test the same hypotheses concurrently to validate, or “triangulate”, the
empirical conclusions. A different approach asserts instead that each method is suitable to answer
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specific types of research questions (e.g, Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). From this perspective, we
should pair each hypothesis with its most suitable method. I follow a third and more integrative
approach, which argues that various data and tools should be combined complementarily based
on their relative strengths and weaknesses (e.g., Seawright, 2016). Therefore, rather than retesting
each hypothesis with multiple methods or using a single method per hypothesis, I integrate multiple
data and methods where they are most helpful.
My mixed empirical strategy seeks to combine breadth and depth. I use a series of large-n
analyses to identify broad empirical patterns in a pooled sample of 22 democracies between 1980
and 2011. The large-n analysis has several key advantages for my purposes. First, it is relatively
broad. The sample contains almost all contemporary developed democracies with available annual
data. The time period, meanwhile, covers the scope of a generation, an interval that is long enough
to show meaningful trends but also minimizes the conflating influence of long-term changes in
the structures of society, the economy, and policymaking. Second, the large sample of cases and
years creates a more nuanced spectrum of values for both the explanatory and outcome variables.
Hence, I can test my hypotheses against a larger space of hypothetical counterfactuals, including
higher ascriptive homogeneity, higher ascriptive diversity with lower values of intergroup inequal-
ity and/or regional segregation, and higher ascriptive diversity with higher values of either or both.
Third, the large-n analysis isolates these relationships more rigorously using econometric tools.
In particular, I exploit the longitudinal nature of the data to hold constant a comprehensive set of
short- and long-term dynamics that operate alongside the structural factors in which I am inter-
ested. I also run several tests that validate my findings’ statistical robustness. All of these analyses
are presented in Chapter 3, including a detailed explanation of my operationalization choices, my
econometric specification, and my primary findings.
At the same time, the large-n analysis is not ideal for portraying the full causal chain, contex-
tualizing it, and examining the mechanisms that underly the different correlations. Therefore, I
complement it with three in-depth case studies, presented in Chapters 4 to 6, that combine quali-
tative and quantitative data. The case-study analysis has several methodological strengths. First,
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it provides depth. Each case study analyzes case-specific historical, public opinion, and public
policy data that are better attuned to its unique cleavages, institutional environment, and political
conflicts. Second, the case studies connect the different theoretical components as part of a single
coherent chain. I analyze all three cases using a structured and focused comparison of the same
core questions (George and Bennett, 2005): (1) the socioeconomic and geographic contexts of the
primary ascriptive cleavage, (2) the implications that these structures have on intergroup relations
and solidarities, (3) the interconnections of both with redistributive preferences, and (4) how these
factors influence actual welfare policies. Moreover, while proving true causality is an elusive task,
I verify that each case jumps through all the necessary hoops, i.e., that all the theoretical links in the
chain perform as expected (Bennett, 2010). Finally, the case studies corroborate my key theoreti-
cal and operational assumptions and contextualize my findings with richer, and noisier, examples
(Seawright, 2016).
Given these goals, I select three cases that approximate the three ideal types of cleavage struc-
tures detailed in my theory: Chapter 4 explores racial diversity with high intergroup inequality
in the United States; Chapter 5 studies Belgium’s ethno-linguistic diversity with high regional
segregation; and Chapter 6 examines Spain’s ethno-linguistic diversity with both high regional
segregation and notable economic differences. The cases themselves were selected based on a
close examination of case-specific economic and geographic data, which I present in depth in each
chapter’s introduction. None, of course, perfectly represent their ideal type. Nevertheless, this real-
world noise lends an opportunity to discuss complex relationships with other factors and compare
real-world examples with the average estimates gleaned from the large-n analysis.
The closing discussion in Chapter 7 summarizes my primary empirical findings and theoretical
conclusions, underscores the dissertation’s contributions to our current understanding of identity
politics and redistribution, and highlights several avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER II
Circles of Solidarity: A Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
How should we think theoretically about the influence that national contexts, and specifically
class and geography, exert on the relationship between ascriptive diversity and redistribution? In
this chapter, I propose a theoretical framework that ties these different factors together and pro-
duces several testable hypotheses. I begin the chapter with a basic theoretical setup that focuses
on collective solidarities under different socioeconomic and geographical contexts. I then discuss
the various redistributive implications that I expect to find in each case, particularly under high
intergroup inequality, high regional segregation, and both together. After discussing some of the
mechanisms that may be at play, I conclude with several testable hypotheses that guide the next
few chapters.
My theoretical framework is bounded by two principal scope conditions. First, although the
theory is presented in general terms, I am primarily concerned with the contemporary political
environment found in fully consolidated democracies. As such, I assume a stable rule of law,
full and equal political rights, and democratic representation. While many of the intuitions that
I present may be relevant for less consolidated or non-democracies, underdeveloped economic
contexts, or earlier periods in history, they are likely to unfold differently under such conditions.
These different political environments raise a new set of questions that would justify a separate
theoretical and empirical investigation.
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Second, I am only concerned with implications on welfare policies that promote direct inter-
personal redistribution. Accordingly, I do not consider broader public policies such as education,
infrastructure, and other forms of public goods provision. Public goods, by definition, are less
targeted than interpersonal redistribution (Hicken, 2011) and as such include coarser dynamics of
inclusion and exclusion. For the same reason, their popular perception as intergroup transfers may
be weaker. In this case, too, my theoretical logic may partially apply but would require additional
adjustments and development.
2.2 Basic Setup
To begin, let us consider a simplified social space that consists of two dimensions, one so-
cioeconomic (income) and one geographical (regions). Members of society have two attributes in
this space: (1) their income and (2) their region of residence. Based on these traits, we can plot
all individuals on a two-dimensional space, as demonstrated in Figure 2.1. Each dot in the graph
locates a person by her income and region.1 For instance, an individual located on the bottom-left
corner has low income and resides in Region 1, whereas another person located in the top-right
corner has a high income and resides in Region 2. Accordingly, the vertical dimension reflects the
income distribution and the horizontal dimension captures the spatial distribution of this society.
Now, let us add two elements of ascriptive identity. First, let each member of society be as-
signed to one of two separate ascriptive identity groups. This proposition relies on two construc-
tivist premises about the nature of ascriptive identities. The first premise assumes that all types of
ascriptive identities—race, ethnicity, religion, and language—share several core attributes. Despite
their differences, all types invoke an alleged common genetic, historic, or spiritual descent, have
relatively rigid and visible criteria, and foster effective social coordination (Hale, 2004; Chandra,
2006; Laitin, 2007; Haller and Eder, 2015). As such, they all form strong bases for ascriptive
mobilization, contingent on case-specific historical forces (Wimmer, 2008). The second premise
1The income values are drawn randomly from a beta distribution, reflecting the common left-skewed distribution
of wages. The geographical values are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution.
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Figure 2.1: Two-Dimensional Social Space by Income and Geography
assumes that ascriptive identities are already formed. An influential body of work shows that as-
criptive identities can develop and change as a result of economic development, relative group
size, electoral institutions, and violent conflicts (e.g., Laitin, 1986; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005;
Sambanis and Shayo, 2013). I adopt a milder position on this issue. On the one hand, I assume that
within every country the primary social cleavages have largely been established, a common claim
with regard to contemporary developed democracies (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).2 On the other
hand, when comparing different societies contemporaneously, the relative political importance of
these identities can differ based on their cleavage reinforcement with class and geography, as I ar-
gue below. Therefore, my discussion does not focus on long-term processes of identity formation
within countries but on their comparative variation under different and relatively formed national
2As Varshney (2009, 288) notes, “Constructivism is not about the radical short-run fluidity of identities. It is about
the long-run formation, and the consequent stickiness, of identities.” In the West, this long-run formation is typically
linked with modernization, industrialization, and state building processes that for the most part completed centuries
ago.
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contexts.
The second element of ascriptive identity that I add is in-group solidarity. In line with the
micro-behavioral literature, let each person have a positive sense of camaraderie with her in-group
members (Tajfel et al., 1971). In formal terms, this solidarity can be seen as an other-regarding util-
ity function, where one’s own wellbeing improves with the wellbeing of other in-group members
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). While I do not consider out-group re-
sentment directly, it can be considered the inverse of in-group solidarity, i.e., as an other-regarding
utility function that assigns negative weight to the wellbeing of out-group members. In either case,
the result is a more exclusive sense of “us” that does not include “them”. Importantly, this concept
of solidarity implies a higher willingness to redistribute part of one’s income to in-group members
compared to the out-group (Costa-Font and Cowell, 2014; Holm, 2016).
The exclusiveness of in-group solidarities varies based on each group’s socioeconomic and
geographical distribution. To see why, Figure 2.2 considers several types of cleavage structures.
In each panel, the ellipses represent each group’s in-group solidarity.3 These circles of solidarity
show the range of people with whom group members feel stronger affinity on the basis of shared
ascriptive identities, and, accordingly, to whom they would more willingly redistribute part of their
income. Each circle, notably, varies in its overlap with the two other social categories, income
and geography, depending on the cleavage structure. In some cases, in-group solidarity includes
all income brackets and regions, while in others it covers just parts of each dimension. Income
and geography, therefore, can become useful social categories that either cross-cut or reinforce
ascriptive group identities, to use the classic terminology of Lipset and Rokkan (1967).
As a baseline example, Panel A in Figure 2.2 simulates a perfectly homogeneous society with a
single ascriptive identity group. In this case, all else equal, we can expect relatively strong national
solidarity that includes most members regardless of their income and region. Panel B, by contrast,
shows a divided society with two identity groups and two solidarity circles. In this particular
case, however, the cleavage structure is cross-cutting: members of both groups distribute equally
3The ellipses are calculated as the two-dimensional 85% confidence region of each group.
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across all incomes and regions. Accordingly, similar shares in both groups experience the same
living conditions, face comparable economic risks, and encounter out-group members on a regular
basis. Moreover, even if there is some positive in-group solidarity, neither income nor geography
provides a distinguishing social category. The result is overlapping solidarity circles that, similar
to a homogeneous society, include all classes and regions.
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(B) Cross−Cutting Cleavages
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(C) Intergroup Inequality
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Figure 2.2: Circles of Solidarity under Different Cleavage Structures
This is not the case in the bottom two panels, where ascriptive divisions are reinforced by
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class or geography and thus create more exclusive solidarities. Panel C illustrates a case with
high intergroup inequality, whereby one identity group is strictly richer than the other. Under
these conditions, one group’s solidarity is limited to middle and higher income citizens while the
other’s solidarity is confined to poorer ones. Panel D, meanwhile, illustrates a case with high
regional separation, whereby each identity group is concentrated in a different part of the country.
In this scenario, each group’s solidarity is limited to residents of a certain region. In these two
cases, then, class and geography become distinguishing social categories that reinforce ascriptive
identity divisions.
While I emphasize the boundaries of solidarity, its salience should be higher as well in the
bottom two panels. Social and political psychologists have found that group identities grow more
cohesive and significant when several cleavages reinforce rather than cut across one another (De-
schamps and Doise, 1978; Brown and Turner, 1979; Vanbeselaere, 1991; Brewer, 2000; Gay,
2004). According to these studies, members of ascriptive identity groups develop stronger in-
group solidarity when their sense of common descent is buttressed by other shared traits, among
them similar socioeconomic conditions or geographical environment. The same factors also in-
crease antagonism toward out-group members, who seem more foreign and unrelatable. Thus,
the in-group solidarities shown in panels C and D are not only more exclusive but should also be
stronger than in Panels A and B.
The basic theoretical setup, then, reinforces the expectations laid out in the micro-behavioral
literature: higher intergroup inequality or geographic separation should create more exclusive and
salient in-group solidarities. In these cases, accordingly, we should also expect a lower willingness
to redistribute income to out-group members. Yet, what are the specific redistributive implications
of these preferences?
2.3 From Preferences to Redistributive Outcomes
Even as intergroup inequality and regional segregation decrease the motivation for intergroup
redistribution, the transition from general preferences to policy outcomes is not straightforward. In
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this shift, I analyze ascriptive identity groups as unitary political actors. Accordingly, for simplicity
and focus, I blackbox each group’s inner politics, including internal factions and elite-grassroots
dynamics, and assume that they eventually act on their aggregate interests. Moreover, I also assume
reelection-seeking politicians that always represent the preferences of the identity groups within
their electoral coalitions. My theoretical discussion, therefore, refers directly to ascriptive identity
groups when hypothesizing about policymaking decisions.
Contrary to what some theoretical and empirical models imply, redistributive policymaking
is not a dichotomous choice between more or fewer government benefits for everyone. Indeed,
by this simplistic logic, in-group solidarity and out-group resentment would induce all groups to
sacrifice their own interests in order to undermine those of others. In reality, however, welfare
policies inherently prioritize certain needs, groups, and communities over others. In particular,
welfare programs often use various social categories—wage, specific needs, past payroll contribu-
tions, citizenship, and so on—as criteria for government benefit provision. This point is especially
important in consolidated democracies with ascriptive divisions. Contemporary democracies are
formally committed to the rule of law and to equal political rights, rendering income redistribution
by explicit ethnic, racial, or religious categories illegitimate. However, when these identities align
with other social attributes, such as income and geography, the latter can be used as proxies for
the former. Intergroup differences in income and geography, however, have different redistributive
policy implications. Let us consider each in turn.
2.3.1 High Intergroup Inequality: Regressive Redistribution
First, what are redistributive implications of ascriptive diversity with high intergroup inequality,
as shown earlier in Panel C in Figure 2.2? In this case, most members of one identity group are
strictly richer than most members of the other group. Hence, the former would prioritize welfare
policies that address the needs of middle and higher classes and would underprioritize programs
targeting the poor, most of whom are out-group members.
On this point, it is useful to consider two of the welfare state’s primary roles. First, by re-
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distributing income from rich to poor, welfare policies reduce the inequalities created by market
forces. This capacity, by its nature, benefits lower classes more than richer ones. Second, welfare
policies provide social insurance against diverse socioeconomic risks. Different risks, however,
vary in the level of threat that they present to different socioeconomic classes. Some risks, like
age-related complications or chronic disability, loom over everyone: both rich and poor grow old
and may suffer from enduring health problems or accidents. Moreover, both aging and chronic
disability hurt one’s employment capacity and thus undermine the occupational advantage held by
high-level workers. By contrast, other risks, like sustained unemployment, material deprivation, or
sudden short-term healthcare costs, threaten lower classes more severely than others. The middle
and higher classes can deal with these problems more easily given their stabler professions, better
access to private insurance, and higher disposable income and savings. The latter risks, therefore,
induce greater interclass redistribution than the former.
Hence, when some ascriptive identity groups are richer than others, their increased in-group
bias should undermine only programs focused on income redistribution and ones targeting lower-
class needs. Programs that cover cross-class risks, by contrast, should remain protected given the
in-group interests of middle-class and rich identity groups.
In addition to underinvestment in certain programs, richer identity groups can also limit the
access that poorer groups have to shared welfare programs. In particular, lower classes can be
excluded based on their status in the labor market, where many developed economies experience
growing segmentation between different tiers of workers. As research on this topic shows, there
is an increasing divergence between so-called “insiders,” workers with relatively secure jobs and
strong political capital, and “outsiders,” low-skilled, temporary, and vulnerable workers that often
have high shares of minorities and immigrants (Rueda, 2005; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Iversen
and Soskice, 2015). Richer groups, therefore, should also enact harsher access criteria to welfare
policies from which they themselves benefit.
These outcomes are driven primarily by the preferences of richer identity groups. Accordingly,
I implicitly assume that the latter have stronger political leverage than poorer identity groups. A
19
counterargument may suggest that if a rich identity group is sufficiently small, the poorer majority
could establish a coalition between the lower and middle classes and force broad income redistri-
bution (Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). I find
this possibility unlikely for two reasons. First, because of the income distribution’s left-skewed
nature, any group that is strictly richer than both the lower and middle classes must be very small
in size. This case, then, would be better described as a relatively homogeneous society rather than
a highly diverse one.4 As society becomes more diverse and the rich group grows in size, its mem-
bers will inevitably fill the ranks of the middle class and fracture a possible alliance with the poor
(Yakter, 2018). Second, even if the rich are a relative minority, a growing literature finds that pol-
icymaking reacts more strongly to their interests than to those of the poor (Gilens, 2012; Bartels,
2015; Peters and Ensink, 2015; Branham, Soroka and Wlezien, 2017). Hence, even a (sufficiently
sizable) rich minority can wield substantial political power. Accordingly, I expect more regressive
redistribution in such cases too.
2.3.2 High Regional Separation: Decentralized Redistribution
High regional separation should lead to somewhat different outcomes. When ascriptive iden-
tity groups reside in different geographical subunits, as illustrated in Panel D in Figure 2.2, their
solidarity circles are structured along regional lines. In this case, the sense of “us” overlaps with
one’s subnational community rather than her socioeconomic class. In fact, when each group has
wide income distributions, as in Panel D, its members should develop a relatively high interclass
solidarity within their own region.
This logic implies that identity groups that concentrate in different regions would prefer to
redistribute their income only within their subnational borders. Moreover, they may support rel-
atively progressive welfare programs within their regions. The result, therefore, should be higher
decentralization of redistributive programs at the expense of a comprehensive national system. Ac-
4Empirically, it is hard to find many current instances of very small but strictly rich minorities in contemporary
developed democracies. Examples of very small privileged minorities in developing regions, typically the result of
colonial legacies, indicate strong protection of their economic interests (e.g., whites in South Africa, ethnic Russians
in former Soviet republics, or ethnic Chinese in various countries in Southeast Asia).
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cordingly, contrary to high intergroup inequality, regional segregation should lead to lower national
investment in all types of redistributive programs, not just ones that cater to certain classes.
This prediction has two important caveats. The first caveat is that my argument requires suf-
ficiently large geographical units. Much of the micro-behavioral research on intergroup contact
and prejudice has focused on residential segregation. However, these units are largely irrelevant
for my theoretical framework for two reasons. First, neighborhoods, towns, and counties are un-
suited to manage extensive welfare programs on their own. While these units can supply some
complementary social services or collect local taxes, they do not have the institutional scale and
capacity to administer complex redistributive programs and/or revenue extraction. Second, while
individuals may feel some personal attachment to their residential environments, deep ascriptive
identities typically do not evolve around such small units. Similarly, municipal elites rarely mobi-
lize residents on national issues based on local identities. By contrast, there are multiple examples
of identity groups that treat their broader regions as historical homelands and mobilize politically
to gain larger territorial autonomy. Two of these instances, in Belgium and in Spain, are examined
in depth in later chapters.
The second caveat is that regional separation can vary in its symmetry. Intergroup inequality
inherently creates a redistributive conflict between richer and poorer identity groups. Regional
segregation, by contrast, can be either symmetrical or conflictual. The hypothetical case shown
in panel D includes two symmetrically isolated groups that could amicably agree on welfare de-
volution. In most cases, however, only some groups are concentrated in specific regions (e.g.,
francophones in Canada or certain ethno-linguistic minorities in Spain) while others are dispersed
over multiple parts of the country. In these cases, group interests should be more conflictual, es-
pecially if the scattered groups prefer centralized programs. Hence, I expect that cases with high
regional segregation would have more welfare decentralization on average, but the extent of this
devolution could depend on their political leverage and on the preferences of other groups. This
power balance, moreover, may also vary by case-specific factors such as political institutions, rel-
ative group sizes, and, as I discuss next, income differences.
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2.3.3 Inequality and Segregation Combined: Concurrent Processes
What happens when both intergroup inequality and regional segregation are high? Under such
conditions, I argue, both factors should exert concurrent pressures for more regressive redistribu-
tion and for higher welfare decentralization. To consider why, Figure 2.3 illustrates such a case
graphically. As the plot shows, the groups are separated both regionally and socioeconomically,
and, accordingly, there is high regional inequality along ascriptive identity lines. As a result, as-
criptive identity groups from richer regions would prefer to prevent progressive transfers to identity
group in other, poorer regions. Poorer groups, by contrast, face conflicting pressures. While they
may prefer to manage social policies locally due to their regional solidarity, they would never-
theless benefit from national programs that redistribute income from richer regions. Accordingly,
they should support higher interregional transfers and have a weaker preference for decentraliza-
tion compared to the rich group.
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Figure 2.3: Circles of Solidarity with Both Intergroup Inequality and Regional Segregation
Therefore, rather than a substitutive or multiplicative effect of geography and class, I expect
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to find an additive combination of both: higher welfare devolution and more regressive redistri-
bution that underprioritizes the needs of poorer regions. This outcome should be driven primarily
by the richer, and presumably politically stronger, identity groups. Whereas I expect to identify
these trends on average, their exact scope would vary based on the political leverage held by richer
groups in each case. This combined expectation thus reinforces the core predictions made sepa-
rately with regard to income and geography.
This expectation is also supported by past research on interregional redistribution in federal
states. Similar to my argument, these studies show that regional inequality creates a deeper in-
terregional conflict on fiscal decentralization and redistribution. Rich regions, in particular, tend
to demand higher redistributive decentralization (Beramendi, 2012; Holm, 2016; Holm and Geys,
2018). Their ability to act on this preference, moreover, varies by their institutional power (Bera-
mendi, 2012; Rogers, 2016). This literature, however, does not pay particular attention to ascriptive
diversity or intergroup differences. My theoretical framework, therefore, situates these insights in
a broader discussion about ascriptive identity politics and their different contexts.
2.3.4 Mechanisms
My theoretical framework infers expected redistributive outcomes based on the interests of
identity groups under different social structures. Yet, how exactly do group interests translate to
policy outcomes? Three types of mechanisms come to mind. The first type of mechanisms oper-
ates through bottom-up pressures by regular group members. As the micro-behavioral literature
makes clear, ascriptive identities can be a central component in people’s social and political iden-
tities, nurtured from the bottom up by family, social norms, and, as my argument stresses, social
structures and hierarchies. Identity group members have several tools to pressure policymakers
into advancing their collective interests, from voting in elections to more advanced forms of politi-
cal activism. Two attributes are particularly important. First, richer groups, as noted, tend to have a
stronger influence on policymaking than their numbers alone would suggest by virtue of their eco-
nomic and political capital. In cases with high intergroup inequality, we should, therefore, expect
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policymakers to be more receptive to these groups’ demands. Second, due to their geographic con-
centration, regionally segregated groups tend to have stronger social capital, better coordination,
and lower barriers to collective action than dispersed electorates. Accordingly, in cases with high
regional segregation, we may expect to see more organized political action, regional movements,
and public pressure on elected politicians. In multilevel systems, moreover, geographical concen-
tration can dominate regional politics, which can, in turn, create institutional leverage on national
politicians.
The second type of mechanisms operates in the other direction, from the top down. Elites, often
acting on their own political and economic interests, can find ascriptive identities and intergroup
tensions a useful tool to gain public support. To harness these forces, elites can articulate and
cultivate in-group solidarities and out-group resentments through the media, political campaigns,
and public rhetoric that emphasizes the in-group’s redistributive interests. For instance, when
identity groups are segregated regionally, local elites can mobilize voters’ ascriptive identities to
demand larger political autonomy that would increase their power. As another example, rich elites
can cultivate the resentment of middle- and upper-class voters against poorer minorities to promote
regressive policies that benefit their own bank accounts. And, in both examples, the mere reference
to the redistributive interests of identity groups can increase voter participation and partisanship.
Nevertheless, to be effective, these tactics require an already receptive audience ready to pick on
these cues.
Finally, a third type of mechanisms operates through political institutions, which can provide
policymaking leverage to different identity groups. Formal power-sharing institutions play a par-
ticularly important part. Some institutions, for example, provide veto power to different regions
or ethnic minorities that would otherwise be dominated by politically stronger groups. Similarly,
electoral institutions can increase or decrease the national representation of territorially concen-
trated identity groups through districting and proportionality. Constitutional protections, too, can
hinder the ability of strong identity groups to advance their interests aggressively at the expense of
other groups. At the same time, these political institutions are not an independent explanatory force
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in my theory. They do not eliminate cleavage structures and subsequent redistributive pressures,
but rather determine the pace, leverage, and concrete policy tools through which these pressures
translate to de facto policies. Moreover, institutions are often shaped endogenously by the same
social structures and intergroup preferences that stand at the heart of my theoretical propositions.
Indeed, identity groups that wish to undermine the political influence of poorer minorities or of
other regions are expected to support institutional structures that would facilitate these goals bet-
ter. I explore and test this point further in the empirical chapters, particularly the case studies.
2.4 Testable Hypotheses
The theoretical framework discussed in this chapter produces several testable hypotheses about
the effect of ascriptive diversity, class, and geography on redistribution. Table 2.1 summarizes the
primary theoretical propositions and the redistributive implications that I expect to find.
These hypotheses can be grouped by several core arguments. First and foremost, my theoretical
framework suggests that higher ascriptive diversity in itself is an insufficient condition for different
outcomes compared to more homogeneous democracies. Accordingly, I do not expect to find a
uniformly negative relationship between ascriptive diversity in itself and redistribution. However,
ascriptive diversity does affect redistribution negatively through the mediation and moderation
of class and geography, to use the terminology of Baron and Kenny (1986). I thus expect that
ascriptive diversity should operate in interaction with the latter two factors.
Second, as the third column in Table 2.1 indicates, my theoretical framework assumes that
both intergroup inequality and regional segregation should create more exclusive forms of group
solidarity. These group solidarities, however, should be different in nature: higher intergroup
inequality should deepen interclass tensions, while regional segregation should deepen regional
identities at the expense of national solidarity.
Third, the interaction of ascriptive diversity with inequality and with segregation should lead
to different sets of redistributive implications. While both should correlate with less government
investment in welfare policy, higher intergroup inequality should suppress programs that target
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Table 2.1: Summary of the Theory and Empirical Implications
Ascriptive Cleavage Circles of
Diversity Structure Solidarity Redistributive Implications
Homogeneous — National High investment and inclusiveness
Diverse Cross-Cutting Overlapping High investment and inclusiveness
Diverse Intergroup Class-based Regressive and Exclusionary:
income 1. Lower aggregate investment
inequality 2. Investment particularly low in
programs targeting lower classes
3. Lower inclusiveness in programs
for all classes
Diverse Intergroup Regional Decentralized:
regional 1. Lower aggregate investment
segregation 2. Negative effect spread out across
all national programs
3. Higher redistributive decentraliza-
tion
Diverse Inequality and Class-based Concurrent (additive) pressures:
segregation and regional higher redistributive decentralization
and more regressive transfers
poorer groups and limit the inclusiveness of cross-class programs. Regional segregation, by con-
trast, should dampen investment in all types of national programs and increase welfare decentral-
ization to subnational units. Both factors, moreover, should operate additively rather than cancel
out one another.
The next few chapters test these hypotheses empirically using both cross-sectional time-series
data from a large sample of countries and years and detailed case studies of three representative
countries. I select three cases that correspond broadly with the three perfect types discussed above:
the US (high intergroup inequality), Belgium (high regional segregation), and Spain (both factors
together). The quantitative analysis seeks broad and robust correlations that corroborate each hy-
pothesis, while the case studies provide a detailed examination of how these relationships connect
together in specific instances. The next chapter focuses on the first of these tasks.
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CHAPTER III
The Heterogeneous Effect of Diversity: Time-Series
Cross-Sectional Analysis, 1980–2011
3.1 Introduction
The first part of my empirical inquiry analyzes a broad array of redistributive outcomes using
quantitative data from 22 developed democracies between the years 1980 and 2011. The purpose
of this chapter is to identify repeated empirical patterns in a relatively large sample of countries
and years while also controlling for other political, social, and economic forces that operate in the
background. The patterns that I find support my hypotheses. All else equal, democracies with
higher ascriptive diversity invest less in redistributive programs when their various identity groups
are more unequal and/or more segregated regionally. The mediating effect of class and geography,
moreover, correlates with different types of outcomes. Intergroup inequality suppresses invest-
ment in programs that target lower-class needs and deems cross-class programs more exclusionary.
Intergroup regional segregation, by contrast, implicates all types of national programs and corre-
lates with higher redistributive decentralization. Thus, I find that redistributive policies in most
democracies are constrained by their ascriptive cleavage structures even as they react separately to
short-term economic and political changes.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by setting up my key explanatory variables—structural
measures of ascriptive diversity, intergroup income inequality, and intergroup regional segregation—
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and discuss my operational choices. I then use these variables with cross-sectional survey data to
examine my argument’s premises about intergroup solidarities, and specifically their negative im-
plication on public perceptions of interclass solidarity and on national identification. The remain-
der of the chapter examines the interactive relationship between ascriptive diversity, the mediation
of inequality and geography, and a set of redistributive outcomes: aggregate spending on social
services, social spending by program types, the level of inclusion in key social security programs,
and welfare decentralization. The chapter concludes with the primary lessons learned from the
quantitative data.
3.2 Key Explanatory Variables: Diversity, Inequality, and Segregation
How should diversity, intergroup income inequality, and regional segregation be measured
quantitatively across multiple countries? The answer is not straightforward and requires several
nontrivial choices. Let us consider each factor in turn.
3.2.1 Ascriptive Diversity
My first explanatory variable is ascriptive diversity. In line with the current literature, I measure
ascriptive diversity using the one minus Herfindahl index of social fractionalization.1 Substan-
tively, the index reflects the odds that two randomly selected members of a given society would
belong to different groups. As society grows more diverse, so do these odds increase.
There has been a significant improvement in the quantity and quality of ascriptive fraction-
alization indices in recent years. Nevertheless, these indices suffer from two notable problems.
First, lacking a clear criterion of choice, the multitude of indices raises the risk of post hoc cherry-
picking based on their correlation with outcomes of interest. Second, available indices calculate
separate scores for different ascriptive identity dimensions, typically by race, ethnicity, religion,
and/or language. As I have argued earlier, however, the ascriptive nature of these identity types
1The index is calculated as F = 1 −∑Gi=1 p2i , where pi is the relative share of group i in the general population
and G is the total number of groups.
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should have similar political implications when they form salient social cleavages. This imposed
separation, accordingly, makes it difficult to examine comparable processes in similarly divided
countries that differ only in the type of active identities that developed there historically, be it race
(the US), language (Belgium), religion (Ireland), or ethnicity (Israel).
One way to deal with this problem is to calculate heterogeneity scores based only on each
country’s politically salient identities (e.g., Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). This approach,
however, is problematic for my hypotheses, which imply that the redistributive implications of
ascriptive identities vary by their interplay with class and geography. A measure that considers
only politically dominant identities risks absorbing, and thus obscuring, the mediating role of
these factors and their differential implications. A broader measure of heterogeneity in all types of
ascriptive identities is needed to test these relationships.
To deal with these problems, I calculate an original Ascriptive Identity Fractionalization (hence-
forth AIF) index that integrates multiple sources and identity types into a single country-score. I
draw from four databases that rely on different types of primary sources: (1) three indices of eth-
nic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization based on encyclopedic sources (Alesina et al., 2003);
(2) the Ethnic Power Relations’ index of ethnic fractionalization in politically relevant groups
based on expert surveys (EPR; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009); (3) the Cross-cutting Cleav-
ages Dataset’s two indices of ethnic and religious fractionalization based on survey data (Selway,
2011); and (4) an index of linguistic fractionalization based on a genealogical linguistic tree analy-
sis (Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ortı´n and Wacziarg, 2012). I assign equal weight to each identity type: I first
average across all indices of a particular dimension, creating separate fractionalization scores for
ethnicity, religion, and language, and then average again across all three identity types to produce
a single AIF score per country.2 Figure 3.1 summarizes the index’s structure.
Due to data limitations, the AIF index is time-invariant, i.e., it assigns a fixed score per country
for the entire sample period. Although this is not ideal, ascriptive heterogeneity is considered quite
stable in the literature, particularly over relatively short periods of 30 years or less (Alesina et al.,
2Most indices count race under ethnicity, so it is not included separately. Although they rely on different primary
sources, the different indices correlate strongly along their respective identity dimensions.
29
Figure 3.1: The Ascriptive Identity Fractionalization (AIF) Index
2003, 161). To corroborate this assumption, I recreated the AIF index using data from Patsiurko,
Campbell and Hall (2012), who calculate ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization scores
for 18 of the countries in my sample in 1985 and then in 2000. The strong bivariate correlation
between the two periods (r = 0.93, p < 0.000) implies high stability over time.
There are, of course, growing immigration inflows to Western democracies in recent years.
However, this should not destabilize the AIF scores significantly during my sample period. First,
immigrant populations arriving by the mid-2000s are included in the data. Indeed, the bivariate
correlation between the AIF index and foreign-born population shares in 2011 (OECD data) is
relatively high (r = 0.66, p < 0.005). Second, later immigration is relatively gradual: with
few exceptions, annual immigration inflow rates leading to 2011 are less than 1% of the host
population. Third, newer immigrants are not absorbed immediately into the cleavage structure
and the political system (Bird, Saalfeld and Wu¨st, 2011; Dancygier et al., 2015) and should thus
influence policymaking quite slowly. Nevertheless, I reestimated all my models with an additional
control for annual immigration inflows as a share of the population (OECD data). Despite a smaller
sample size, my findings remain robust.
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3.2.2 Intergroup Inequality
My theory contends that higher ascriptive diversity would influence redistributive outcomes as
a function of class and geography. The second explanatory variable, therefore, is the level of in-
come inequality between different identity groups. I measure intergroup income differences using
the Cross-Cutting Cleavages Dataset’s score of income cross-cuttingness with ascriptive identities
(Selway, 2011). The dataset aggregates data from various public opinion surveys from 1981–2012
to evaluate the distribution of group membership in one cleavage across another. Two cleavages
cross-cut if members who cluster together in the first cleavage distribute widely across the sec-
ond cleavage’s categories. Conversely, they reinforce one another when the same members cluster
together in both cleavages. Similar to the AIF measure, I average across two ascriptive identity
scores in the dataset: cross-cuttingness of income and ethnicity and cross-cuttingness of income
and religion.3 Since high cross-cuttingness implies relative income equality across groups, I invert
the score by subtracting it from 1 to reflect intergroup inequality.
This measure is relatively robust to concerns of endogeneity with redistribution levels. In
particular, the correlation between two distributions—in this case, in income and in ascriptive
identities—is preferable to indices that calculate intergroup inequality using the Gini coefficient
of mean group incomes (e.g. Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Houle, 2015). The latter capture the
level of income dispersion between different groups, which government taxes and transfers tend
to narrow. By contrast, my measure reflects their relative distributions binned by income brackets,
which should not change much due to welfare policies even if the gaps narrow. Nevertheless, to
validate the exogeneity assumption, I reestimated my models with an alternative measure of group
inequality that relies on economic development rather than income and found substantively similar
results. I elaborate on this test later in the chapter and in Appendix C.
Like the AIF index, the intergroup inequality scores are time-invariant due to data limitations.
3In the dataset, Selway (2011) counts linguistic groups under ethnicity. Additionally, Greece has no data on ethnic-
ity/income cross-cuttingness, but I nonetheless keep it in the sample using only its religion/income cross-cuttingness
score. Ethnicity plays only a minor role in Greece: its combined ethnic fractionalization score is 0.094 compared to a
sample mean of 0.284. As a robustness check, I omitted Greece from all my models and found substantively similar
results.
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This constraint, too, should not pose a fundamental problem. As I noted earlier, welfare policies
lower income gaps and insure against social risks, but they do not address deeper problems under-
lying social mobility. Rather, changes to mobility and stratification require long-term investment
in education, infrastructure, and economic opportunities for underprivileged identity groups. Not
only do such programs depend on the cooperation of politically strong groups, but they should also
take years, if not generations, to make meaningful changes. That said, I corroborate this stability
assumption in two ways. First, I analyzed the intersurvey stability of intergroup inequality over
time using the raw data pooled by Selway (2011). Specifically, I analyzed the intergroup inequality
scores of 97 comparable surveys—surveys conducted by the same data-collecting project, in the
same country, using the same question wording, but in different years—and calculated the annual
difference rate between all comparable dyads. The results do not show a meaningful temporal
change in the relationship between identity and income. This procedure and its findings are re-
ported in more detail in Appendix A. Second, the case studies analyzed in chapters 4–6 support
this assumption as well. The US, Belgium, and Spain all demonstrate that intergroup economic
differences change slowly, if at all, typically as a result of exogenous economic and structural
processes.
3.2.3 Intergroup Regional Segregation
The third and final explanatory variable is the level of regional segregation between different
identity groups. I measure intergroup regional segregation using the combination of two sources.
First, similar to the inequality measure, I average across the Cross-Cutting Cleavages Dataset’s
scores of geographical cross-cuttingness with ethnicity and with religion, again inverted to reflect
segregation. The majority of surveys ask respondents about their residence in key administrative
units, typically regions or large provinces. As noted earlier, this unit level is appropriate theoreti-
cally: unlike residential units, regional or provincial areas can play a central part in the construction
of ascriptive identities and are better suited to manage independent redistributive services than the
former.
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Country surveys, however, are typically designed to represent national demographics and may
thus over- or under-represent specific regions. To account for possible regional biases and in-
crease measure reliability, I weigh the cross-cuttingness scores by a second measure of intergroup
segregation created by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). Rather than surveys, the latter calculate
regional segregation indices by ethnicity, religion, and language using formal population estimates
from administrative regions. Unfortunately, these indices do not include all countries in my sam-
ple. Accordingly, I use them only for countries with available scores. As with the AIF score, I use
a two-step calculation: first, I average across both sources by each identity type (where possible)
and, second, I average across the latter.4 Since the two indices use different formulas of intergroup
segregation, I normalize both on a scale of 0–1 prior to the calculation.
The relationship between the AIF index and the two mediating variables, both normalized
on a scale of 0–1 for better comparability, is plotted in Figure 3.2. While there is some positive
correlation with ascriptive diversity (r = 0.43 for intergroup inequality and r = 0.57 for intergroup
segregation), it is neither linear nor overly strong.
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Figure 3.2: The Relationships between AIF, Intergroup Inequality, and Regional Segregation
4The corresponding dimensions in both sources correlate relatively well.
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3.3 Premises: Class Conflict and Regional Identification
Before examining redistributive outcomes, I begin with a brief corroboration of my two main
theoretical premises. The first premise assumes that higher intergroup inequality (but not regional
segregation) in diverse societies should fracture interclass solidarity. The second premise assumes
that higher intergroup regional segregation (but not inequality) in diverse societies should increase
regional identities at the expense of national ones.
To test these premises, I use my three explanatory variables with data from two cross-sectional
surveys. First, I examine the level of perceived class conflict using the Social Inequality IV module
(2009) from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). These data include 17 countries
from my sample.5 I measure perceptions of class conflict using survey responses to the following
question: “In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups.
In your opinion, in [Respondent’s country] how much conflict is there between the working class
and the middle class?” The answers range on a 4-point scale from “there are no conflicts” to
“very strong conflicts”. The question is particularly useful given its focus on tensions between the
lower and middle classes, a critical coalition that can force higher income redistribution upon the
rich (Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). The
models also control for individual-level differences in age, sex, education level, religiosity, and
full employment.
I estimate responses to this question using a multilevel linear regression with random intercepts
by country. My main hypotheses posit that intergroup inequality, but not regional segregation, con-
ditions the relationship between ascriptive diversity and class solidarity. To test this conditionality,
I interact ascriptive diversity with inequality and with segregation, separately and then side by side
(Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006; Kam and Franzese, 2007). As noted earlier, I normalize both
intergroup inequality and regional segregation on a 0–1 scale to better compare their moderating
effects.
The results are presented in table 3.1. Model 1 finds that ascriptive diversity in itself is not
5The survey does not have data from Canada, Greece, Ireland, Japan, and the Netherlands.
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Table 3.1: Perceptions of Class Conflict: Multi-Level Linear Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country-Level
AIF -0.146 -1.137 -0.129 -1.219
(0.394) (0.716) (0.720) (0.752)
Inequality -1.907∗∗∗ -1.933∗∗∗
(0.713) (0.652)
AIF × Inequality 4.128∗∗ 4.229∗∗∗
(1.759) (1.553)
Segregation -0.295 -0.373
(1.050) (0.819)
AIF × Segregation 0.527 0.781
(2.569) (2.115)
Individual-Level
Age Group -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Female 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Education -0.057∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Religiosity 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Full Employment -0.041∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 2.234∗∗∗ 2.701∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗ 2.741∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.254) (0.243) (0.285)
Random intercept variance (country) -1.711∗∗∗ -1.911∗∗∗ -1.717∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.198) (0.211) (0.186)
Residual variance -0.408∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Observations 19,160 19,160 19,160 19,160
Countries 17 17 17 17
AIC 38,742 38,739 38,746 38,743
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
correlated with greater perceptions of conflict between the lower and middle classes. Model 2,
however, finds that it has a positive and statistically significant effect on perceptions of class con-
flict when intergroup inequality grows. By contrast, model 3 does not identify a similar interaction
35
with intergroup segregation. As model 4 shows, these differential results remain robust when the
two interactions are estimated together. The findings thus corroborate my premise that ascriptive
diversity with higher intergroup inequality, but not intergroup segregation, fractures the sense of
solidarity between the lower and middle classes in diverse societies. To reinforce this point fur-
ther, I used the same models to estimate responses to a similar question about the level of conflict
between rich and poor. None of the key explanatory variables, or their interactions, were signifi-
cant. This null finding implies that these cleavage structures do not create a general sense of social
discord, but specifically splinter the key alliance between the poor and the middle class.
The conditional relationship found in Table 3.1 is illustrated graphically in the left-hand panel
of Figure 3.3. Based on model 2, the graph simulates the effect that a hypothetical switch from
complete ascriptive homogeneity to complete ascriptive diversity (i.e., from an AIF score of 0 to
an AIF score of 1) would have on perceptions of class conflict conditional on different values of
intergroup inequality. As the plot shows, higher ascriptive diversity does not have a statistically
significant effect on perceptions of class conflict under low levels of intergroup inequality. How-
ever, when the latter are sufficiently high and growing, greater ascriptive diversity increases these
perceptions on average, all else equal.
To explore my second premise, I examine the implications of the same factors on the tension
between regional and national identities. I do so with data from waves 2, 3, and 4 (1990–1994,
1995–1998, and 1999–2004) of the World Values Survey (WVS), which include 11 countries from
my sample.6 As the dependent variable, I use the following question: “To which of these ge-
ographical groups would you say you belong first of all?” The answers include one’s locality,
region, country, continent, or the world. I recode the answers as a dummy variable that indicates
the choice of region over all other options, including one’s country. I include the same individual-
level control variables as before, as well as fixed effects for survey waves. The probability of
choosing one’s region is estimated using a multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts by
6The survey includes data from Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and the United States. Despite its limited number of countries, the sample provides good variation
in the key explanatory variables.
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Figure 3.3: The Conditional Effect of Ascriptive Diversity on Perceptions of Class Conflict and on
Regional Identification as a Function of Inequality and of Segregation
country.
The results, shown in Table 3.2, are the complement of the previous findings. Once again,
ascriptive diversity in itself does not increase the probability of choosing one’s region as the first
political unit of identification. However, there is a positive and statistically significant interaction
with intergroup regional segregation: ascriptive diversity increases the probability to identify first
with one’s region when identity groups concentrate more distinctly in different parts of the country.
By contrast, this interactive effect is not found with higher intergroup inequality. As before, these
findings remain unchanged when both interactions are included in the same model.
To better interpret this relationship, the right-hand panel of Figure 3.3 simulates the average
effect that a switch from complete ascriptive homogeneity to complete ascriptive diversity has on
the probability that respondents would identify with their regions first. The horizontal axis exam-
ines how this influence changes conditional on different values of intergroup regional segregation.7
The graph underscores two insights, both fitting my expectations. First, greater ascriptive diversity
7Since the logit function depends on all control variables, I hold them at their mean values when calculating the
conditional effect. The simulation is based on model 2 in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Regional Identification: Multi-Level Logistic Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country-Level
AIF -0.742 -3.554 -2.897∗∗∗ -2.209
(0.555) (2.887) (0.745) (2.014)
Inequality -1.920 -0.173
(2.445) (1.776)
AIF × Inequality 8.726 -1.786
(9.027) (6.792)
Segregation -2.978∗∗ -2.743∗
(1.415) (1.450)
AIF × Segregation 10.867∗∗∗ 10.793∗∗∗
(3.837) (3.940)
Individual-Level
Age Group -0.059∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Female -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Education 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Religiosity -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Full Employment 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.037
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Constant -1.096∗∗∗ -0.533 -0.656∗∗ -0.698
(0.243) (0.693) (0.267) (0.482)
Random intercept variance (country) 0.089∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.031∗
(0.041) (0.038) (0.017) (0.016)
Wave Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,341 18,341 18,341 18,341
Countries 11 11 11 11
AIC 15,453 15,456 15,448 15,451
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
increases the probability that citizens identify with their regions when regional segregation is suf-
ficiently high and as it grows further. Second, and perhaps less trivial, greater ascriptive diversity
lowers the odds of regional identification when intergroup segregation is low. In other words, when
identity groups in more diverse societies are relatively intermixed geographically, respondents find
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it harder to identify with their regions than in more homogeneous societies. This finding supports
my general argument about the importance of national contexts: ascriptive identities can have dif-
fering, and at times even opposite, influences depending on the social cleavages that reinforce or
cross cut them.
Hence, both premises are supported by the data: intergroup inequality undermines interclass
solidarity in diverse societies while regional segregation increases attachment to one’s region. My
larger question, nevertheless, asks how these different pressures shape redistributive outcomes, a
set of hypotheses to which I turn next.
3.4 Redistributive Outcomes
3.4.1 Data, Variables, and Model Specification
My primary dataset of redistributive outcomes includes annual macro-comparative data from
22 democracies between 1980 and 2011. The countries included in my sample are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The panel is unbalanced, i.e., not all countries have available data
for all years and models.
3.4.1.1 Dependent Variables: Four Aspects of Redistribution
To test my theoretical framework, I examine several aspects of redistribution: (1) the overall
size of the welfare state, (2) its internal prioritization of different social needs, (3) its inclusive-
ness, and (4) its decentralization. Each aspect is measured and analyzed using separate dependent
variables. Let us consider each in turn.
The first dependent variable examines the overall level of government investment in welfare
policy. Past research has used several measures of redistribution levels, each with its own strengths
and weaknesses. I operationalize redistributive levels as each country’s annual public social spend-
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ing as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) using the OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX)
Database. The advantages of these data, for my purposes, are their standardized and annual for-
mat, their availability for a large number of countries and years, and their inclusion of both direct
cash transfers and in-kind services. Furthermore, this measure correlates well with alternative vari-
ables, such as the relative reduction rate in the Gini coefficient of household income before and
after taxes and transfers (r = 0.79, p < 0.000, calculated using OECD data). Although the latter is
more limited in countries and years, I use it later in the chapter as a robustness test for my findings.
Based on my hypotheses, I expect that overall social spending levels would be lower when, all
else equal, greater ascriptive diversity is reinforced by higher intergroup inequality or by higher
intergroup segregation.
The second set of dependent variables disaggregate public social spending by several cate-
gories. In line with my theoretical framework, I group spending on different programs by the type
of social needs that they address: (1) age-related benefits, (2) incapacity and sickness benefits, (3)
unemployment benefits, (4) social assistance and family benefits, and (5) public healthcare. All
else equal, I expect that more ascriptive diversity with higher intergroup inequality would under-
mine spending on the last three types, which address the needs of poorer groups more clearly.
Old-age and disability, conversely, should not be affected given their cross-class target audiences.
By contrast, I expect that interaction with higher intergroup segregation would lead to less spending
on all types of programs, reflecting lower investment in national programs as a whole.
The third set of dependent variables measure the level of inclusiveness in labor-market protec-
tion programs. I use data from the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Project (CWED2; Scruggs,
Jahn and Kuitto, 2014) on two key social security programs, unemployment and sick-pay insur-
ance.8 As a measure of their inclusiveness, I examine the share of labor force covered under each
program. All else equal, I expect that the interaction of higher ascriptive diversity with higher
intergroup inequality, but not with segregation, will dampen both programs’ coverage.
Finally, the fourth dependent variable is the log of effective redistributive decentralization. Fol-
8The CWED2 data do not include Israel.
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lowing Beramendi (2012, 213), I measure effective redistributive decentralization as the multipli-
cation of two factors: (1) the share of direct social transfers to households that are administered by
subnational authorities, calculated using Cusack’s Public Finance Database, and (2) regional fiscal
autonomy, measured as the degree of tax revenue decentralization (Stegarescu, 2005).9 Weighing
decentralization by fiscal autonomy gauges the de facto control that subnational units have over
the redistributive policies they administer (Rodden, 2004; Beramendi, 2012). I expect that, all else
equal, effective redistributive decentralization would increase when ascriptive diversity combines
with higher regional segregation, but not with intergroup inequality.
3.4.1.2 Control Variables
In addition to my primary explanatory variables, I also control for other factors that explain
cross-sectional and temporal differences in redistributive spending, inclusiveness, and decentral-
ization. When estimating social spending and coverage, I control for a set of institutional factors
(the number of institutional veto points), political factors (cabinet partisanship and union power),
and socioeconomic factors (unemployment rate, labor force participation, female participation in
the labor force, the share of elderly population, the log of trade, and the log of GDP per capita).
When estimating redistributive decentralization, I control for institutional factors (federalism
and proportional representation), economic factors (regional income inequality, the log of GDP
per capita, and GDP growth) and sociodemographic factors (the log of total population, population
density, and the share of urban population). Table 3.3 summarizes the full list of control variables,
their operationalization, and their data sources.
3.4.1.3 Empirical Specifications
My estimations consist of a series of pooled OLS regressions. Due to indications of panel-
specific heteroskedasticity and the likelihood of spatially correlated errors in social spending and
coverage data, their estimations calculate panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995,
9The available data are limited to the years 1980–1997 and exclude Israel and New Zealand.
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Table 3.3: Definitions and Sources of Control Variables
Variable Definition Data Source
Veto An additive index of veto points: (1) degree
of federalism, (2) presence of presidential-
ism, (3) degree of bicameralism, (4) use of
referenda, (5) degree of proportionality, (6)
presence of judicial review
Armingeon et al.
(2016)a
Left The share of cabinet portfolios held by left-
wing parties
Swank (2013), EJPR
Political Data
Yearbookb
ChristDem The share of cabinet portfolios held by
Christian-Democratic parties
Swank (2013)
CWB Centralization of wage bargaining Visser (2015)
Unemployment Unemployment rate as a share of the total la-
bor force
World Economic Out-
look Database
LabForce Civilian labor force participation as a share of
population aged 15 or above
OECD Labor Statistics
FemLabForce Female participation as a share of the civilian
labor force
OECD Labor Statistics
Elderly The share of population aged 65 or above World Development
Indicators
LogTrade The log of trade (the sum of exports and im-
ports of goods and services) as a share of
GDP
World Development
Indicators
LogGDP The log of gross domestic product based on
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita
World Economic Out-
look Database
RegInequality Cross-cuttingness of income and geography
(inverted)
Selway (2011)
Federalism Degree of Federalism Armingeon et al.
(2016)
Proportionality Degree of Electoral Proportionality Armingeon et al.
(2016)
LogPopulation The log of total population in country OECD
PopDensity Population density (total population divided by
land size in square kilometers)
World Development
Indicators
Urban The share of population living in urban areas World Development
Indicators
a I use Armingeon et al’s coding rules to calculate various components for Israel, which is missing form their
dataset.
b Swank’s database does not include Israel. I use his coding rules and data from the European Journal of Political
Research (EJPR) Political Data Yearbook to calculate the cabinet portfolio allocation for left parties in Israel
during all sample years. Israel does not have Christian-Democratic parties.
42
2011). I analyze social spending and coverage data using an error-correction model (ECM; David-
son et al., 1978; Beck, 1991; De Boef and Keele, 2008). The ECM specification is particularly
appropriate for social spending data given their slow change rate and strong serial autocorrelation.
This approach models the relationship between the outcome and explanatory variables as a stable
equilibrium that is occasionally disturbed by short-term shocks and then reverts to the longstanding
trend. These complex dynamics are estimated by regressing changes in the dependent variable on
the lagged values of the independent variables (long-term equilibrium relationship), their first dif-
ference (short-term disturbances), and the lagged value of the independent variable (the correction
back to equilibrium).10 In this particular application, some of the control variables—labor force
participation, female participation in the labor market, population aging, and logged trade—show
stable trends without notable short-term shocks. Accordingly, I only consider the first difference
of variables that exhibit sufficient short-term fluctuation to cause sudden shocks: the partisan com-
position of cabinets, centralization of wage bargaining, unemployment rates, and logged GDP per
capita.
My primary explanatory variables are time-invariant and thus estimated only in levels, i.e.,
they relate to the equilibrium relationship rather than to the higher-frequency ones. Their effect,
therefore, is modeled as a constant sociodemographic influence outside the dynamic adjustments
caused by political and economics factors. As before, I interact ascriptive diversity with inter-
group inequality and with regional segregation to test their hypothesized conditionality. Formally,
changes in redistribution levels and in coverage are modeled as follows:
∆Ri,t = α + β
′
1∆X1i,t + γ(Ri,t−1 − β′2X1i,t−1 − β′3X2i,t−1)+
β4AIFi × Inequalityi + β5AIFi × Segregationi + i,t
where β1 estimates the short-term effect of a vector of dynamic control variables X1, β2 and
β3 estimate the long-term effect of these dynamic variables and of stabler control variables X2,
10Following a series of Lagrange multiplier tests, most models also include the lagged first-difference of GDP (the
denominator of social spending) to eliminate remaining autocorrelation. The lagged change in the dependent variable
indicates that the complex dynamics include persistence in momentum as well.
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γ is the error-correction term capturing the adjustment rate back to equilibrium, and β4 and β5
estimates the interactive effects of my primary explanatory variables. My primary interest is in the
latter coefficients.
Effective redistributive decentralization, by contrast, tends to be stabler over time and is es-
timated using less dynamic factors. I therefore follow Beramendi (2012) and analyze these data
using a simpler OLS regression model with panel-specific AR(1) correction for autocorrelated
errors. Formally, the levels of effective redistributive decentralization are modeled as follows:
Di,t = α + β
′
1Xi,t + β2AIFi × Inequalityi + β3AIFi × Segregationi + i,t
i,t = ρi,t−1 + νi,t
Several alternative model specifications—including slower-changing independent variables,
fewer controls, a standard lagged dependent variable (LDV) model, and simpler cross-sectional
model with a between-effects estimator—support the same substantive conclusions despite their
relative weaknesses. I use the ECM as the baseline specification because it both controls for addi-
tional variables (unlike a simple cross-sectional model with fewer degrees of freedom) and captures
intricate temporal dynamics by separating stable relationships from short-term disturbances (un-
like a simpler Lagged Dependent Variable model). I elaborate upon these alternative specifications
later in this chapter and in Appendix C.
3.4.2 Findings
3.4.2.1 Aggregate Redistribution
The first set of findings, presented in Table 3.4, examines whether intergroup inequality and
segregation mediate the negative relationship between ascriptive diversity and aggregate social
spending. Contrary to the common macro-comparative argument, Model 1 finds that ascriptive di-
versity in itself does not have a statistically significant effect on annual changes in social spending.
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Table 3.4: Overall Public Social Spending: Error-Correction Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. PCSE Coef. PCSE Coef. PCSE Coef. PCSE
Structural Relationships
AIF -0.272 (0.236) 0.201 (0.253) 1.348∗∗∗ (0.413) 1.447∗∗∗ (0.402)
Segregation 2.358∗∗∗ (0.741) 2.146∗∗ (0.843)
AIF × Segregation -5.789∗∗∗ (1.775) -5.157∗∗ (2.387)
Inequality 2.308∗∗∗ (0.647) 2.157∗∗∗ (0.640)
AIF × Inequality -5.935∗∗∗ (1.655) -5.140∗∗∗ (1.908)
Veto -0.004 (0.019) 0.031 (0.023) -0.007 (0.018) 0.026 (0.026)
Short-Term Relationships
∆Left 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
∆ChristDem 0.008∗∗ (0.004) 0.007∗ (0.004) 0.009∗∗ (0.004) 0.008∗∗ (0.004)
∆CWB 0.035 (0.052) 0.035 (0.050) 0.029 (0.051) 0.029 (0.050)
∆Unemployment 0.139∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.136∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.130∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.126∗∗∗ (0.038)
∆LogGDP -20.941∗∗∗ (1.989) -21.014∗∗∗ (1.950) -21.299∗∗∗ (1.948) -21.328∗∗∗ (1.922)
Long-Term Relationships
Leftt−1 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
ChristDemt−1 0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 0.003∗∗ (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
CWBt−1 0.047 (0.031) 0.048 (0.031) 0.041 (0.031) 0.042 (0.031)
Unemploymentt−1 -0.011 (0.010) -0.023∗∗ (0.010) -0.021∗∗ (0.010) -0.032∗∗∗ (0.011)
LabForcet−1 -0.002 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) -0.011 (0.007) -0.011 (0.008)
FemLabForcet−1 0.014 (0.009) 0.021∗∗ (0.010) 0.019∗∗ (0.009) 0.021∗∗ (0.010)
Pop65t−1 0.030∗∗ (0.015) 0.027∗ (0.014) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.050∗∗ (0.020)
LogTradet−1 -0.002 (0.072) 0.137 (0.091) -0.041 (0.071) 0.065 (0.087)
LogGDPt−1 -0.200 (0.145) -0.303∗∗ (0.150) -0.253∗ (0.143) -0.337∗∗ (0.152)
Error-Correction Term
Spendingt−1 -0.037∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.045∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.054∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.058∗∗∗ (0.011)
Lagged Differences
∆Spendingt−1 0.189∗∗∗ (0.058) 0.181∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.177∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.170∗∗∗ (0.056)
∆LogGDPt−1 10.020∗∗∗ (1.904) 9.002∗∗∗ (1.900) 8.867∗∗∗ (1.905) 8.077∗∗∗ (1.888)
Observations 627 627 627 627
Countries 22 22 22 22
R2 0.517 0.526 0.528 0.535
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
While the coefficient has the expected negative sign, it is small in size and relatively noisy.11
The negative effect of ascriptive diversity, however, gains statistical significance once the two
mediating factors are added, separately or side by side. The negative and statistically significant
interaction terms in models 2 and 3 indicate that ascriptive diversity dampens social spending
more strongly when either inequality or regional segregation increase in size. Figure 3.4 illustrates
11To verify that this null result is not an artifact of my AIF measure, I reran model 1 using the original ethnic,
linguistic, and religious fractionalization measures used by Alesina and Glaeser (2004). None of their indices produced
a statistically significant coefficient.
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this mediation visually by plotting the conditional effect of a hypothetical shift from complete
ascriptive homogeneity to complete ascriptive heterogeneity under different values of inequality
(left-hand panel) and segregation (right-hand panel). The two graphs demonstrate that ascriptive
diversity requires certain minimal levels of segregation and inequality to influence social spending
and that this negative relationship intensifies as the two factors increase in size. Model 4 shows
that the two interactive effects remain unchanged when estimated side by side, implying that they
operate concurrently and independently of one another.12
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Figure 3.4: The Conditional Effect of Ascriptive Diversity on Overall Public Social Spending as a
Function of Inequality and of Segregation
Most, although not all, control variables in Table 3.4 have a statistically significant relationship
with aggregate social spending. In almost all models, social spending grows more strongly given
long-term trends of lower unemployment, more females participation in the labor market, and an
older population—all reflect either a stabler tax base or increased demand for social services by
working women and the elderly. Increased GDP is negatively associated with social spending both
in the long and short term, not least due to its mechanical effect as the outcome’s denominator.
12Although not shown here, a three-way interaction between ascriptive diversity, inequality, and segregation is
statistically insignificant, lending additional support to the hypothesis that class and geography operate independently.
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Social spending also grows due to short-term increases in the political power of Christian Demo-
cratic parties and in unemployment. The latter exemplifies the complex relationship between social
spending and unemployment: a sudden increase in unemployment raises the demand for benefits,
but, as it sustains over the long term, the government’s available revenue base shrinks. Finally, the
negative and statistically significant error term indicates that social spending tends to revert back
to its long-term trends after short-term shocks.
Contrary to what we may expect, the estimations in Table 3.4 do not find statistically significant
correlations with the number of institutional veto points, the political power of the left, labor force
participation rates, and trade. The minimal impact of institutions is particularly interesting and
supports my argument on their limited independent power. Although I do not show it here, three-
way interactions with the veto point index do not produce statistically significant coefficients. In
later chapters, I show that specific institutions can operate as a mechanism that explains the exact
pace and policy tools through which preferences translate to concrete redistributive policies.
3.4.2.2 Program Prioritization
My theoretical framework, nevertheless, predicts that class and geography should implicate
redistributive priorities differently. To examine these differences, I regress each of the five subcat-
egories of social spending—together with an additional measure of old-age pension requirements
that I discuss below—on the same set of covariates. For ease of presentation, Figure 3.5 presents
only the coefficients of the two interactions, regressed side by side, by model.13 The interactions
remain substantively unchanged when estimated separately rather than side by side, and in fact
produce smaller standard errors and higher statistical significance than shown here.
The results largely support my theoretical expectations. As I expect, higher intergroup inequal-
ity dampens only spending that targets lower-class needs: unemployment, social assistance, and
public healthcare. At the same time, this interactive effect is not found in cross-class programs that
address old-age and incapacity needs, both relevant for stronger identity groups as well.
13The full estimations are presented in tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.
47
Cross−Class Needs Lower−Class Needs
l
l
−4
−2
0
2
Old−Age
Spending
l
l
−20
−10
0
10
Work Yrs for
Full Pension
l
l
−4
−2
0
2
Incapacity
Spending
l
l
−4
−2
0
2
Unempl.
Spending
l
l
−4
−2
0
2
Social Assist.
Spending
l
l
−4
−2
0
2
Healthcare
Spending
l lGeography Inequality
Figure 3.5: Public Social Spending by Type of Program: Coefficient Plot of Interaction Terms
from Error-Correction Models
By contrast, as groups are more segregated regionally, the negative effect of ascriptive diversity
crosses class lines, including lower spending on incapacity, unemployment, and social assistance
programs. There are two exceptions, however. The first is spending on old-age programs, where
the interaction remains statistically insignificant. Yet, old-age spending stands out due to the con-
tinuous and rapid aging trends across the developed world. It may be the case, therefore, that the
fast growth in demand for old-age services tramples counter-pressures. To test this possibility, I
use an alternative measure with lower sensitivity to this mechanical effect: the number of years
that a person is formally required to work to be considered fully covered by a public pension (data
from Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto, 2014). Unlike the other coefficients, a higher value implies stricter
prerequisites (i.e., more years in the labor market) that limit the number of full public pensions.
The results, shown in the second panel from the left, indicate that ascriptive diversity with more
segregation is indeed associated with higher barriers for a full government pension. Thus, higher
segregation, but not intergroup inequality, has dampening implications for old-age programs too.
The second exception is in public healthcare spending, where the interaction with segregation
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is insignificant and quite noisy. This outcome can be explained by two unique trends in public
healthcare management. First, due to the large size of public healthcare systems, devolution of
healthcare financing is often driven not by identity politics but by attempts to improve efficiency
and curb costs, including in cases with lower ascriptive diversity than average (e.g., Italy or Swe-
den). Second, in several cases with high ascriptive diversity and regional segregation (e.g., Bel-
gium or the United Kingdom), the provision of healthcare was in fact decentralized but funds are
still transferred from the central government (Saltman, Bankauskaite and Vrangbaek, 2007; Costa-
Font and Greer, 2013). With the exception of healthcare, however, ascriptive diversity with higher
regional segregation suppresses government investment in all types of programs, as I expect.
3.4.2.3 Coverage
Lower spending on the lower classes is not the only way that richer groups can minimize
intergroup redistribution in diverse, unequal democracies. Another course of action, I argued, is
by restricting the access of poor minorities to core social security programs that serve both groups,
especially insurance against labor market risks. Models 1–4 in Table 3.5, shown without control
variables for ease of presentation, support this expectation.14 While higher diversity in itself does
not affect unemployment or sick-pay coverage, it restricts both when identity groups are more
unequal. Regional segregation, which should not fracture class relations, does not have the same
mediating effect.
Can we be sure that lower coverage indeed hurts weaker workers? To corroborate this assump-
tion, I examine whether the same factors also predict other labor-market policies that benefit strictly
stronger workers. In model 3, I estimate the implications on the OECD’s Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL) index for individual and collective dismissals of regular contracts, an accepted
measure of pro-insiders policy in segmented labor markets (Rueda, 2005). Since the EPL scores
hardly change over time, this model is estimated using a cross-sectional OLS regression with a
between-effects estimator that averages variable values for the entire sample period.15 Consistent
14The full estimations are presented in Table B.3 in Appendix B.
15Since strong workers are typically organized in powerful unions, I include an additional control variable for union
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Table 3.5: Unemployment and Sick-Pay Coverage and Employment Protection Legislation: Error-
Correction Model
Unemployment Sick-Pay EPL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AIF 0.002 0.086∗∗ -0.006 0.101∗∗ -19.924∗
(0.007) (0.036) (0.010) (0.044) (6.707)
Inequality 0.081∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ -11.582∗
(0.032) (0.037) (4.657)
AIF × Inequality -0.263∗∗ -0.356∗∗ 51.867∗
(0.120) (0.144) (18.148)
Segregation -0.003 0.011 2.474
(0.022) (0.014) (6.551)
AIF × Segregation 0.008 -0.005 -7.596
(0.063) (0.036) (18.838)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 539 539 535 535 562
Countries 20 20 20 20 21
R2 0.110 0.129 0.144 0.177 0.804
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Panel-corrected standard errors (models 1–4) and
regular standard errors (model 5) in parentheses.
with the previous two models, higher ascriptive diversity with more intergroup inequality indeed
leads to stronger protections for better-off workers at the expense of weaker ones. Intergroup
segregation, meanwhile, does not make a difference.
3.4.2.4 Redistributive Decentralization
While intergroup segregation implicates all types of redistributive programs, I hypothesized
that this negative influence reflects broader pressures to decentralize redistribution from the na-
tional to the regional level. To test this hypothesis, Table 3.5 presents model estimations of the level
of effective redistributive decentralization. Unlike social spending, model 1 shows that higher as-
criptive diversity in itself correlates with more redistributive decentralization. This finding echoes
previous arguments that higher ascriptive diversity is often accommodated by greater political
decentralization writ large (Linz, 1997; Stepan, 2001; Obinger, Liebfried and Castles, 2005). Nev-
density in this model using data from Visser (2015). The full estimation is presented in Table B.4 in Appendix B.
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ertheless, as I expect, model 2 finds that this negative relationship increases in size when diverse
identity groups are more segregated. This trend is illustrated visually in the right-hand panel in
Figure 3.6. Model 4 demonstrates that this mediation holds, and even increases in slope, when the
interaction between ascriptive diversity and intergroup inequality is added.
Table 3.6: Effective Redistributive Decentralization: OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AIF 2.061∗∗∗ 2.439 17.419∗∗∗ 11.999∗∗∗
(0.752) (1.844) (3.593) (4.228)
Segregation -10.572∗∗∗ -10.813∗∗∗
(2.458) (2.976)
AIF × Segregation 19.836∗∗∗ 28.235∗∗∗
(6.613) (8.657)
Inequality 10.175∗∗∗ 5.895∗
(2.175) (3.316)
AIF × Inequality -42.995∗∗∗ -34.388∗∗∗
(8.712) (12.740)
RegInequality -1.151 13.612∗∗∗ 1.450 8.515
(5.537) (4.669) (5.316) (5.488)
Federalism 0.432∗∗∗ 0.136 0.144 0.049
(0.097) (0.115) (0.107) (0.104)
Proportionality 0.923∗∗∗ 0.382 1.043∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗
(0.278) (0.340) (0.303) (0.434)
LogGDP 0.829∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.237) (0.225) (0.268)
∆LogGDP 1.903∗ 2.029∗ 1.536 1.771
(1.155) (1.140) (1.086) (1.122)
LogPopulation -0.511∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗ -0.779∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.110) (0.110) (0.224)
PopDensity 0.001 -0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Urban 0.091∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 318 318 318 318
Countries 20 20 20 20
R2 0.619 0.704 0.658 0.723
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Interestingly, although my theoretical framework is neutral on the role that intergroup inequal-
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Figure 3.6: The Conditional Effect of Ascriptive Diversity on Effective Redistributive Decentral-
ization as a Function of Inequality and of Segregation
ity plays in welfare decentralization, model 3 finds that it has a negative mediating effect. As the
left-hand panel in Figure 3.6 shows, high ascriptive diversity is correlated with more centralization
of welfare services when intergroup inequality grows. Nevertheless, this pattern fits my broader
theoretical logic: since intergroup inequality leads to discrimination of poorer identity groups, po-
litically stronger groups may prefer to keep policymaking under their centralized control rather
than face grassroots initiatives by the former. This possibility opens rooms for further research,
particularly given cross-country variation in the geographical distribution and political represen-
tation of the poor (Jusko, 2017). However, this outcome is also more statistically unstable than
the interaction with segregation. First, the share of variation explained by model 3, expressed in
its R2 value, is appreciably lower than that of model 2, implying that segregation has a stronger
explanatory power than inequality. Second, the estimation’s statistical fit is sensitive to influential
cases, and specifically Greece. Once Greece is omitted from the sample, the interactive coefficient
of ascriptive diversity and inequality in model 4 loses its magnitude and statistical power, whereas
the effect of ascriptive diversity and segregation remains robust.
Most control variables in Table 3 have a statistically significant effect on welfare decentral-
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ization. In almost all models, all else equal, higher redistributive decentralization is associated
with proportional electoral rules, a higher GDP, a smaller population, and a higher share of urban
population. Higher GDP growth, federalism, and population density are positively correlated with
decentralization in one or two models but lose their statistical significance once the interaction
terms are included together. Interregional income inequality is positively associated with decen-
tralization, as expected, but its statistical significance diminishes once the interaction of ascriptive
diversity and intergroup inequality is taken into account. This finding may imply that part of the ex-
planatory power of interregional inequality, which has received notable scholarly attention, could
reflect identity politics as well.
3.4.3 Robustness Tests
The primary findings presented in this chapter are robust to several potential issues. The first
potential concern is that the countries in my sample may not pool well. Unaccounted heterogeneity
between cases, in turn, may undermine the model’s inferences. To rule out this possibility, I
cross-validated all models by dropping each country at a time and comparing the statistical fit
in every iteration (Beck and Katz, 2011). The models perform similarly well in all cases, with two
exceptions. The first, which was discussed above, is Greece’s notable influence on the estimation
fit of welfare decentralization under high intergroup inequality. The second is Ireland’s strong
influence on the estimation fit of employment years required for old-age pensions. Nevertheless,
that model produces substantively similar results when Ireland is dropped from the sample.
A second potential concern is that the estimations are overly dependent on some of my more
arbitrary modeling choices. To address this concern, I reestimated the primary ECM models with
several alternative specifications. First, to model slower effects over time compared to my strictly
annual data, I replaced all yearly control variables with their 3-year moving averages. Second,
since some of the institutional and political control variables may be partially endogenous to as-
criptive diversity and social structures, I reestimated all my models without them. Third, I replaced
the ECM with a standard lagged dependent variable (LDV) model, firstly with the first lag of all
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independent variables and then with their 3-year moving averages. Finally, I reestimated all my
models with a simple cross-sectional between-effects estimator. Due to the limited degrees of free-
dom in this specification, I omitted all control variables (except for the log of GDP per capita,
which controls for changes in the denominator of social spending, and its first difference, which
controls for real GDP per capita growth rate) and estimated the two interactions separately. De-
spite their weaker fit to the data, all alternative specifications support my conclusions. I report their
results in more detail in Appendix C.
A third potential concern is that social spending as a share of GDP does not capture redistri-
bution levels accurately. To validate my findings with respect to this concern, I reestimated the
ECM specification with an alternative measure of redistribution, the relative reduction in income
inequality before and after taxes and transfers, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS). Whereas social spending reflects government input into redistributive policies, relative in-
come inequality reduction can be seen as one of its outputs. In particular, higher values reflect
more regressive policies, and as such should be affected by intergroup inequality more than by
intergroup regional segregation.
As noted above, the data on inequality reduction is more limited in countries and years.16
Since the LIS data are not annual and are spaced unequally in different countries, I follow Persson,
Roland and Tabellini (2007, 19) and Lupu and Pontusson (2011, 324) in averaging the values of
annual independent variables for the period between every two country observations. Overall, I
have 88 data point from 19 countries between the years 1983 and 2005. The results, presented in
a truncated form in Table 3.7, once again corroborate my findings.17 As before, contrary to the
common claim, ascriptive diversity in itself does not predict lower inequality reduction. Model 2,
however, finds a negative relationship when intergroup inequality is higher, indicating that redis-
tribution becomes less progressive when identity groups cluster in different parts of the income
distribution. As expected, model 3 does not find that regional segregation has a similar mediat-
16Specifically, the LIS data do not include Japan, New Zealand, and Portugal. Because of the low number of
time periods per country and their inconsistent availability across different countries, I estimate robust standard errors
instead of panel-corrected standard errors.
17The full estimation is presented in Table B.5 in Appendix B.
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ing effect. Finally, model 4 demonstrates again that the interactions do not change much when
estimated included together. The results, then, corroborate my earlier findings about the internal
redistributive priorities under each context.
Table 3.7: Relative Income Inequality Reduction after Taxes and Transfers: Error-Correction
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AIF 0.009 0.173∗∗ 0.093 0.169∗
(0.063) (0.087) (0.101) (0.102)
Inequality 0.091 0.087
(0.061) (0.063)
AIF × Inequality -0.435∗∗∗ -0.373∗
(0.157) (0.195)
Segregation 0.029 -0.006
(0.149) (0.169)
AIF × Segregation -0.208 -0.030
(0.392) (0.497)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 88 88 88 88
Countries 19 19 19 19
R2 0.404 0.451 0.443 0.452
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
A final potential concern is that my measures of intergroup inequality and regional segregation
may be inaccurate or endogenous to social policies despite my theoretical reassurances. To confirm
the validity of these measures, I reran my models with an alternative measure for each in turn. I first
replace my intergroup inequality variable with a measure of ethnic inequality created by Alesina,
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016).18 The latter map nighttime satellite imagery of light
density, which reflects economic development, onto historic homelands of different ethnic groups
within each country. They then calculate a Gini coefficient of light-density inequality between
subnational ethnic regions. This alternative measure should be more strongly exogenous to welfare
policies, but has two significant weaknesses: first, it refers only to ethnicity, and, second, the focus
on historic homelands excludes ascriptive cleavages formed through non-geographic processes
18I use scores from the year 2000 based on data from Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) and exclud-
ing groups smaller than 1% of the population. Since this measure is related to geographic goods distribution, the
estimations do not include regional segregation to avoid potential confounding.
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such as migration, slave trade, or religious conversion. Even so, it correlates reasonably well with
my cleavage reinforcement measure (r = 0.65, p < 0.01). The results, which are reported in more
detail in Table C.4 in Appendix C, corroborate my findings.
Next, I substitute my segregation measure with an alternative measure proposed by Alesina and
Zhuravskaya (2011). Assuming that in-groups members from neighboring countries concentrate
near shared borders, the alternative measure predicts the geographical distribution of different
identity groups by matching them with similar groups in each adjacent country. A positive share
of in-group members in a neighboring country positively skews the group’s assumed geographical
distribution toward the bordering region. The predicted distributions are then used to calculate
a measure of intergroup segregation. Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) compute three separate
instruments by ethnicity, religion, and language, which I average to create a single country score.
This variable, too, correlates strongly with my own segregation measure (r = 0.72, p < 0.001).
Rerunning my models with this alternative variable supports my original findings, as reported in
Table C4 in Appendix C. Despite their crudeness, then, both alternative variables provide additional
corroboration for my measures and my findings.
3.5 Conclusion: Lessons and Gaps
In summary, the set of empirical patterns presented in this chapter provide consistent and varied
support for my theoretical propositions. Contrary to the common argument, ascriptive diversity in
itself does not predict lower redistribution levels in developed democracies, echoing the empirical
puzzle with which I started. However, the negative implications of ascriptive diversity appear once
we consider the national contexts within which it operates, particularly high intergroup inequality
and high regional segregation.
Furthermore, each of these factors carries its own set of redistributive implications. When more
diverse democracies have greater intergroup inequality, their redistributive outcomes are more re-
gressive and exclusionary. In particular, the mediating influence of higher intergroup inequality
correlates with less investment in programs that target lower-class needs, lower coverage rates in
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cross-class programs, and lower inequality reduction after taxes and transfers. Yet, at the same
time, these factors do not undermine the benefits and access enjoyed by better-off groups. Higher
ascriptive diversity also tends to depress investment in redistribution when different identity groups
cluster in different parts of the country. Yet, contrary to intergroup inequality, regional segregation
is not correlated with more regressive outcomes. Instead, these conditions lead to lower public
investment in all types of national programs (with the exclusion of public healthcare) and to more
welfare devolution to subnational units. Furthermore, the analyses indicate that the pressures ex-
erted by intergroup inequality and by regional segregation operate concurrently and independently
of one another. These differential outcomes are supported by multiple indicators and are robust to
several diagnostic tests.
My analysis implies that the structural combination of ascriptive diversity, intergroup inequal-
ity, and regional segregation is a constant influence on redistributive patterns alongside other eco-
nomic and political factors. The findings, therefore, do not cancel out the importance of the latter
or argue that redistribution is set solely by identity politics. Rather, the analysis indicates that
redistributive politics operate dynamically within the limits of stable cleavage structures. While,
on average, all developed democracies react similarly to shocks in unemployment or to long-term
population aging, higher ascriptive diversity with structural inequalities or with regional divisions
constraints these reactions compared to more homogeneous or cross-cutting social structures.
At the same time, these findings tell us very little about the development and manifestation of
these correlational relationships in concrete, and messier, cases. Moreover, by testing a series of
separate hypotheses, they do not examine the causal chain and mechanisms that link the different
theoretical parts together. To gain a deeper understanding of these issues, the next few chapters an-
alyze three representative cases—the US (diversity with high inequality), Belgium (diversity with
high segregation), and Spain (diversity with both factors)—with particular focus on the context,
coherence, and connections that underly the broader patterns identified in this chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
Race, Intergroup Inequality, and Redistribution in the United
States
4.1 Introduction
My first case study examines the relationships between high intergroup inequality and redistri-
bution in the United States, with a particular focus on the country’s long-standing racial cleavage.
Race relations between whites and blacks have been deeply woven into the socio-political fabric of
the United States since its colonial days.1 Equally important, there has been notable economic in-
equality between whites and blacks throughout American history. According to the United States
Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS), the median income of black households in
2016 was 60.7% of the median income of white households. The wealth gap is even more stag-
gering: according to the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the
median net worth of black households in 2013 equaled only 7% of the median net worth of white
households.2 The US, meanwhile, spends less on social policy and is more unequal both before
and after taxes and transfers than the average OECD country. Do racial relations and intergroup
inequality play a part in these outcomes? In exploring this question, I use the American case to
1Ascriptive diversity in the United States extends to many other groups, including Native Americans, Hispanics,
Asians, and various other immigrant groups from across the world. Nevertheless, for the sake of focus, this chapter
centers on the primary divide between whites and blacks, which stands out in its historical depth, salience, and political
implications on social policy.
2Net worth is defined as the total monetary value of all household assets, from real estate and cars to stocks and
interest earning, minus all owed debts.
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delve deeper into the interconnections between the different components of my argument.
Regional differences between blacks and whites are secondary to class in the US. Blacks have
traditionally concentrated in the Southeast, the historic center of slavery. This is illustrated in the
left-hand map in Figure 4.1, which shows the population share of blacks by state in 1860, the
last census before the abolition of Southern slavery.3 This regional density, however, was coerced
and spread over several states. As such, it did not foster a cohesive and free political community
tied to a specific territory. Indeed, recent census data from 2010, shown in the right-hand map,
demonstrate that many blacks have moved northward over the next 150 years. Accordingly, as I
will show in more detail, racial identities in the US did not develop a strong regional dimension.
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Figure 4.1: Share of Blacks by State, 1860 and 2010
In what follows, I examine (1) the role that socioeconomic inequality plays in US racial rela-
tions, (2) how both intergroup inequality and race relations shape redistributive preferences, and
(3) how these preferences are manifested in actual welfare policies. Using historical, public opin-
ion, and policy analysis, I find that white prejudice against blacks is strongly tied to the latter’s
lower socioeconomic class. This prejudice, moreover, is correlated with higher opposition to wel-
fare policies that specifically target the poor. Most whites support welfare programs that benefit
their own in-group members—old-age, disability, military service, middle-class tax breaks—but
3For ease of comparison with 2010, the data from 1860 are presented by contemporary state lines rather than 1860
territories.
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not ones focused on unemployment and poverty assistance. This duality extends from preferences
to de facto welfare policies. The American welfare state has consistently prioritized programs that
serve the elderly, disabled, veterans, and middle class while limiting investment and standardiza-
tion in programs serving the poor. I find several channels by which the federal government has
suppressed redistribution to poorer blacks, including low investment in means-tested programs,
selective decentralization that differentiates between communities along racial lines, subsidies for
private insurance plans, and tax expenditure on the middle and upper classes. The US, therefore,
corroborates my theoretical expectations: high intergroup inequality is associated with low inter-
group solidarity and a relatively regressive welfare state that underprioritizes the poor and blacks.
4.2 Economic Inequality and Intergroup Relations in the US
Intergroup inequality has been a defining feature of US race relations. I begin, therefore, with
a closer look at the historical context of socioeconomic inequality between whites and blacks, and
then examine its current implications on interclass solidarity. Theoretically, I expect that intergroup
inequality would not only precipitate intergroup tensions but would also fracture solidarity with the
poor. Meanwhile, unlike cases with high regional segregation, I do not expect to find meaningful
connections between race and regional identification among either blacks or whites.
4.2.1 Historical Context
Racial history in the US is characterized by deep social and political inequalities that extend
beyond class. The African-American community grew out of forced slavery that lasted well into
the mid-nineteenth century. Slavery was constitutionally abolished in 1865 following the civil war.
However, despite a brief and largely failed period of reconstruction, racial oppression soon took
a new form in the Jim Crow laws, a set of local legislation in Southern states that codified racial
disenfranchisement, discrimination, and segregation (Woodward, 1955; Kousser, 1974). Together
with informal practices of violence, harassment, and social sanctions, the Jim Crow regime stymied
black integration and protected the old racial hierarchy (Mickey, 2015; Acharya, Blackwell and
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Sen, 2018). These laws lasted for over 80 years until their revocation in the 1950s and 1960s by
a series of court decisions and civil rights laws. The black community has made notable strides
since the civil rights era, but, more than half a century later, its members continue to face softer
forms of discrimination and lag behind whites economically, a point that I explore next.
4.2.1.1 Intergroup Income Inequality
Socioeconomic inequality has been a central component of racial oppression since the abolition
of slavery. Initial attempts to assist the newly freed slaves during reconstruction were short-lived
and ineffective. Indeed, the Freedmen’s Bureau, a government agency established in 1865 for this
purpose, was unpopular and stripped of funding by 1872 (Williams, 2003). Meanwhile, vague
promises offering forty acres and a mule for freed slaves evaporated as prewar land owners re-
claimed their old territories. Jim Crow laws, further, legalized discrimination in land ownership,
employment, education, and housing (Mickey, 2015; Lindert and Williamson, 2016). Lacking
other options, most former slaves made do with sharecropping, low-wage farm jobs, and peddling
(Fox, 2010; Bodenhorn, 2015).
Intergroup inequality ran deeper than discriminatory laws in the South, however. Between the
1910s and 1960s, in what became known as the Great Migration, several million blacks relocated
to urban centers in the north in search of new jobs. Yet, they faced significant economic barriers
there, too. Blacks in northern cities were employed primarily in low-wage industrial jobs with little
professional mobility, were excluded from union membership until the 1930s, and were the first
to lose their jobs due to automation (Sundstrom, 1994; Brown, 1999). Lacking proper housing,
they concentrated in underdeveloped inner-cities ghettos while better-off whites fled to segregated
suburbs (Williams, 2003; Nall, 2015).
The civil rights era lowered legal barriers and opened up new opportunities for blacks. Yet,
while the racial income gap has narrowed after the 1960s, it is far from closed. This trend is
shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 4.2, which plots the estimated wage ratio of blacks to
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whites throughout American history (Lindert and Williamson, 2016).4 The data find a deep and
largely stable income gap from the 1770s to the 1940s, during which the average salary of blacks
was less than 50% of a white person’s average wage. While the civil rights era brought notewor-
thy improvement, the racial income ratio stagnated at around 70% since the 1980s. To this day,
black poverty and racial inequality are particularly high in old centers of slavery, underscoring the
lingering economic legacy of racial oppression (Nunn, 2008; O’Connell, 2012).
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Figure 4.2: Income and Wealth Gaps Between Blacks and Whites, 1774–2016
4.2.1.2 An Even Deeper Wealth Gap
Despite the narrowing income gap, the latter obscures a deeper and stabler racial gap in accu-
mulated wealth. Using Census Bureau data from 1991 to 2016, the right-hand panel in Figure 4.2
compares the racial gap in median household income with the racial gap in median household net
worth. While the black-to-white income ratio sits stably around 60%,5 the median black household
4Lindert and Williamson (2016) estimate the earnings of black slaves as the cost of their personal consumption of
housing, clothing, food, and so on. When direct data about slave maintenance is missing, they approximate it as the
estimated exploitation rate of black labor. For an in-depth explanation of their calculations, see Appendix C in Lindert
and Williamson (2016).
5Note that the left-hand panel considers income per worker and the right-hand panel examines the median income
of households. This distinction may account for the small estimation difference (70% versus 60%) between the two
calculations.
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possesses less than 10 cents for every dollar owned by the median white household. This wealth
gap, furthermore, has slightly expanded in the past twenty years, down from 10.3% in 1991 to less
than 7% in 2013.
Like with wages, the growing wealth gap, too, is rooted in deep and long-standing structural
barriers. As early as the reconstruction era, blacks were effectively excluded from the main banks
and forced to use a separate banking system with lower capital, poorer investments, and more lim-
ited lending capability (Baradaran, 2017). This discrimination became all the more important in
the twentieth century, when cheap consumer credit accelerated the growth and wealth accumula-
tion of the white middle class (Shapiro, 2004; Baradaran, 2017). To this day, blacks face stricter
mortgage rates and advance payment requirements, forcing many to buy cheaper houses in segre-
gated neighborhoods with worse public schools and higher crime rates. Low net worth, moreover,
restricts the ability of black parents to support their children’s college tuition, first house purchase,
and eventual inheritance (Shapiro, 2004). Hence, the wealth gap buttresses different starting points
even as black families earn relatively higher wages.
4.2.2 Implications for Intergroup Relations
How does the deep socioeconomic inequality between whites and blacks affect intergroup sol-
idarity in the US? Much ink has been spilled on the rich history and multiple aspects of American
race relations, many of which stretch beyond the scope of my argument. In this section, therefore,
I limit my discussion to a narrower set of contemporary implications. First, in line with my the-
oretical assumptions, I focus primarily on the racial attitudes of whites, the richer and politically
dominant group. Second, I focus only on the nexus of race, class, and geographic identification.
Finally, I concentrate only on the past few decades.
4.2.2.1 From Overt to Symbolic Racism
Historically, blacks have experienced unconcealed racism from whites. Nevertheless, explic-
itly racist attitudes have become socially unacceptable since the civil rights era (Kinder and Sears,
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1981; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1997; Bonilla-Silva, 2006). In a survey conducted in 1942, 53%
of white respondents did not consider blacks to be as intelligent as whites, a classic marker of old
racism. By 1956, however, 80% of white respondents concurred that both races are equally intel-
ligent. Between the 1950s and 1990s, there was an equally large growth in the share of whites re-
jecting discriminatory practices and expressing willingness to engage regularly with blacks. While
these changes were stronger among more educated and non-Southern whites, they nonetheless
applied across the entire spectrum of white respondents (Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1997).
Yet, racial prejudice has not disappeared but taken new forms. An influential body of work
finds that many whites substituted old racism with subtler prejudice against the behavior and val-
ues of blacks. This so-called Symbolic Racism is characterized by “moral feelings that blacks
violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, work ethic, obedience,
and discipline” (Kinder and Sears, 1981, 416). These perceptions often consider the lower socioe-
conomic status of blacks as proof that they are collectively lazy and irresponsible. Moreover, they
undermine white support for various policies designed to improve racial integration (Kinder and
Sears, 1981; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Henry and Sears, 2002; DeSante, 2013).6
Surveys from the past few decades illustrate the prevalence of these sentiments. Pooling
data from the General Social Study (GSS) from 1990–2016, Figure 4.3 showcases white respon-
dents’ evaluations of whites and blacks by several dimensions: (1) intelligent versus unintelligent,
(2) committed to strong families versus non-committed, (3) hard-working versus lazy, (4) self-
supporting versus living off welfare, and (5) not prone to violence versus violent. Each dimension
is scored on a 7-point scale between the two opposing attributes. The darker boxes, which mark the
distribution of respondent scores assigned for peer whites, are all skewed positively. On average,
then, whites tend to perceive other whites favorably along multiple behavioral dimensions. Blacks,
by comparison, are evaluated by whites more negatively in all attributes except intelligence, the
foregone marker of overt racism. Only 31.9% of white respondents consider blacks more strongly
6The theoretical and empirical validity of symbolic racism has been debated extensively since the 1980s. For a
succinct summary of the argument, criticisms, and compelling responses, see Hutchings and Valentino (2004, 390–
393).
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Whites’ Opinion on Blacks and on Whites
committed to their families than not, only 17.2% think that they are more hard-working than lazy,
only 13.4% consider them more self-supporting than welfare dependent, and only 15.3% consider
blacks less prone to violence than violent.
Three of the questions—intelligence, work ethic, and a tendency for violence—repeat in several
survey years. Figure 4.4 plots the share of white respondents that evaluated blacks negatively in
these dimensions since 1990. While the negative evaluations have declined over time in all three
aspects, this trend has largely stagnated since the 2000s. Symbolic racism, it seems, is far from
gone, even today (see also Hutchings, 2009; Kinder and Chudy, 2016).
4.2.2.2 Race and Sympathy for the Poor
As we have seen, current forms of racial prejudice deem blacks lazy and irresponsible. Fur-
thermore, a different body of research also finds that whites’ racial resentment increases when
they sense a greater threat to their socioeconomic and political privilege (Blumer, 1958; Giles and
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Figure 4.4: Whites’ Opinion of Blacks Over Time, 1990–2016
Hertz, 1994; Bobo, 1999; Jardina, 2014; Wetts and Willer, 2018). Do intergroup tensions indeed
fracture solidarity with the poor?
The answer is positive, although not straightforwardly so. Contrary to popular belief, recent
research finds that most Americans, regardless of their income and values of individualism, express
sympathy for the poor, criticize the rich, and feel concerned about rising inequality levels (Page
and Jacobs, 2009; Piston, 2018).
Sympathy for the poor, however, fades once race is taken into account. Positive attitudes toward
the poor depend on whether they seem worthy of help or not. Yet, many whites consider blacks
personally responsible for their own socioeconomic woes and thus not worthy of assistance (Kinder
and Sanders, 1996; Gilens, 1999). Using survey data from the American National Election Studies
(ANES) from 1986–2016, Figure 4.5 summarizes white and black perceptions of the circumstances
behind racial disadvantage. The top two panels display the share of respondents who agree that
blacks face unfair barriers outside their control. The bottom two panels, by contrast, showcase the
share of respondents who think that blacks are personally responsible for their situation and do
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not deserve special favors.7 The data show that a majority or near-majority of whites disagree that
blacks face structural injustices and believe that they should pull themselves up by their bootstraps
without special help. Most black respondents, expectedly, express the opposite worldview.
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Figure 4.5: Perceptions of the Causes for the Socioeconomic Position of Blacks, 1986–2016
7The full statements, in clockwise order from the top-left panel, are as follows: (1) “Generations of slavery and
discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class”;
(2) “Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve”; (3) “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other
minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors”; and
(4) “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just
as well off as whites”. Respondents evaluated all statements using a 5-point scale between “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”. Figure 4.5 sums up the share of white respondents who agree and who strongly agree with each
statement.
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Importantly, these racial attitudes correlate with lower sympathy for the poor in general. I
examine this relationship more closely using an ANES sample of white respondents from 1972–
2016. The dependent variable, sympathy for the poor, is measured as a feeling thermometer score
toward the poor on a scale of 0 to 100. I use three measures of racial resentment as independent
variables. The first two measures are based on the pairs of questions shown earlier in Figure 4.5:
first, I measure belief that blacks are held back by structural barriers as the average score of the top
two questions; and, second, I measure the belief that blacks are held back by their low work ethic
as the average score of the bottom two questions.8 The third independent variable gauges racial
affect more explicitly using a 0–100 feeling thermometer score toward blacks. In all three cases,
I control for differences in ideological self-identification (using a 7-point scale of conservatism
versus liberalism), age group, gender, education level, church attendance, income bracket, and
residence in the South. I also include survey-year fixed effects.
The results, presented in Table 4.1, find a statistically significant correlation between racial
resentment and lower sympathy for the poor. All else equal, a switch from strong disagreement
that blacks face structural barriers to strong agreement is estimated to raise one’s sympathy for the
poor by 6.5 points. Similarly, the difference between strong agreement and strong disagreement
that blacks should improve their work ethic is worth 5.6 points of sympathy for the poor.
Some researchers suggest that this correlation is spurious. According to this argument, both
lower sympathy for the poor and the belief that blacks should try harder reflect a colorblind com-
mitment to an individualistic ideology (Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Sniderman and Carmines,
1997). This interpretation is problematic, however, for several reasons. First, as model 3 in Ta-
ble 4.1 shows, sympathy for the poor is also correlated with a straightforward measure of black
affect. This finding does not align with the notion of a colorblind concern about work ethic. Sec-
ond, experimental evidence finds that the mere mention of a black-sounding name decreases white
respondents’ willingness to assist an otherwise identical poor person (DeSante, 2013). Finally,
additional findings show that the media has consistently portrayed negative stories of poverty with
8The division of these four questions to two dimensions is supported by factor analysis with a Kaiser-normalized
varimax rotation.
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Table 4.1: Positive Feelings toward the Poor: OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Structural Barriers 1.624∗∗∗
(0.206)
Low Black Work Ethic -1.403∗∗∗
(0.223)
Black Thermometer Score 0.352∗∗∗
(0.009)
Conservatism -0.781∗∗∗ -0.814∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.163) (0.107)
Age Group 1.353∗∗∗ 1.403∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.126) (0.085)
Female 0.039 0.022 -0.000
(0.031) (0.031) (0.015)
Education -1.794∗∗∗ -1.908∗∗∗ -2.071∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.268) (0.166)
Religiosity -1.216∗∗∗ -1.229∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.132) (0.092)
Income -0.958∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗ -0.942∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.206) (0.138)
South 2.909∗∗∗ 2.773∗∗∗ 2.891∗∗∗
(0.444) (0.444) (0.310)
Constant -2.124 41.987 56.253
(62.502) (62.360) (29.054)
Survey Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,807 10,814 17,896
R2 0.080 0.077 0.205
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
images of blacks, reinforcing the association between blacks and unworthy poverty (Gilens, 1999).
Hence, the direct connection between racial prejudice and lower solidarity with the poor seems
quite strong.
4.2.2.3 Race and Regional Identities?
Before turning to the redistributive implications of these attitudes, I conclude this section by
examining whether the racial divide reinforces regional identification. That this is not the case
is demonstrated with survey data on regional identification from waves 3 and 4 (1994–1998 and
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1999–2004) of the World Values Survey (WVS). Examining the sample of American respondents,
Table 4.2 summarizes the distribution of answers to the same question analyzed in Chapter 3: “To
which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?” Although American
racial history is rooted in the South, the data show that neither whites nor blacks identify primar-
ily with their region or state.9 Instead, a majority of both groups identify either with their local
community or with the country as a whole.
Table 4.2: Geographical Identification by Unit, 1994 and 1999
Total Whites Blacks Other Races
Locality or Town 31.4% 31.6% 34.6% 24.5%
State or Region of Country 9.9% 9.8% 10.0% 11.0%
The US as a Whole 38.2% 40.1% 30.4% 32.9%
North America 2.8% 2.6% 3.4% 4.2%
The World as a Whole 17.7% 16.0% 21.6% 27.5%
Observations 2,659 2,048 359 252
These sentiments place the US behind most other OECD countries. Using American respon-
dents as the baseline in a cross-sectional sample, Figure 4.6 plots country coefficients from a
logistic regression estimating the probability of identifying with one’s region/state as opposed to
other options. Similar to my analysis in Chapter 3, the regression also controls for age group,
gender, education level, church attendance, income bracket, and WVS wave. All else equal, Amer-
ican respondents are less likely to identify with their region or state than all but three other OECD
countries. Regional identification, then, is not a significant aspect of most Americans’ identities.
4.3 Intergroup Relations and Redistribution
Thus far, the discussion has established that the deep and structural inequalities between whites
and blacks play a central part in shaping racial prejudice and in fracturing solidarity with the poor.
The next question is whether and how they connect to redistributive preferences and outcomes.
To examine this question, I begin with a brief historical overview of the American welfare state
and its racial aspects, and then consider the current preferences of white Americans regarding
9These shares remain the same among residents of the South.
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Figure 4.6: Regional Identification: Country Coefficients from Logistic Regression
these policies. I conclude this section with a summary of the various policy tools that constrain
redistribution to blacks in particular.
4.3.1 Race and Welfare Institutions in the US: Historical Context
The structure and history of the American welfare state are quite complex and tortuous ,and, as
such, warrant some simplification. In what follows, I summarize the development of the system’s
main components by three broad periods: The New Deal (1930s–1950s), the Great Society (1960s–
1970s), and a defensive period of partial retrenchment, tax cuts, and expanding racial spillover
(1970s to today).
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4.3.1.1 The New Deal and Establishment of Social Security
The American welfare state is often described as a laggard compared to its European counter-
parts. Indeed, welfare policy was local and patchy as late as the mid–1930s. Only two national
programs predated the 1930s: pensions for civil war veterans, which started in the 1860s and cov-
ered 28% of male adults by 1910; and, starting in 1911, federal subsidies for state-provided benefits
for needy mothers (Skocpol, 1992). Other social policies before the 1930s were neither broad nor
federally supported. By the 1920s, for example, most states offered workers’ compensation and
a small handful of states granted old-age pensions, but neither involved the federal government
(Skocpol, 1992; Fox, 2010).
Both the civil war and mothers pensions eventually phased out. The current American welfare
system, instead, is rooted in the New Deal legislation from the 1930s. Facing the fallout of the
Great Depression, Congress established a federal social security fund in 1935 based on mandatory
payroll contributions. The new social security system funded three core programs: (1) old-age
pensions, (2) unemployment benefits, and (3) social assistance that included Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC, later AFDC), assistance for needy elderly, and other small aid programs. In com-
ing years, social security also added survivor benefits (1939) and disability insurance (1956).
Several other national programs were established outside the social security system, including
housing subsidies for the poor (1937 and 1949) and, more notably, the GI Bill (1944). The latter
awarded extensive benefits for World War II veterans, including college tuition and financial sup-
port, vocational training, temporary unemployment benefits, housing assistance, and low-interest
loans (Campbell, 2004; Mettler, 2005). In addition, between the 1930s and 1950s, the federal
government expanded tax exemptions for private retirement and healthcare plans provided by em-
ployers (Stevens, 1988; Hacker, 2002).
These core programs varied, and still do, in their level of federal standardization (Finegold,
2005). Indeed, the initial structure of social security stemmed from a compromise between South-
ern Democrats, who sought local control over redistribution to protect existing racial hierarchies
and cheap labor supply, and progressives and labor unions, who wanted broad federal benefits
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(Amenta and Skocpol, 1988; Quadagno, 1994; Davies and Derthick, 1997; Lieberman, 1998). The
result has been a two-tiered system. The first tier is fully funded and uniformly managed by the
federal government, and includes such programs as old-age, disability, and veteran benefits. The
second tier is funded by federal subsidies, but is co-funded and managed by the states, including
bigger freedom to set eligibility criteria and benefit levels. This tier includes unemployment bene-
fits, which all states must provide, and most social assistance benefits, in which state participation
is typically voluntary.
While not overtly racist, this differential structure facilitated racial exclusion in two indirect
ways. First, it enabled discriminatory criteria at the state level, particularly in Southern states. For
instance, many states denied ADC benefits from black mothers for being unmarried or through an
opaque requirement for a morally “suitable home” (Neubeck and Cazenave, 2001; Ward, 2005).
Similarly, aid for the needy elderly was lower for blacks and, in Southern states that relied on cheap
laborers, was suspended during cotton picking season (Quadagno, 1988; Brown, 1999; Williams,
2003).
Second, the welfare system reproduced broader practices of racial discrimination in employ-
ment and housing. For example, both old-age and unemployment insurance did not cover agri-
cultural and domestic workers, who were disproportionally black (Quadagno, 1994; Lieberman,
1998; Brown, 1999; Katznelson, 2005). Indeed, in 1940, 48.1% of black men and 79.3% of black
women were not insured by social security due to their occupations, compared with only 29.7% of
white men and 26.5% of white women (Williams, 2003, 81). Similarly, tax subsidies for private
pensions and health insurance favored middle-class professions from which blacks were largely
excluded. Housing assistance, too, systematically favored segregative projects, denied funding for
riskier neighborhoods, and prioritized middle-class recipients. By 1960, merely 2% of home buy-
ers using this program were black (Williams, 2003, 79). Finally, while some see the GI Bill as color
blind and inclusive (Mettler, 2005), others argue that it replicated racial discrimination in military
enlistment and, when claiming benefits, in college admissions and housing markets (Brown, 1999;
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Williams, 2003; Katznelson, 2005).10
Thus, the welfare system that emerged from the New Deal largely prioritized the interests of
Southern states and the white middle class at the expense of more inclusive redistribution. This
status quo remained quite stable until the changes brought about by the Civil Rights era.
4.3.1.2 The Great Society and War On Poverty
By the early 1960s, the New Deal coalition of Northern and Southern Democrats was eclipsed
by a new progressive alliance of civil rights activists, liberal organizations, and labor unions
(Schickler, 2016). Furthermore, the Great Migration of blacks to Northern cities expanded the ge-
ographic scope and national awareness of racial poverty (Skocpol, 1988; Brown, 1999; Williams,
2003). Against this background, and with the election of a historically liberal Congress in 1964,
the Johnson administration embarked on its Great Society project, a set of ambitious reforms ad-
dressing civil rights, racial inequality, and poverty.
These efforts made two structural changes to the welfare state. First, under the banner of the
War on Poverty, several new programs expanded assistance for the poor. This legislation included
vocational training, food stamps, public housing programs, and elimination of racial barriers in ex-
isting programs such as the ADC (now AFDC). Indeed, the share of black mothers receiving AFDC
benefits grew from 19.9% in 1942 to 45.2% in 1969 (Williams, 2003, 141). The Nixon administra-
tion broadened these programs further in the early 1970s, expanding the food stamps program and
establishing the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program to support needy elderly, disabled,
and blind recipients.
Second, Congress established two seminal public healthcare programs for the elderly (Medi-
care) and for the poor (Medicaid). The two programs followed the old two-tier system: whereas
Medicare was managed by the federal government like other old-age services, Medicaid was fed-
erally subsidized but managed by the states subject to basic federal requirements. Furthermore,
contrary to Medicare, state participation in Medicaid was voluntary. Whereas Medicare and Med-
10See Katznelson and Mettler (2008) for a direct discussion between these opposing perspectives. A similar dis-
agreement rises with regard to the inclusiveness of the earlier civil war pensions (see Skocpol, 1992; Williams, 2003).
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icaid focused on the elderly and poor, working-age citizens received additional tax breaks for
employer-sponsored healthcare plans in the private market (Hacker, 2002).
Overall, the changes made in the 1960s and early 1970s successfully reduced unemployment
and poverty among blacks (Brown, 1999; Williams, 2003). Yet, by narrowly focusing on black
poverty, they augmented two long-term racial problems. First, the reforms did not address deeper
structural inequalities. Thus, the continued racial discrimination in employment and real estate
limited the effectiveness of professional training and housing subsidies (Weir, 1992; Quadagno,
1994; Brown, 1999). Similarly, tax breaks for private insurance primarily benefited the white
middle class and neglected lower-level workers (Hacker, 2002). The result was shown earlier: the
income gap did narrow at first but then stagnated.
Second, the distinct emphasis on black poverty created a backlash effect among many whites.
Since the 1960s, poverty assistance was increasingly associated with undeserving black depen-
dency (Orfield, 1988; Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004; Ward, 2005). Thus, the Great Society’s anti-
poverty programs soon drew heavier public criticism compared to other types of benefits, espe-
cially at the onset of the 1980s.
4.3.1.3 After the 1970s: Cutbacks, Tax Breaks, and Expanding Racial Spillover
Despite Nixon’s expansion of social assistance in the early 1970s, the economic crises and
emboldened conservative agenda of the mid–1970s and 1980s put new pressures on the welfare
state. Whereas old-age pensions and Medicare proved too popular to reform (Pierson, 1996), the
Reagan administration successfully cut back on several social assistance programs—AFDC, pub-
lic housing, food stamps, vocational training—not least by taking advantage of their racial stig-
mas (Skocpol, 1988; Slessarev, 1988; Williams, 2003; Hancock, 2004). In 1996, the Republican
Congress, together with a reluctant President Clinton, replaced the AFDC program with the more
restrictive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) plan. The latter added harsher time
limits and stricter work requirements at the federal level and granted states greater control over
benefit rates, eligibility criteria, and sanctions. The new law, moreover, was partly funded by cuts
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to food stamps and Supplemental Security Income.
The reform had a clear racial undertone. By using a rhetoric that emphasized a Culture of
Poverty and stricter policing of irresponsible recipients, it invoked prevalent racial stereotypes and
hinted at the broader war against black violence in inner cities (Williams, 2003; Soss, Fording and
Schram, 2011). Indeed, after the reform, states with a higher share of black recipients imposed
stricter limitations and provided lower benefits than states with a higher share of white recipients
(Soss et al., 2001; Johnson, 2003; Fellowes and Rowe, 2004).
Direct retrenchment had its limits, however, as other programs proved popular and politically
difficult to cut back. In this period, therefore, the tax system was used more frequently as an
alternative channel for redistributive changes (Hacker, 2004). Indeed, tax code modifications have
traditionally faced fewer political obstacles and have attracted less public attention than public
welfare reforms (Howard, 1997; Bartels, 2005). Since the 1970s, Congress and the government
continuously expanded tax credits for the middle and higher classes, subsidizing breaks for private
insurance plans, mortgages, and child care. With the increasing political influence of big money,
the more recent tax cuts passed by Republicans in 2001, 2003, and 2017 favored the rich more
overtly (Hacker and Pierson, 2005; Gilens, 2012; Faricy, 2016).
The final historical development worth mentioning is the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, better known as Obamacare, which passed in 2010 after several failed attempts to expand
public health coverage. Obamacare expanded Medicare, tightened regulation on private insurers,
provided means-tested subsidies for certified private plans, and taxed uninsured individuals. Ac-
cording to Census Bureau data, the share of uninsured people indeed dropped from 16.3% in 2010
to 8.8% in 2016.
Despite its achievements, Obamacare did not change the healthcare system’s reliance on a
medley of private insurers, Medicaid, and Medicare, nor did it explicitly target racial inequalities.
Yet, it has been highly contested, not least by racial lines. As such, it sheds light on the expansion
of racial spillover to new areas of public policies. Whereas anti-poverty programs activated racial
tensions due to images of black recipients, Obamacare did so because of its titular association
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with a black president. Indeed, recent research finds that racially resentful whites increased their
opposition to public healthcare immediately after Obama’s election. The mere mention of Obama’s
name, furthermore, increased their disapproval of plans that they were otherwise willing to accept
(Tesler, 2012). The racialization of an ever-expanding set of public policies has been particularly
prevalent in welfare and economic policymaking (Tesler, 2015; Kinder and Chudy, 2016). More
generally, it is part of an increasingly polarized age in American politics, during which racial,
social, and cultural identities are merged into two grand partisan camps (Mason, 2018). This trend
will undoubtedly play a larger role in future developments to the American welfare state.
4.3.2 Redistributive Preferences: Differential Support
The history of the American welfare state, then, has consistently underprioritized the interests
of the lower class. How well do these trends reflect American public opinion, particularly among
the politically dominant white group? Theoretically, I expect differential preferences along racial
lines: most whites should support programs that benefit the middle and higher classes and oppose
programs that focus on the poor, primarily blacks, and vice versa. My findings support these
expectations.
4.3.2.1 Support for Redistribution in General and by Program Type
Several recent studies argue that Americans are more supportive of redistributive policy than
some may think: a majority of Americans support a more equal distribution of income and wealth
and want the government to play a more active part in these efforts (Page and Jacobs, 2009; Piston,
2018). Indeed, 51% of respondents in the 2016 GSS survey agree that the government ought to
reduce income differences between rich and poor.11 Moreover, most Americans express greater
support for redistribution when they are assured that it helps the poor and taxes the rich (Faricy
and Ellis, 2014; Piston, 2018).
11The level of agreement with this statement was measured using a 7-point scale ranging from “the government
ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor” to “the government should not concern itself with
reducing income differences”. For ease of presentation, I collapse this scale to a 3-point range of positive, neutral, and
negative answers.
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Yet, this support is more elusive than it seems. First, general attitudes on redistribution vary
notably by race. Using GSS data from 1978–2016, Figure 4.7 shows that while a large majority of
blacks support government action to reduce income inequality, whites are evenly divided on this
question.
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Figure 4.7: Support for Income Redistribution by Race, 1978–2016
Second, while some researchers of American politics consider these numbers a positive sur-
prise, they nevertheless lag behind other developed democracies. A cross-sectional survey from
2006, conducted as part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), asks a similar ques-
tion about the government’s responsibility to narrow income differences between rich and poor.12
The left-most panel in Figure 4.8 displays country coefficients from a cross-sectional OLS regres-
sion estimating answers to this question. The regression controls for individual-level differences
in age group, gender, education level, church attendance, and full employment. On average, all
else equal, Americans show significantly lower support for redistribution than almost all other
countries.
Finally, support for redistributive policies, especially among whites, varies by type of program.
Past research finds wider support for programs that serve the elderly and invest in human capi-
12Unlike the GSS, the ISSP uses a 4-point rather than a 7-point scale of agreement.
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Figure 4.8: Support for Redistribution by Type: Country Coefficients from OLS Regressions
tal (e.g., education and professional training) and stronger opposition to programs that assist the
poor and blacks (Gilens, 1999; Winter, 2006; Page and Jacobs, 2009; Kinder and Kam, 2010).
More recent survey data corroborate this pattern. Table 4.3 compares the share of white and blacks
respondents who support increased or decreased government spending on multiple welfare pro-
grams.13 White respondents’ answers indeed differ by category: the majority of white respondents
support more spending on the elderly and on veterans, but are divided on, and at times express
stronger opposition to, spending on unemployment and on social assistance. Notably, their support
is lowest for “welfare”, a strongly racialized term (Gilens, 1999), and for assistance for blacks.
13Colloquially, most Americans equate “Social Security” with old-age, survivors, and disability pensions, and “Wel-
fare” with anti-poverty benefits (e.g., Clinton’s 1996 “Welfare Reform” in AFDC/TANF). I categorize these programs
accordingly, in line with previous research. For ease of presentation, I omit neutral answers supporting no change for
current spending levels.
79
By contrast, despite reluctance about a couple of specific programs, most black respondents want
higher spending across all categories.
Table 4.3: Preference to Increase/Decrease Government Spending on Welfare Programs by Race
White Respondents Blacks Respondents
Increase Decrease Diff. Increase Decrease Diff.
Old-Age
Social securitya 62.5% 3.7% 58.8 80.7% 3.2% 77.5
Medicarec 58.3% 36.1% 22.2 57.6% 34.7% 22.9
Veterans
Veteran benefitsd 76.9% 2.8% 74.1 83.3% 2.4% 80.9
Healthcare for veteransc 78.9% 18.2% 60.7 73.9% 24.3% 49.6
Unemployment
Unemployment benefitsb 24.7% 25.1% -0.4 53.2% 13.2% 40.0
Social Assistance
Aid to the poora 37.4% 18.9% 18.5 68.1% 25% 43.1
Welfarea 15.6% 51.3% -35.7 32.5% 25.8% 6.7
Food stampse 34.2% 25.2% 9.0 39.8% 40.3% -0.5
Healthcare for poor childrenc 48.7% 43.9% 4.8 68.8% 27.3% 41.5
Housing assistance for the poore 31.1% 28.5% 2.6 54% 23% 31.0
Medicaidc 37.4% 48.9% -11.5 44.6% 53% -8.4
Assistance for blacksa 11.5% 28.3% -16.8 52.2% 4.7% 47.5
Healthcare (General)
Healthcared 46.1% 22.1% 24 81.9% 7.7% 74.2
a ANES, 2016
b GSS, 2016
c Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Tracking Poll, April 2017
d Pew Research Center, Political Survey, April 2017
e CNN/ORC Poll, March 2011
A similar pattern is found in Table 4.4, which shows white and black support for tax breaks and
for stricter eligibility criteria for social assistance programs. While white support for tax breaks
is categorically higher than for spending on unemployment or social assistance, they nevertheless
favor tax breaks targeting the middle class (private healthcare and college tuition) more than for low
wage earners. A large majority of whites also endorse stricter eligibility requirements for social
assistance. Blacks, by contrast, favor all types of tax breaks and are split on tougher eligibility
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criteria.
Table 4.4: Support/Opposition to Tax Breaks and Eligibility Requirements by Race
White Respondents Blacks Respondents
Support Oppose Diff. Support Oppose Diff.
Tax Breaks
Tax breaks for healtcharea 70.9% 7.6% 63.3 69.4% 9.2% 60.2
Tax breaks for student loansa 58% 14.8% 43.2 64.5% 18% 46.5
Tax breaks for low-incomea 46.3% 26% 20.3 60.4% 11.2% 49.2
Eligibility Criteria
Medicaid - work requirementb 76.7% 23.3% 53.4 52.2% 47.8% 4.4
Medicaid - drug testsb 69.1% 30.9% 38.2 44.2% 55.8% -11.6
Food stamps - drug testsc 74.1% 25.9% 48.2 47.8% 52.2% -4.4
a Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2014
b Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Tracking Poll, June 2017
c United Technologies/National Journal, Congressional Connection Poll, December 2013
Where does this place Americans comparatively? Using the same ISSP survey as before, the
two remaining panels in Figure 4.8 estimate country differences in support for two specific types of
redistribution: government responsibility to provide (1) a decent standard of living for the old, and
(2) a decent standard of living for the unemployed. Agreement with both statements range on a 4-
point scale between “definitely should not be responsible” and “definitely should be responsible”.
Two insights stand out. First, all else equal, Americans express comparatively low support for
both types of redistribution. This finding implies that the gap compared to other countries is not
limited to specific parts of the welfare state. But, second, this gap is smaller on average for old-
age programs than it is for unemployment benefits. The differential preferences of Americans on
redistribution, then, holds from a comparative perspective too.
4.3.2.2 The Role of Race
Most Americans, and whites in particular, prefer welfare policies that benefit the middle and
higher classes more than they support social assistance for the poor. Do these differential pref-
erences correlate with racial attitudes? Multiple studies find that negative perceptions of blacks
indeed predict stronger opposition to redistribution, particularly when targeting poverty and blacks
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(Peffley, Hurwitz and Sniderman, 1997; Gilens, 1999; Luttmer, 2001; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004;
Piston, 2018). Additional experimental evidence verifies the causal direction from racial prejudice
to welfare preferences: as noted earlier, whites express stronger opposition to otherwise identical
welfare policies if black recipients are mentioned explicitly (Gilens, 1996; Kinder and Sanders,
1996; Avery and Peffley, 2003; DeSante, 2013) and if they are cued about the demographic threat
to the white majority (Wetts and Willer, 2018).
In addition to a negative out-group threat, redistributive preferences are also driven by a positive
in-group solidarity. Whereas white racial resentment predicts opposition to anti-poverty policies,
stronger white identification corresponds with higher support for old-age pensions and for Medi-
care (Winter, 2006; Kinder and Kam, 2010; Jardina, 2014). Similarly, blacks with a stronger racial
identity express higher support for policies that benefit blacks (Kinder and Kam, 2010).
To examine this relationship systematically across different types of policies, I replicate, with
minor changes, the multivariate regression model estimated by Gilens (1999, Ch. 4).14 Gilens
argues that perceptions of blacks as lazy increase white opposition to anti-poverty policies. As the
outcome of interest, he focuses on support for government spending on “welfare”, i.e., on poor
families. I broaden the estimation to multiple policy areas with updated data. Using Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) data from 2014, I examine whether white respondents think
that the government spends too much, about the right amount, or too little on (1) assistance for
the elderly, (2) making college affordable, (3) improving public healthcare, (4) assistance for the
unemployed, and (5) aid for the poor. I also examine the level of support for three types of tax
breaks: (6) tax breaks for employer-provided healthcare plans, (7) tax breaks for parents who pay
for their children’s college tuition, and (8) tax breaks for low-income earners. I limit the sample to
white respondents only, the richer and politically dominant identity group.15
Like Gilens (1999), my primary explanatory variable is perceptions of blacks’ work ethic.
14My model makes several small differences compared to Gilens (1999). First, due to data limitations, I cannot
control for marrital status and family income, although Gilens’ results show that these factors should not have a large
effect. Second, there are minor differences in the operationalization of some explanatory variables, although they
follow Gilens’ theoretical concepts (compare my operationalization with Gilens, 1999, 223–224). Finally, as I explain
below, I add a measure of the perceived work ethic of whites that Gilens does not consider.
15I am grateful to Spencer Piston for providing access to the data.
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Specifically, I use a question that asks respondents to rank blacks on a 7-point scale between
“hardworking” and “lazy”. Expanding the original model, I also include a similar question on the
work ethic of whites to gauge in-group favorability.
The model controls for several other ideological and demographic factors. Individualistic be-
liefs are measured by a question asking whether “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better
life” or “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections”.
Perceptions of the poor’s deservingness are measured with a question asking whether the poor
“have a lot more money than they deserve” or “a lot less money than they deserve” on a 7-point
scale. Ideological and partisan identities are measured by respondents’ self-placement on 7-point
scales of conservatism versus liberalism and Republican versus Democrat. Finally, I also control
for age group, gender, education level, employment status, and residence in the South.
The results, presented in tables 4.5 and 4.6, fit the broader patterns presented in Chapter 3.
According to Table 4.5, whites who perceive blacks as lazy tend to express stronger opposition to
spending on unemployment benefits, aid for the poor, and public health services. However, racial
prejudice does not undermine support for spending on the elderly and on college students, both in-
clude a high share of whites. A similar finding appears with regard to tax breaks, as shown in Table
4.6. All else equal, negative perception of blacks’ work ethic correlates with stronger opposition
for low-income tax breaks but does not erode support for private healthcare and college tuition, two
benefits that serve the middle class. The latter two policies, moreover, are more strongly supported
by white respondents who appreciate the work ethic of other whites, implying stronger in-group
solidarity.
4.3.3 Differential Redistribution: Class as Proxy for Race
As I hypothesized, then, both public opinion and welfare policy in the US have favored the
redistributive interests of the middle and upper classes and have underprioritized the needs of
the poor, especially blacks. While these trends have been relatively stable throughout American
history, the policies themselves have gradually changed. In particular, as overt forms of racial
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Table 4.5: Support for More Federal Spending on Different Needs: OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Old-Age College Healthcare Unemployment Poverty
Black Laziness 0.005 -0.006 -0.059∗ -0.072∗ -0.089∗∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
White Laziness -0.026 -0.023 0.026 0.010 0.037
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Individualism -0.177∗∗ -0.012 -0.017 -0.233∗∗ 0.012
(0.059) (0.077) (0.080) (0.082) (0.090)
Poor Deservingness 0.085∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.037)
Conservatism -0.005 -0.089∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027)
Republican -0.004 0.012 -0.016 0.007 -0.054∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Age Group 0.041∗ -0.082∗∗∗ 0.029 -0.017 -0.023
(0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025)
Female 0.184∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.104 0.068 0.132
(0.056) (0.068) (0.072) (0.072) (0.077)
Education -0.070∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.063∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.061∗
(0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
South 0.043 -0.133 -0.162∗ -0.058 -0.145
(0.060) (0.081) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074)
Full Employment -0.025 -0.058 0.026 -0.063 -0.045
(0.061) (0.077) (0.080) (0.074) (0.080)
Constant 2.145∗∗∗ 2.444∗∗∗ 2.159∗∗∗ 2.370∗∗∗ 1.981∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.281) (0.321) (0.292) (0.380)
Observations 637 641 639 640 642
R2 0.184 0.201 0.279 0.290 0.391
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
exclusion became unacceptable, the system adjusted the ways by which it depresses redistribution
for poorer blacks. In these changes, alternative social categories, not least class, have been a
primary tool to differentiate recipients along racial lines.
The first form of differentiation is by levels of government investment. Using data from 2016,
Table 4.7 breaks down the annual federal spending, level of administration, and shares of white
and black recipients by key welfare programs.16 According to Census Bureau estimations, the
16Spending data is from the Office of Management and Budget. The share of recipients by race is calculated using
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Table 4.6: Support for Different Tax Breaks: OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Private Healthcare College Costs Low Wage
Black Laziness -0.024 0.075 -0.118∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.054)
White Laziness -0.104∗ -0.155∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.046) (0.043) (0.053)
Individualism -0.206 0.292∗ -0.289
(0.128) (0.145) (0.152)
Poor Deservingness 0.028 0.170∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.044) (0.052)
Conservatism 0.000 0.032 -0.081
(0.048) (0.048) (0.057)
Republican 0.021 -0.000 -0.087
(0.037) (0.037) (0.045)
Age Group 0.036 -0.101∗ -0.036
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041)
Female -0.035 -0.061 0.001
(0.109) (0.119) (0.112)
Education 0.068∗ 0.038 -0.052
(0.034) (0.043) (0.042)
South 0.150 0.101 0.061
(0.107) (0.133) (0.126)
Full Employment 0.209 -0.211 0.037
(0.119) (0.137) (0.130)
Constant 3.915∗∗∗ 2.941∗∗∗ 3.432∗∗∗
(0.482) (0.538) (0.589)
Observations 640 630 636
R2 0.065 0.079 0.291
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
share of Blacks in the general population in 2016 was 12.7% and the share of whites 72.6%. Using
this reference, we can see that whites are overrepresented in three of the largest four programs:
social security (old-age, survivors, and disability), Medicare, and veteran benefits. Moreover,
federal spending on social security and Medicare, the only two programs in which blacks are
underrepresented, is more than double the amount spent on all other programs combined. By
data from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, with the exception of Food Stamps (data from the United
States Department of Agriculture) and Children’s Health Insurance Program (data from the Center for Children and
Families at the Georgetown University Health Policy Institute).
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contrast, blacks are overrepresented in all means-tested programs, which receive relatively low
federal funding and are almost always administered by the states, a point that I expand upon next.17
The federal government, then, invests more financial and administrative resources in programs that
serve disproportionately white beneficiaries.
Table 4.7: Primary Welfare Programs by Key Attributes, 2016
Federal Spending Administration
Program (USD Million) Level % Whites % Blacks
Old-age, survivors, disability 910,282 Federal 83.8% 10.7%
Medicare 588,361 Federal 83.2% 10.7%
Medicaid 368,280 State 68.3% 19.8%
Veterans Benefits 106,211 Federal 81.4% 13.2%
Food Stamps 95,797 State 31.7% 24.2%
Supplemental Security Income 56,557 Federal 64.7% 25.3%
Unemployment Compensation 32,175 State 78.9% 13.6%
Public Assistance 23,063 State 62.4% 28.0%
Children’s Health Insurance 14,305 State 33.0% 20.0%
Table 4.7 highlights a second form of differentiation: devolving program administration to the
states. As the table shows, while the federal government manages uniform benefits for the elderly,
disabled, and veterans, almost all other programs are managed by the states. As noted earlier,
state control over benefits and eligibility criteria was originally set by Southern legislators seeking
to limit redistribution to black families and cheap black laborers. Geographic differentiation al-
lows local politicians to tailor specific rules for different communities by their racial composition
(Mettler, 2000; Schram, Fording and Soss, 2008). Contrary to federally administered programs,
state-managed benefits and coverage rates have been consistently lower in communities with higher
shares of black recipients and racial tensions (Orr, 1976; Soss et al., 2001; Johnson, 2003; Fellowes
and Rowe, 2004).
A recent example from Michigan demonstrates how such geographic differentiation can take
place. In 2018, Michigan state legislators drafted a proposal to impose harsher work requirements
on Medicaid recipients, with an exception for counties with an unemployment rate above 8.5%.
17Unemployment insurance recipients also include beneficiaries of veterans unemployment benefits and of employer
insurance due to work injuries, a calculation that likely inflates the share of white recipients. Public assistance includes
TANF, family, and general assistance.
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This exemption was found to benefit white communities almost exclusively: according to a Wash-
ington Post analysis, whereas 23% of the state’s residents are black, only 1.2% would be exempted
by this rule (Stein and Van Dam, 2018). Hence, state politicians used their authority to set Med-
icaid criteria and their familiarity with Michigan’s local demography to curb benefits for blacks
more than for whites.
A third form of differentiation is achieved through the private market, which is more regressive
and racially discriminatory by its nature. Healthcare policy, in particular, has been built around
employer-sponsored private coverage. Rather the establishing a universal public healthcare sys-
tem, American policymakers have consistently subsidized private plans using tax breaks, federal
guarantees, and friendly regulation (Hacker, 2002, 2004). Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) complement rather than compete with the private market by
aiding populations who are largely outside the labor force. Obamacare, too, has continued to rely
on private insurers. Indeed, according to data from the Census Bureau’s CPS, 67.5% of adults—
but only 56.5% of blacks—had private health insurance in 2016. OECD data finds that voluntary
private spending on healthcare in the US reached 5.8% of GDP in 2013, far ahead of all other devel-
oped democracies; France, which ranked second, spent only 1.5% of its GDP on private healthcare
plans. Similarly, generous retirement pensions are particularly common among strong unions and
large corporations in which blacks remain underrepresented (Hacker, 2002).
Finally, a fourth form of differentiation occurs through tax expenditures. Howard (1997, 26)
estimates that welfare-related tax expenditures in 1995 have reached USD 437 billion, about half
of direct federal spending on welfare programs. Almost all welfare-related tax breaks benefit the
middle and upper classes more than the lower class, buttressing the racial gaps in income and
wealth (Howard, 1997; Faricy, 2016). Even relatively progressive tax instruments, such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), benefit workers with higher wages than the bottom income
quintile (Howard, 1997, 28). In addition, many tax breaks reproduce market inequalities: almost
half of the welfare-related tax subsidies are given to private healthcare plans, old-age pensions, and
mortgages, all of which are more common among white middle-class employees and homeowners.
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Their legislation, furthermore, is conducted far from the public eye and with little representation
for weaker social groups, not least racial minorities (Howard, 1997; Bartels, 2005; Hacker and
Pierson, 2005).
4.4 Conclusion: Lessons from the American Case
In summary, the American case supports my hypotheses and complements my quantitative find-
ings of more regressive and exclusionary redistribution under high intergroup inequality. Racial
diversity is an inseparable part of American history and politics. From its onset, race relations in
the US have been characterized by deep intergroup inequality. Over time, racial inequality has
transformed from slavery and overt oppression to softer forms of political and economic exclu-
sion, including lingering income and wealth disparities. Moreover, socioeconomic inequality and
threat to white privilege have become the focal points of current racial prejudice. To this day, the
data show that a substantive share of whites consider blacks economically irresponsible and balk
at redistributive policies aimed to assist them.
This form of racial prejudice fractures sympathy for the poor in general and undermines sup-
port for progressive redistribution. Americans are not categorically against welfare policies, but
their preferences vary notably by type of program and by the strength of their racial resentment.
Whereas blacks support all types of redistributive policies, the majority of whites favor only pro-
grams that serve cross-group interests: old-age, disability, military service benefits, and tax breaks
for middle-class wage earners. Meanwhile, most are unenthusiastic about programs targeting
lower-class needs and prefer stricter access criteria. Importantly, these differential preferences
grow with deeper prejudice against blacks. The data show that whites who disparage the work
ethic of blacks express greater opposition to progressive redistribution. Furthermore, racial prej-
udice does not undermine support for broader programs; in fact, a higher appreciation of fellow
whites increases support for tax subsidies for the middle class. The racial undertone of these redis-
tributive priorities is thus quite consistent.
These preferences are matched by actual welfare policies. The American welfare state has been
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shaped by many forces, not all discussed here in depth. Yet, racial relations have left a clear imprint.
Throughout the past century, welfare policies have consistently prioritized national programs for
the elderly, disabled, and veterans, as well as tax subsidies for private insurance and other middle-
class needs. Unemployment and social assistance programs, by contrast, have been smaller, have
faced larger retrenchments, and have been managed with looser standardization. This dual system
has consistently underfunded the socioeconomic needs of blacks, reproduced racial discrimination
in jobs and housing, and treated various areas differentially based on their racial composition. As
overt forms of racial exclusion became illegitimate over time, policymaking gradually shifted to
indirect forms of exclusion based on the socioeconomic and geographical characteristics of black
recipients.
4.4.1 Mechanisms: From Preferences to Policies and Back
The American case provides several insights into the mechanisms that link preferences to actual
policies. In particular, two of the mechanism noted in Chapter 2 are evident. The first type involves
bottom-up pressures by voters. Racial prejudice in the US is rooted in early-life experiences,
including one’s personality, family, education, and social norms (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Kinder
and Kam, 2010; Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2018). These attitudes, in turn, influence voters’
partisan alignments and candidate support (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Giles and Hertz, 1994; Kinder
and Sanders, 1996; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Kam and Kinder, 2012). Office-seeking politicians,
accordingly, have a strong interest to follow the deep-seated racial preferences of their voters,
particularly on salient issues such as race and intergroup redistribution. For example, as discussed
earlier, part of the Democratic Party’s liberal turn and welfare expansion in the 1960s is attributable
to bottom-up pressures from grassroots organizations, civil rights activists, and a more progressive
electorate (Schickler, 2016).
Voters and local actors also influence policymaking by setting the boundaries within which self-
interested elites can operate. For instance, the broad public support for popular welfare programs
such as Medicare and Social Security has stymied consistent retrenchment attempts since the 1980s
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(Pierson, 1996). On the other hand, Southern Democrats in Congress successfully vetoed a more
inclusive welfare system in the 1930s and 1940s thanks to the lack of public opposition to racial
discrimination and the willingness of labor unions to compromise on these issues (Quadagno,
1994; Lieberman, 1998; Brown, 1999). Voter constraints, however, are conditional on attention and
knowledge. For example, weak public awareness of tax legislation and growing partisan loyalty
have enabled Republican elites to cut taxes for the very rich more freely in recent years (Bartels,
2005; Hacker and Pierson, 2005).
Bottom-up pressures on elites are not fully exogenous, however. The second type of mech-
anisms identified in the US operates from the top down. In several historical junctures, popular
positions on race policies became more prevalent after they were publicly articulated by politicians
(Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Zaller, 1992; Kinder and Sanders, 1996). The media, too, plays a
central role in amplifying racial framing for issues like crime or poverty (Gilens, 1999; Kellst-
edt, 2003). Political candidates, moreover, often purposefully prime voters’ racial attitudes for
electoral gains using various campaign cues (Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings and White,
2004). For example, the association of poverty with blacks since the 1960s, which was promoted
by media editors and by various politicians, helped pave the way for later cutbacks in the 1980s
and 1990s (Orfield, 1988; Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004; Ward, 2005). Thus, the strength of public
attitudes is in itself affected by elite frames and cues to which many voters are exposed.
The existence of top-down forces does not contradict the bottom-up effect of voter preferences.
The success of elite cues on race and redistribution depends on preexisting voter receptiveness for
these messages. As Kinder and Sanders (1996, 9) explain, “American public opinion—in general
and on matters of race—is an expression of a small set of primary ingredients,” including bottom-
up factors such as voters’ material interests, intergroup affect, and political principles, yet “which
ingredients they weigh heavily and which they ignore as they form their views depend on how the
issue is framed by political elites.” In other words, the racial cleavage and intergroup inequality
are a necessary ingredient in redistributive policymaking, even as its intensity may rise or fall due
to elite actions.
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4.4.2 Class and Geography
Finally, what can the US teach us about the role of geography in a case that is dominated by
high intergroup inequality? The data in this chapter found that regional identification does not play
a central part in American race relations. Even though the black population was concentrated in
Southern states until the early twentieth century, neither racial group has developed strong geo-
graphic solidarities. A couple of factors may explain the primacy of inequality over geography.
First, status differences are more deeply embedded in American racial identities than geography.
Black identity has been structured around shared historical experiences of slavery, discrimination,
and lower access to resources and opportunities (Coates, 2015). White privilege, too, has been cen-
tral to whites’ own racial identity (Jardina, 2014). Second, blacks were historically concentrated in
the South by force. As such, they did not form a free community seeking greater political auton-
omy or establish local institutions for self-rule. Instead, once they could, many chose to migrate
to other regions in search of better economic opportunities. Hence, the depth and dominance of
intergroup inequality pushed aside regional considerations.
These processes, however, do not render geography completely moot. The US illustrates two
ways by which geography, particularly residential segregation, plays a secondary role to salient
intergroup inequality. First, higher levels of residential segregation and local concentration of
blacks have increased racial resentment among American whites both in the short and in the long
term (Key, Jr., 1949; Giles and Hertz, 1994; Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2018; Enos, 2018). Even
without meaningful regional identities, then, the geographical distribution of groups can exacerbate
or moderate local tensions, communal norms of exclusion, and intergroup threat between unequal
identity groups.
Second, residential segregation can serve as an effective tool for exclusion. When racial groups
are sufficiently separate locally, geographic boundaries can be used to differentiate public services,
law enforcement, and material resources along racial lines. Nevertheless, unlike my hypotheses on
regional segregation, this differentiation is not motivated by regional solidarity or by self-rule aspi-
rations. Instead, the extent of devolution is set partially and selectively by the federal government
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and is utilized mostly with underprioritized programs. Moreover, this selective decentralization
does not overlap with ascriptive identity communities but often involve smaller units (e.g., coun-
ties) and private companies. Thus, in cases such as the US, decentralization is often used as a
selective tool to exclude poorer minority groups (Schram, Fording and Soss, 2008).
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CHAPTER V
Language, Regional Segregation, and Redistribution in Belgium
5.1 Introduction
The second case study that I consider in depth is Belgium, where the primary ascriptive cleav-
age has been defined historically by geographic separation more than by class. Since its estab-
lishment in 1830, modern Belgium has been divided between two large ethno-linguistic commu-
nities based in separate regions, Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia, mapped
in Figure 5.1.1 This strict geographic separation has endured over time and played a key part
in the construction of Belgium’s ethno-linguistic identities. This cleavage and its territorial as-
pects, moreover, have dominated Belgian politics since the mid-twentieth century, reshaping the
country’s constitution, party system, and policymaking. In this chapter, I focus specifically on its
implications on intergroup solidarity, redistributive preferences, and actual welfare policies.
The data confirm Belgium’s strict and stable geographic divide along linguistic lines. The first
Belgian census, conducted in 1846, found that 96.6% of the population in Flemish provinces spoke
Dutch and 95.4% in Walloon regions spoke French (Zolberg, 1974). Almost two centuries later,
this pattern still holds. Using European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2016, Figure 5.2 shows the
shares of primary French and Dutch speakers by province.2 The results trace the regional border
1Belgium includes a third recognized linguistic group, German-speaking Belgians. However, this group is both
small in size—less than 0.7% of the population in 2016—and politically marginal compared to the other two groups.
In this chapter, therefore, I focus only on the primary cleavage between Flemings and Walloons.
2The relevant survey question asks about the language spoken most often in respondents’ home. Brussels, which
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Brussels
Flanders
Wallonia
Figure 5.1: Belgium’s Regions
between Flanders and Wallonia perfectly: in all provinces, near or over 90% of respondents speak
the group’s respective language in their homes. There are also limited interregional population
flows: according to official Statbel data from 2010–2016, the annual average net interregional
migration to Flanders and to Wallonia was 0.12% and 0.16% of their respective populations.3
Given these numbers, in what follows I refer to ethno-linguistic groups and regions (with the
exception of Brussels) interchangeably.
Contrary to the US, intergroup inequality in Belgium has been smaller and more dynamic over
time. Wallonia was the richer region throughout much of Belgium’s history, but, as noted later in
the chapter, the regional fortunes have gradually shifted throughout the twentieth century. In 2016,
Flanders had the higher regional GDP per capita, $42,072 compared with $29,852 in Wallonia,
and an unemployment rate of 4.9% compared with 10.6%.4 This inequality, however, does not
map entirely onto community lines. Figure 5.3 breaks down average monthly wages in 2015 (left-
hand panel) and employment shares in 2016 (right-hand panel) by Arrondissement (provincial
is considered an independent region rather than a province, is left blank in both maps. Brussels itself is a francophone
and cosmopolitan island: according to the survey, 69.3% of respondents from Brussels speak French at home, 28.8%
speak other languages, and only 1.6% speak Dutch.
3Both regions’ positive internal migration is balanced by Brussels’ net loss.
4The data are taken from the OECD Regions and Cities database. GDP per capita is calculated in USD value using
constant prices, constant PPP (base year 2010).
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Figure 5.2: Shares of French and Dutch Speakers by Province (Excluding Brussels), 2016
subdivisions).5 While both maps show a richer Flemish north, they also illustrate large within-
region variation. Indeed, some parts of Wallonia, particularly more densely populated areas, are
doing equally well or better than some parts of Flanders. The secondary role played by class is
discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
(A) Average Full−Time Wage (EUR), 2015
2,600 to 2,800
2,800 to 3,000
3,000 to 3,200
3,200 to 3,400
3,400 to 3,600
3,600 to 3,800
3,800 to 4,000
(B) Employment (% of Working Age Pop.), 2016
30 to 40
40 to 50
50 to 60
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
Figure 5.3: Income (2015) and Employment (2016) by Arrondissement
5Wages are measured as the average gross monthly salary of full-time workers by Arrondissement of employ-
ment (Statbel data). I calculate local employment share as all persons employed in a given unit divided by the local
population aged 15–64 using Eurostat data.
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Despite its deep ethno-linguistic divide, Belgium poses a challenge to the common expectation
that diversity strictly dampens redistribution. As of 2015, Belgium has ranked third among all
OECD countries in public social spending as a share of GDP. My analysis in this chapter, nev-
ertheless, reveals intergroup tensions, preference for welfare decentralization, and actual steps to
promote the latter. The Belgian case, moreover, exemplifies how political institutions and unique
historical moments can determine the ways and pace by which these outcomes unfold. At the
same time, it also illustrates that institutional constraints can change endogenously as a result of
ascriptive social structures.
The structure of this chapter follows the same theoretical path as the American case study. I
begin by examining the brief history of Belgium’s ethno-linguistic cleavage, its strong geographic
nature, and its implications on intergroup solidarity. I find that the history and geographic context
of Belgium have, indeed, created two separate ethno-linguistic communities with distinct regional
identities, cultures, and negative out-group stereotypes. In the second part of the chapter, I find that
these tensions correlate with higher support for welfare regionalization but not for more regressive
policies. These preferences, moreover, are particularly strong in Flanders, where regional identities
have traditionally been deeper. Belgium’s centralized welfare institutions, which were created dur-
ing a historical juncture with temporarily subdued ethno-linguistic politics, have mostly resisted
these demands. Yet, in recent years, the pressures from below have been gradually eroding this re-
sistance and have lead to increased redistributive devolution. Thus, despite the country’s relatively
high investment in welfare policies, the Belgian case supports my theoretical expectations.
5.2 Geography and Intergroup Relations in Belgium
The first theoretical link that I examine is the interrelations between Belgium’s ethno-linguistic
cleavage, its strong geographic characteristics, and intergroup solidarity. Theoretically, I expect
that the strict regional segregation will foster two separate communities with strong regional iden-
tities and weak intergroup solidarity. At the same time, unlike the US, I do not expect that the
linguistic conflict would not lead to deep class tensions. First, however, let us briefly review the
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cleavage’s history.
5.2.1 Historical Development
5.2.1.1 The Roots of Belgium’s Ethno-Linguistic Politics: 1830 to the 1960s
Like many other European countries, Belgium emerged from a collection of feudal states that
switched different imperial hands from the middle ages to the early nineteenth century. Modern
Belgium was established in 1830 by local francophone elites that rebelled against the short-lived
United Kingdom of the Netherlands. The rebellion unified elites form Wallonia and Flanders,
most of whom Catholic, relatively liberal, and influenced by French ideas and culture. French,
moreover, was initially set as the sole official language. Nevertheless, the residents of these two
regions were naturally divided along linguistic and cultural lines (Zolberg, 1974; McRae, 1986;
Humes, 2014).
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Flanders was largely rural and underdeveloped and
its people overlooked by francophone elites. These conditions led to cultural and linguistic inequal-
ity and, accordingly, to growing Flemish grievances about discrimination by the state’s institutions
(McRae, 1986; Vos, 1998). The Flemish frustrations grew further in the late nineteenth century as
the region gradually modernized. With modernization, more Flemings found that upward mobility
required mastery of French and assimilation into francophone networks. Meanwhile, growing liter-
acy and education rates nurtured a burgeoning Flemish culture with a strong local nature (Zolberg,
1974; Vos, 1998; Humes, 2014).
Geography played a decisive role in these early identity formation processes. The lack of
regular contact hid most Flemings from the view of francophone elites, who assumed that the
Flemish language would eventually assimilate into the country’s modern French culture. Ironically,
this overconfidence, together with the geographical separation, provided the Flemish identity a
broader space to develop (Zolberg, 1974; Huyse, 1981). Furthermore, the francophone authorities
reacted to the Flemish grievances with local and poorly-implemented laws that integrated Flemish
as a second language in Flanders only, further reinforcing the nexus between language and region
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(Van Goethem, 2011; Humes, 2014).
Despite its early formation, however, the linguistic divide remained politically restrained until
the twentieth century. Several reasons account for this relative moderation. First, lacking suffrage
until 1893, the Flemish masses had little political influence or representation. Instead, local Flem-
ish elites were mostly francophone and conducted their business in French (Zolberg, 1974; Huyse,
1981; Humes, 2014).
Second, after the establishment of full male suffrage in 1893, the linguistic divide was chan-
neled into the existing party system, which was already structured around church and class. The
latter two cleavages predominated Belgian politics in the nineteenth century due to the country’s
rapid industrialization, at one point leading Western manufacturing together with Britain (Zolberg,
1974; Huyse, 1981). Belgium’s swift modernization led to growing tensions between the Catholic
Church and liberal elites, particularly over control of public education. Meanwhile, more workers
migrated to industrial centers, especially in booming Wallonia, forming a new labor constituency
(Humes, 2014). Seeking to counter the dual threat of secular liberalism and labor socialism, the
Catholic Church turned to the silent Flemish majority. Although it previously disapproved of the
Dutch language for fear of Calvinist influences, the church now harnessed Flemish identity and
linguistic grievances to co-opt the region’s lower and middle classes (Strikwerda, 1988; Gevers,
1998; Erk, 2005).
This mobilization strategy was highly successful. The Catholic Party decisively won the first
post-suffrage election of 1894, with 51.6% of the votes and 68.4% of lower-house seats (Nohlen
and Sto¨ver, 2010). Of these seats, 63.5% came from Flemish districts compared to only 12.5%
from Wallonia. By comparison, Walloon districts accounted for 85% of the Liberal Party’s seats
and all of the Labour Party’s seats. Moreover, the Catholic vote in Flemish provinces was higher
than in Wallonia even when holding constant class markers such as urbanization and the share of
workers (de Smaele, 2011).
The alignment between the Catholic Party and Flemish voters was further institutionalized
in following decades as the Catholics, the Liberals, and the Socialists established three separate
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pillars, each involving its own political, social, and economic institutions.6 While these pillars
crossed regional lines, a majority of Flemings consistently supported the Catholic Party while
a majority of Walloons voted for the Liberals and Socialists up until the mid-twentieth century
(McRae, 1986, p. 134).
Despite the pillar system, the salience of regional-linguistic identities continued to grow in
the first half of the twentieth century. With sustained modernization and unequal linguistic status,
the Flemish nationalist movement expanded and grew more militant. These pressures led to new
language laws in the 1920s and 1930s that formally recognized Flanders and Wallonia as mono-
linguistic regions with state services in their respective languages (Van Goethem, 2011; Humes,
2014). These laws, in turn, induced a Walloon counter-movement that sought to protect the privi-
leged status of French and considered Walloons a distinct cultural community of their own (Huyse,
1981; McRae, 1986; Kesteloot, 1998).
These developments were restrained politically until the 1960s due to a third reason: backlash
following the German occupation of Belgium in both world wars (1914–1918 and 1940–1944). In
both wars, the German occupiers strategically utilized Flamenpolitik (“Flemish policy”), a divide-
and-rule strategy that purposefully prioritized Flemish demands and split Belgium further along
its linguistic lines (Van Goethem, 2011; Humes, 2014). Moreover, the Germans found willing
collaborators among the regionalist movements, particularly in Flanders. Although this collabora-
tion was limited in size—it is estimated that 13% of Flemings collaborated with the Nazis during
World War II—it portrayed Flemish nationalists as traitors and set back their agenda after each war
(McRae, 1986; Vos, 1998). This backlash effect was particularly strong after World War II, when
tens of thousands of collaborators were publicly persecuted and the Flemish nationalist movement
disbanded for several years. Belgium’s liberation in 1944 fostered, instead, a temporary rally-
around-the-flag effect and short-lived political unity. As I discuss later in this chapter, this moment
was a critical juncture in the centralization of Belgium’s welfare state.
6The term Pillarization is used to describe the segmentation of society, most famously in the Netherlands and
Belgium, into several ideological families, each with its own social and political institutions (e.g., political parties,
labor unions, media outlets, schools, youth organizations, etc.). For more, see Lijphart (1968) and Post (1989).
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5.2.1.2 Ethno-Linguistic Dominance and State Reform: 1960s Onward
The ethno-linguistic cleavage finally took over Belgian politics from the 1960s onward. Its
upsurge was facilitated by several factors. First, the salience of the two old cleavages, structured
around church-state and class divisions, eroded. The conflict between church and state calmed
down, particularly after a compromise agreement on public education was reached in 1958. Old
class politics, meanwhile, weakened in the face of new post-materialist interests (Inglehart, 1971;
Huyse, 1981; Humes, 2014).
Second, the Flemish grievances about linguistic discrimination resurfaced in the 1960s, with
a particular focus on public universities and on the dwindling status of Dutch around Brussels.
These vocal, student-led protests resulted in new language laws that further institutionalized each
region’s linguistic autonomy (Vos, 1998; Van Goethem, 2011; Humes, 2014).
Finally, the ethno-linguistic tensions deepened due to an interregional shift in economic for-
tunes (Vos, 1998; Van Goethem, 2011; Humes, 2014). Wallonia’s steel and coal-based industries
faced a deep crisis since the 1950s, while Flanders gradually drew foreign investments and estab-
lished new petrochemical and automotive industries. In 1966, Flanders’ gross regional product per
capita surpassed Wallonia for the first time in Belgium’s history (McRae, 1986; Leibfritz, 2009).
The economic changes fractured class solidarity further, particularly after Flemish unions refused
to join Walloon strikers in 1960–1961 (Fontaine, 1998; Kesteloot, 1998).
The growing dominance of the ethno-linguistic cleavage raised new pressures in favor of polit-
ical and institutional decentralization. During the 1960s, new regional parties emerged and gained
a larger following in both areas. As a result, the three established parties—the Catholics, So-
cialists, and Liberals—split into pairs of Flemish and Walloon sister parties between 1968 and
1978. Competing within a single region, the split parties now aligned themselves with regional
interests at the expense of shared intergroup agendas (Huyse, 1981; De Winter and Baudewyns,
2009; Deschouwer, 2013). The growing fractionalization of the party system also complicated
coalition-building and governance, a problem that persists to this day.
Eventually, the ethno-linguistic divide led to a series of constitutional reforms in 1970, 1980,
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1988, 1993, 2001, and 2011, officially transforming Belgium from a unitary state to a federa-
tion (McRae, 1986; Falter, 1998; Swenden and Jans, 2006). The reforms created a complicated
multilevel structure, comprising (1) three Communities (Walloon, Flemish, and German) with re-
sponsibility for interpersonal affairs such as language, culture, and education; (2) three Regions
(Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels) with responsibility for territorial affairs such as infrastructure,
planning, and economic development; and (3) a federal government with responsibility for national
defense, monetary policy, and, as I discuss in the next section, social security. Importantly, Bel-
gium’s federal system is not hierarchical: each level, with its own parliament and government, has
exclusive responsibilities within its jurisdiction. Thus, within the division of labor noted above,
a communal or regional decree has equal power to a federal law. This structure continues to face
cross-pressures to centralize and decentralize different components and authorities, implying that
additional reforms may be yet to come.
5.2.2 Implications for Intergroup Relations
The physical segregation and lack of regular contact have been principal forces in the forma-
tion of Belgium’s ethno-linguistic cleavage, establishing two distinct communities with separate
geographic spaces, historical narratives, and political institutions. Existing research and recent
data show that this context has indeed strained the country’s intergroup solidarity, including neg-
ative affect and stereotypes, low interpersonal trust, and a relatively weak shared identity. At the
same time, unlike in cases with high intergroup inequality, there are no signs of a strong interclass
conflict. Let us examine each aspect in turn.
5.2.2.1 Negative Affect and Stereotypes
First, both ethno-linguistic communities express negative affect and stereotypes toward the
other group. Research conducted among Belgian students as early as the 1960s and 1970s found
both positive perceptions of one’s ethno-linguistic in-group members and negative feelings toward
the other group. These sentiments were largest among students who did not come in regular contact
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with the other group (McRae, 1986). Moreover, members in both linguistic groups guessed that
out-group members thought worse of them than the latter actually did (McRae, 1986; Mesquita
et al., 2010).
The content of out-group stereotypes is rooted in the two groups’ historical narratives, each
emphasizing its own victimhood. This point is implied by a survey question that asks Belgians
to state the year in which the ethno-linguistic conflict began (Rime´ et al., 2015). The median
answer among Flemings was 1830, the year of Belgium’s independence, evoking memories of
Flemish disenfranchisement under francophone dominance. By contrast, the median Walloon an-
swer was 1930, the interwar period in which Flemish nationalism grew stronger and new bilingual
laws eroded the privileged status of French. Both groups, then, identify the conflict’s roots in the
other side’s antagonistic behavior. Furthermore, when asked explicitly, members of both groups
indicated that their own group suffered more at the hands of the other side than vice versa.
Given the Flemish narrative of francophone disparagement, many Flemings consider Walloons
arrogant and disdainful compared to a more authentic and honest Flemish nature (Klein et al.,
2011). Indeed, Flemish nationalist parties continue to frame themselves as rebels against cos-
mopolitan elites who belittle and condescend Flemish identity (de Smaele, 2011). Many Walloons,
meanwhile, consider the Flemings selfish and intolerant of other groups and traditions (McRae,
1986; Klein et al., 2011). These stereotypes and narratives are reinforced by the lack of regular,
unmediated contact. With federalization, each community maintains its own education system, me-
dia outlets, and political debates and cultivate different values and worldviews (Erk, 2003; Billiet,
Maddens and Frognier, 2006). Moreover, the split media tends to cover political events through a
narrow lens that flattens and typecasts the other group’s positions (Van Goethem, 2011; Sinardet,
2007).
5.2.2.2 Intergroup Distance, Trust, and Shared Identity
The prevalence of mutual stereotypes and high social distance fracture intergroup solidarity,
trust, and a shared national identity. Recent studies find that Belgians with a stronger sense of
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collective victimhood and in-group identification also tend to express stronger out-group antag-
onism and purposefully avoid contact with the other ethno-linguistic group (Jasini, Delvaux and
Mesquita, 2017; Meuleman, Abts and Meeusen, 2017).
As the micro-behavioral literature would expect, the social distance between Flemings and
Walloons undermines social trust more generally. I examine this relationship using survey data
from the 2007 Belgian National Election Study (BNES).7 As the outcome variable, I measure
interpersonal trust as the level of respondent agreement with the following statement: “Today
you cannot be careful enough when dealing with other people”. The answers range on a 5-point
scale from “Completely disagree” to “Completely agree”. A majority in both regions (52.7% of
Flemings and 66.1% of Walloons) agreed or completely agreed with the statement.
To consider the relationship between trust and ethno-linguistic relations, I regress interpersonal
trust on two measures of intergroup distance. The first, which measures perceived intergroup
differences, is a dummy variable based on the following question: “Are there major or minor
differences in mentality and lifestyle between Flemings and Walloons?” The answers are either
“Small differences” or “Major differences”. The second measure captures cultural distance based
on a question that asks respondents if they feel closer to a Belgian out-group member or to a
foreign citizen from their respective cultural heritage (French citizens for Walloons and Dutch
citizens for Flemings). I code the answers as a dummy variable that indicates higher identification
with a French/Dutch citizen over a Belgian out-group member. Table 5.1 shows the distribution
of answers to both questions. While more Flemings see major differences between the groups,
an attestation to their stronger historical mobilization, substantive shares of both communities
perceive broad intergroup and cultural distance.
Table 5.2 presents estimates from an OLS regression that also controls for individual-level age
group, gender, education, church attendance, and full employment. Perceiving major differences
between the two groups and feeling closer to a foreign cultural peer both correlate with lower levels
of interpersonal trust. The negative correlations hold whether the two social distance variables are
7I am grateful to Prof. Marc Swyngedouw from the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO) at
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven for access to BNES datasets from 1991 to 2007.
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Table 5.1: Intergroup Distance by Region, 2007
Total Flanders Wallonia Brussels
Intergroup Differences
Small Differences 46.0% 38.8% 52.8% 64.0%
Major Differences 54.0% 61.2% 47.2% 36.0%
Observations 1988 1,039 707 242
Cultural Distance
Close to Dutch/French citizen 34.0% 36.4% 32.4% 28.1%
Closer to out-group Belgian 30.2% 33.6% 27.1% 23.7%
No difference/Depends 35.8% 30.0% 40.5% 48.3%
Observations 2,032 1,071 714 247
included separately (models 1–2), together (3), or with region fixed effects (model 4).
Table 5.2: Interpersonal Trust: OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intergroup Differences -0.143∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
Cultural Distance -0.181∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
Age Group -0.016 -0.013 -0.017 -0.022
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Female -0.125∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.110∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Education 0.255∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Religiosity 0.033∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.031∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Full Employment 0.054 0.062 0.067 0.059
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
Constant 2.053∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗ 2.038∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.120)
Region Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 1,985 2,028 1,978 1,978
R2 0.111 0.114 0.117 0.146
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
Belgium’s ethno-linguistic cleavage also undermines their shared Belgian identity. Compara-
tively, Belgians take less pride in their country than most other Europeans. Using pooled survey
data from waves 3 and 4 (1999–2001 and 2008–2010) of the European Values Survey (EVS), I
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examine a question that asks respondents how proud they are to be citizens of their country. The
answers range on a 4-point scale between “Not at all proud” and “Very proud”. I regress this
variable on EU country dummies, while also controlling for age group, gender, education, church
attendance, full employment, and EVS wave. Figure 5.4 plots the country dummy coefficients
compared to the Belgian baseline, marked in a dashed line. All else equal, Belgian respondents’
pride in their country is weaker on average than all but four EU countries.
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Figure 5.4: National Pride: Country Coefficients from OLS Regression
Using survey data from 1979 to 2014 (BNES, Deschouwer et al., 2015), Figure 5.5 compares
the share of Flemings and Walloons who state that they are firstly Belgians (left-side panel) and
the share who instead chose their Fleming/Walloon regions or communities (right-side panel).8 In
both groups, the data show a relatively stable pattern of double-digit identification with the regions
8Additional answers, which are not shown, included one’s province and one’s commune/city.
105
and communities before the state. Nevertheless, Flemings consistently identify with their region
and community more strongly than Walloons. This pattern corroborates the existence of a more
cohesive and mobilized Flemish identity, fitting the historical processes discussed earlier. Further-
more, some Walloons with a strong national identity may still think of a francophone Belgium as
it existed in the past (Fontaine, 1998).
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Figure 5.5: National and Subnational Identification by Region, 1979–2014
At the same time, a majority in both regions identified as Belgians first, particularly since the
1990s. The literature offers both a substantive and a technical explanation for this curious trend.
Substantively, federalization may have enabled regional and national identities to complement one
another more easily, although at the cost of a thinner national identity (Hooghe, 2004; Billiet,
Maddens and Frognier, 2006; De Winter and Baudewyns, 2009). This explanation echoes a similar
process identified in Spain, as the next chapter discusses. Technically, this survey question was
shown to be sensitive to small changes, such as different wording or the order of the answers
presented to respondents (Hooghe, 2004; Deschouwer et al., 2015). Thus, the exact distribution of
answers and the temporal trends should be treated cautiously.
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5.2.2.3 Interclass Conflict
My theoretical framework expects that cases like Belgium, where group identities are shaped
more strongly by geography than by class, would not produce noteworthy levels of interclass con-
flict. Several questions from the BNES surveys show that neither ethno-linguistic group expresses
particular reservations toward the poor, even as the historically left-leaning Walloons are some-
what more progressive than Flemings. In 2007, a majority in both groups (63.3% of Flemings and
74.2% of Walloons) agreed or strongly agreed that “Workers still have to struggle for an equal
position in society”. In the same vein, in 1999, less than a third of either group (29.8% of Flemings
and 23.7% of Walloons) agreed or strongly agreed that “Even ordinary people usually get their fair
share of the wealth of our country”.
Moreover, class identification does not seem central to either group. The 1995 election survey
asked respondents how important they consider membership in a list of social categories. A major-
ity of both groups found shared territory (61.1% of Flemings and 68.3% of Walloons) and shared
language (66.4% of Flemings and 73.7% of Walloons) important or very important. By contrast,
only a minority of both groups found social class (18.7% of Flemings and 30.1% of Walloons) and
shared occupation (16.5% of Flemings and 25% of Walloons) important or very important.
Comparatively, Belgians’ perceptions of class struggle do not stand out from other countries.
To see that, I examine the same question from the 2009 module of the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP) used in Chapter 3: “In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts
between different social groups. In your opinion, in [respondent’s country] how much conflict
is there between the working class and the middle class?” The answers range on a 4-point scale
between “There are no conflicts” and “Very strong conflicts”. Unfortunately, the 2009 ISSP only
surveyed Flemish Belgians. Nevertheless, given that there are only mild differences between the
groups on class issues, the data are still instructive. As before, I estimate an OLS regression that
includes country dummies while also controlling for individual-level age group, gender, education,
and church attendance. The country coefficients are plotted in Figure 5.6 with Belgium as the
baseline category. The results place Belgium’s baseline around the middle of the sample, neither
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particularly higher nor particularly lower than other countries.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
United States
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Portugal
Norway
New Zealand
Italy
Israel
Great Britain
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Austria
Australia
Belgium (Flanders)
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Coefficient Compared with Belgium
Co
un
try
Figure 5.6: Class Conflict: Country Coefficients from OLS Regression
5.3 Intergroup Relations and Redistribution
Thus far, the Belgian case has followed my theoretical expectations regarding intergroup re-
lations and solidarity. How does this context implicate redistributive preferences and policies? I
begin, again, with a brief historical context of Belgium’s welfare state.
5.3.1 Redistributive Centralization and Decentralization in Belgium: Historical Context
The development of Belgium’s welfare state can be roughly divided to three periods: an initial
period of bottom-up formation from the nineteenth century to World War II; a period of centraliza-
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tion from World War II to the 1980s; and, starting from the 1980s, a period of increased pressures
to decentralize welfare policy to the communities. Let us briefly examine each in turn.
5.3.1.1 Fragmented Roots
Belgium’s welfare state developed historically from the ground up. In the nineteenth century,
as industrialization swept through Belgium, basic social services began to mushroom across the
country’s industrial centers through local associations, mutual aid funds, labor unions, religious in-
stitutions, and employer-run funds. These services included insurance for occupational accidents,
unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, and family allowances, among others (Be´land and
Lecours, 2008; Cantillon, 2011). Throughout this period, the central government played a limited
role confined to basic regulation and to minor subsidies for these grassroots organizations (Moeys,
2018).
The state’s involvement gradually grew from the end of the nineteenth century to World War I,
although still mostly through regulations and subsidies. Meanwhile, the welfare system’s localized
structure remained in place, particularly as the voluntary organizations integrated into the pillar
system’s social and political ecosystems. Rather than the ethno-linguistic divide, the reliance on
local service provision was driven to a large extent by partisan ideology and interests. Like other
Christian Democrats in Europe, the ruling Catholic Party rejected nationalized social security in
favor of state subsidies for privately-run welfare services, not least their own (Van Kersbergen,
2011). At the same time, this diffusion was not absolute: protecting their political power, the
Catholics centralized the subsidy allocation mechanism to curb the influence of local authorities
controlled by the socialists or liberals (Moeys, 2018).
The left gained more political leverage in the 1920s and 1930s, following Belgium’s switch
to proportional representation and coalition-based governments. With this change, the state in-
troduced its first two mandatory programs: old-age pensions (1924–1925) and family allowances
(1930). Yet, even as the central government broadened its reach, the management and distribu-
tion of these services remained at the hands of local social organizations. In addition, the new
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compulsory programs did not replace existing employer-run services (Be´land and Lecours, 2008;
Cantillon, 2011). Thus, by the eve of World War II, the Belgian welfare system was highly frag-
mented with some government regulation and subsidies.
The ethno-linguistic cleavage was not a major factor in these processes. Between the still-active
church-state and class cleavages and the pillar system’s successful co-optation of ethno-linguistic
identities, the fragmented provision of social services mitigated redistributive conflicts between
the two groups. That said, some tensions did surface when group interests collided more overtly.
This was more common in the interwar period, when ethno-linguistic antagonism deepened and
the central government became more involved in social policy. In one notable example, some
Walloons objected the national expansion of mandatory family allowances in 1930, claiming that
they unfairly transferred income to large Catholic families in Flanders (Be´land and Lecours, 2008;
Cantillon, Pestieau and Schokkaert, 2009; Van Goethem, 2011). Yet, these conflicts were limited
in scope and exceptions rather than the rule.
5.3.1.2 Post-World War II Centralization
Belgium’s fragmented welfare state reached a critical historical juncture in 1944, when the
country switched to a national and mandatory social security system. The new system emerged
following the Social Pact, an agreement reached in April 1944 by representatives of the pre-war
trade unions, employer organizations, and civil service. The Social Pact was negotiated secretly
under the German occupation in preparation for the country’s liberation. It eventually laid out
general principles for cooperative labor relations in return for expanded social rights and a national
social security system.
In December 1944, merely three months after the Allied Forces freed Brussels, the pact’s gen-
eral principles were fleshed out by new legislation. Belgium’s new social security system was
based on a national fund that pooled mandatory contributions from employers and workers com-
plemented by state subsidies. At the same time, the distribution of benefits remained at the hands
of existing social organizations, particularly labor unions and mutual health funds (Be´land and
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Lecours, 2008; Cantillon, 2011).9 The system included four core services: old-age pensions, un-
employment benefits, family allowances, and health insurance. It also offered occupational injury
compensation, annual paid leave, and modest, means-tested social assistance. Additional expan-
sions in the 1960s and 1970s added coverage for the self-employed and means-tested income
support for the disabled and elderly (Dandoy and Baudewyns, 2005; Be´land and Lecours, 2008).
Despite various pressures for reforms, the system’s core framework remained strongly rooted in
the 1944 legislation for decades to come.
Although the calls for a national social security were not new, the shock caused by World War
II was crucial for the centralization of Belgium’s welfare state. Ideologically, the new agreements
were part of an effort to project unity and moderation as Belgium restored from the toxic inter-
nal divisions and extremist factions cultivated by the Nazis, not least the regionalist movements
(Conway, 2012). This effort was further reinforced by a similar expansion of social services across
post-war Europe, a shared and hard-taught lesson on the risks of mass unemployment and radical-
ized workers (Conway, 2012).
From a political perspective, the end of the German occupation opened a temporary window
to pass reforms without effective opposition. The Social Pact was negotiated clandestinely under
Nazi rule, a period in which many social actors, especially the unions, were weakened and thus
more open to compromise (Pasture, 1993). The absence of political and institutional opposition
was particularly apparent in the follow-up legislation, drafted and pushed by Achille Van Acker, the
minister of Labor and Welfare and head of the Socialist Party. Despite the lack of broad consensus
regarding the new system’s design, the legislation passed quickly using a series of special wartime
decrees, with a single cabinet discussion and no parliamentary vote (Pasture, 1993; Dandoy and
Baudewyns, 2005; Be´land and Lecours, 2008; Conway, 2012).
These exclusionary dynamics largely muted ethno-linguistic and regional sentiments. The re-
gionalist movements, which were the primary bearers of ethno-linguistic politics, faced public
backlash due to some of their members’ collaboration during the war. With their temporary dis-
9According to Be´land and Lecours (2008, 153), the shared responsibility between the state and local organizations
explain why most Belgians refer to the system as “social insurance” rather than a “welfare state”.
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integration, the reform was passed by a relatively conservative coalition rooted in the old pillar
system.
5.3.1.3 New Pressures to Decentralize
The possibility of social security decentralization, which would devolve revenue collection
and policymaking to each community, was raised as early as the 1950s and 1960s. Some ar-
guments were functional, but others, particularly from the (then) economically stronger Walloon
side, claimed that the system unfairly redistributes income to the Flemish community (Dandoy and
Baudewyns, 2005; Be´land and Lecours, 2008). Yet, these positions were taken at the margins. In
fact, as late as 1968, the primary regional parties expressed their support for the national social
security system (Dandoy and Baudewyns, 2005).
The pressures to decentralize social security gained more steam from the 1970s onward, with
the ethno-linguistic realignment of Belgium politics, federalization, and the interregional reversal
of economic fortunes. By the early 1970s, the regional parties changed course and demanded
social security changes aligning with their respective priorities: the Flemish movement wanted full
devolution, while the francophone regionalists, concerned with the economic crisis in Wallonia,
proposed to devolve family and health benefits but keep unemployment and old-age programs
centralized. By the mid–1990s, as the federalization process was in full force, the regional Flemish
government and legislature endorsed proposals to transfer social policymaking to the community
level. The position in Wallonia was more fragmented, wavering between strict opposition and
support for partial devolution, particularly among its smaller regionalist factions (Dandoy and
Baudewyns, 2005; Be´land and Lecours, 2008).
These pressures, however, have mostly been futile. The constitutional reforms consistently pro-
tected the federal government’s authority over social security, in particular the core, contribution-
funded programs that involve old-age pensions, incapacity and occupational injuries, unemploy-
ment benefits, health insurance, and, until recently, family allowances. Belgium’s complex federal
structure allows the regions and communities to add social services within their jurisdictions so
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long as they are not overreaching the central government’s authority. The result is partial decen-
tralization at the margins of the welfare state (Cantillon et al., 2006; Be´land and Lecours, 2008;
Velaes, 2011). For example, while the federal government manages unemployment benefits, the
regions manage unemployment training programs. The regions also run certain social assistance
programs outside social security, such as public housing and rent subsidies. The communities,
meanwhile, offer complementary services—prevention, education, daily assistance, and so on—
for healthcare, family, and old-age needs.
The level of decentralization is also limited by taxation capacity, which has largely remained at
the federal level (Swenden and Jans, 2006). The communities currently have no fiscal autonomy,
and so their social services are mostly funded by federal tax transfers. By contrast, the regions are
authorized to levy additional taxes or give certain tax breaks on top of federal taxation, although
most regional revenues are transferred from the central government. New legislation, passed in
2014, is expected to increase the regions’ taxation autonomy.10
Unlike certain federations, there are no direct interregional transfers in Belgium. Rather, most
interregional redistribution flows indirectly through the social security system and other federally
collected taxes (Leibfritz, 2009). According to estimations from the early 2000s, about 4% of
Flemish income was transferred to Wallonia and Brussels in this way (Dandoy and Baudewyns,
2005; Cantillon et al., 2006). This number reflects the existing socioeconomic and demographic
differences between the groups, although it is also not unbearable. Thus, the federal welfare sys-
tem, which is interpersonal in nature, is a key vehicle for intergroup redistribution. Indeed, the
public discussion on social security decentralization is far from over, and, as I discuss below, have
led to gradual changes nonetheless.
10According to OECD data, the regions and communities increased their reliance on their own taxation as the
reforms progressed. Thus, by 2007, the share of their revenues from federally transferred taxes dropped to 59.3%
compared to 74.7% in 1990 (Leibfritz, 2009). The new taxation capacities may need more time to take effect, however:
according to the 2017 budget plans of the regional Flemish and Walloon governments, the planned share of revenues
from federal sources remains 58.9% and 59%, respectively.
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5.3.2 Redistributive Preferences: Redistribution vs. Decentralization
Given that Belgian social security pools together two antagonistic groups, what do their mem-
bers think about the country’s redistributive system? In line with my theoretical framework, I
separate attitudes toward income redistribution in general and toward the decentralization of so-
cial security in particular. Theoretically, I expect to find a stronger support for the latter than the
former, particularly as regional identities grow.
5.3.2.1 Public Preferences on Redistribution
I begin with general preferences on income redistribution. Using ESS data from 2016, Table
5.3 summarizes the distribution of Belgian respondents’ agreement that “the government should
take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. The answers range on a 5-point scale be-
tween “Disagree strongly” and “Agree strongly”, which I collapse to a 3-point scale for ease of
presentation. The findings show that a majority of Belgians support or strongly support income
redistribution by the government. As expected, Flemings hold less progressive views on redistribu-
tion than Walloons, who have been historically more left-winged than the former. Yet, in Flanders,
too, a large majority positively supports income redistribution.
Table 5.3: Support for Redistribution by Region, 2016
Everyone Flanders Wallonia Brussles
Disagree strongly/Disagree 14.5% 17.6% 11.0% 6.8%
Neutral 13.1% 13.5% 12.0% 13.7%
Agree/Agree strongly 72.4% 68.9% 77.1% 79.5%
Observations 1,760 1,068 502 190
I find similarly strong support, and fewer differences, when examining specific areas of so-
cial policy. Table 5.4 showcases the distribution of answers to three questions about the level of
responsibility that the government should take for (1) a reasonable standard of living for the old,
(2) a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed, and (3) sufficient child care services for
working parents. The answers range on an 11-point scale between “Should not be governments’
responsibility at all” and “Should be entirely governments’ responsibility”, which I collapse to a
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3-point scale for ease of presentation. As the data show, members of both groups display strong
support for all three policies with few intergroup differences.
Table 5.4: Support for Different Types of Redistribution by Region, 2016
Old-age Unemployment Child-care
Flanders Wallonia Flanders Wallonia Flanders Wallonia
Negative 2.9% 2.6% 15.7% 17.3% 5.6% 4.6%
Neutral 5.1% 4.8% 16.9% 17.5% 6.2% 6.8%
Positive 92.0% 92.6% 67.4% 65.1% 88.2% 88.7%
Observations 1,072 502 1,071 502 1,070 502
These positions place Belgians in par with most European countries. To illustrate that, I exam-
ine the same four questions—support for income redistribution in general and for the three specific
policy areas in particular—using the full cross-sectional ESS sample.11 I regress support for each
question on the sample’s country dummies while controlling for individual-level differences in
age group, gender, education, church attendance, and full unemployment. Figure 5.7 displays the
country coefficients compared with Belgium. In all cases, the Belgian baseline, marked by the
dashed line, is around the center. Belgians, in other words, do not stand out from other European
countries in their views on redistribution.
In addition to policy preferences, a majority of Belgians in both regions are supportive of
the country’s welfare institutions. Three waves in the EVS survey, between 1990 to 2008, asked
respondents about their level of confidence in their country’s social security system. The answers
ranged on a 4-point scale between “None at all” and “A great deal”, which I collapse to a simple
binary indicator of positive or negative support. Figure 5.8 displays the answers over time by
region. In both regions, a clear majority of respondents express strong confidence in Belgium’s
social security system. (The peak in 2008–2010 may reflect higher demand for welfare benefits
given the global economic crisis.)
This confidence, moreover, is comparatively high. As before, Figure 5.9 presents country
coefficients based on a cross-sectional OLS regression that controls for individual-level age group,
11I collapse the latter 3 questions to a 5-point scale for easier comparison with the first one. I use version 1.1 of ESS
wave 8 (2016), published April 9, 2018. While this version is the most recent, it is missing several countries (Hungary,
Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) whose data was still being processed prior to future release.
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Figure 5.8: Confidence in Social Security by Region, 1990–2010
gender, education, church attendance, and full employment, as well as for EVS wave. Holding
these attributes constant, Belgians’ confidence in social security is higher than all countries but
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Figure 5.9: Confidence in Social Security: Country Coefficients from OLS Regression
As I expect, then, Belgium’s tense intergroup relations do not produce weak or conflictual
preferences on income redistribution. The data show that most Belgians support public welfare
policies express trust in the country’s welfare institutions. Despite a small interregional gap, which
is consistent with historical left-right differences, these attitudes are shared by large majorities in
both groups.
5.3.2.2 Public Discourse and Preferences on Social Security Decentralization
In contrast to general redistribution, the intergroup tensions surface when we shift our gaze
to social security decentralization. As noted previously, the pressures to devolve social security
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have intensified since the 1990s, particularly in Flanders. Flemish elites have raised two types
of arguments in favor of social security decentralization, one functional and the other conflictual.
Functionally, given that the communities already manage some social policies, moderate Flemings
argue that welfare decentralization would create a more institutionally coherent system. In addi-
tion, invoking the core EU principle of subsidiarity, some claim that devolved welfare programs
would be better attuned to the preferences and needs of each community (Orsini, 2004; Dandoy
and Baudewyns, 2005; Be´land and Lecours, 2018).
Other arguments, however, point explicitly to the system’s intergroup transfers. Flemish nation-
alists, in particular, have argued that social solidarity should be strictly communal, exclaiming in
one slogan that “every year, every Flemish family pays for a new car for a Walloon family” (Be´land
and Lecours, 2008, 166). Flemish nationalists, moreover, portray social security transfers to Wal-
lonia as unfair subsidies to a lazy and profligate culture of government dependency. The Flemings,
conversely, are described as productive and efficient, squeezed between carefree Walloons from
below and the taxes of a corrupt, cosmopolitan elite from above (Dandoy and Baudewyns, 2005;
Be´land and Lecours, 2008; Jamin, 2011).
The Walloons, expectedly, reject this narrative. Francophone elites have raised several counter-
arguments, both factual and normative. From a factual standpoint, Walloon economists have ar-
gued that the interregional transfers flow from Flanders due to demographic factors, not cultural
or behavioral differences. As such, they argue, the balance would flip once the current economic
and sociodemographic conditions change. Furthermore, normatively, francophone elites paint the
social security system as a last bastion of national solidarity and unified Belgian identity. Decen-
tralization, they warn, may hasten the disintegration of Belgian society (Dandoy and Baudewyns,
2005; Be´land and Lecours, 2008, 2018).
This conflict is reflected well in public opinion. Between 1995 and 2003, the BNES survey
asked respondents whether they agree that the social security system should be defederalized. The
answers ranged on a 5-point scale between “Completely agree” and “Completely disagree”, which
I collapse to a 3-point measure of positive, neutral, or negative support for redistributive decen-
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tralization. The distribution of answers over time, presented in Figure 5.10, finds an intergroup
rift on this issue. In Flanders, a plurality of respondents support social security decentralization
and between 22–27% are neither opposed nor supportive. In Wallonia, by contrast, a majority of
61–71% opposes the devolution of social security, although these rates consistently decline since
1999.
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Figure 5.10: Support for Social Security Decentralization by Region, 1995–2003
A deeper look at the data corroborates the relationship between support for decentralization
and the ethno-linguistic conflict. To see that, I use the most recently available BNES survey from
2007. In this survey, respondents were asked to rate their position on a 10-point scale between
“Defederalize social security” and “Federalize social security”.12 I regress their answers on the two
variables of group distance used previously: (1) perceived intergroup differences in mentality and
lifestyle, and (2) respondents’ cultural distance from the other group. I add several sets of control
variables. First, I control for differences in age group, gender, education, church attendance, full
employment, and the number of children. Second, I add controls for ideological beliefs related
12The change of wording and scale relative to 1995–2003 complicates direct comparison with previous years. While
I do not include the 2007 survey in Figure 10, the distribution of answers follows the same pattern: Flemings are
equally divided between support and opposition to decentralization, while a majority of Walloons reject it. The exact
shares, however, depend on the exact conversion method from a 10-point to a 3-point scale.
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to welfare, including level support for redistribution, support for individualist values, and self-
identification on a left-right scale.13 Finally, I add region dummy variables with Flanders as the
baseline category.
The results are presented in Table 5.5. As I expect, the perception of major intergroup dif-
ferences and a larger cultural distance both correlate with increased support for social security
decentralization. According to model 1, all else equal, the linear combination of perceiving major
group differences and identifying more strongly with a foreign cultural peer increases support for
decentralization by 1.7 points (or 17% of the dependent variable’s 10-point scale). The significant
effect of these two variables remains robust to the inclusion of ideological preferences (model 2)
and even regional dummies (model 3). Hence, the relationship between ethno-linguistic tensions
and support for decentralization is not an artifact of sociodemographic differences or of a partic-
ular region. Moreover, the large size and statistical significance of the regional dummies, even
after controlling for individual attributes and beliefs, imply that the disagreement on social secu-
rity decentralization has become entrenched in interregional identities and politics more broadly
and collectively. Finally, to reinforce the point made earlier, model 4 regresses general support
for redistribution on the same covariates and does not find that similar implications by intergroup
attitudes.
5.3.3 Redistributive Decentralization: Baby Steps Toward Devolution
The final link in my theoretical chain argues that preferences on redistribution, in this case
for more decentralization, should lead to actual policy outcomes. However, despite the growing
pressures to decentralize social security, Belgium’s primary welfare programs remain centralized.
Why is this so? And are there any signs of change? A closer look at recent policy developments
implies that the pressures for social policy devolution do bear fruit, even if gradually so.
13Support for redistribution is measured using the level of agreement that the government should reduce income
differences (4-point scale), individualism is measured as the level of agreement that “in our society everything turns
around one’s own interest, power and material success. That is why it is better to take care first and only for oneself”
(5-point scale), and left-right self-identification is measured on an 11-point scale.
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Table 5.5: Support for Social Security Decentralization: OLS Regression
Support for Social Support for
Security Decentralization Redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intergroup Differences 0.965∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.404∗ -0.098
(0.191) (0.191) (0.179) (0.058)
Cultural Distance 0.711∗∗ 0.645∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.216) (0.212) (0.191) (0.061)
Age Group -0.014 -0.028 -0.089 -0.031
(0.103) (0.102) (0.097) (0.030)
Female -0.283 -0.158 -0.113 0.098
(0.191) (0.189) (0.174) (0.057)
Education 0.124 0.079 0.113 -0.188∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.102) (0.093) (0.030)
Religiosity -0.051 -0.064 -0.094 -0.015
(0.063) (0.063) (0.057) (0.019)
Full Employment -0.114 -0.035 -0.063 -0.105
(0.245) (0.242) (0.225) (0.073)
Number of Children -0.001 -0.028 -0.055 -0.041
(0.104) (0.100) (0.095) (0.033)
Redistribution -0.486∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗
(0.098) (0.091)
Individualism 0.331∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗ -0.017
(0.094) (0.088) (0.028)
Right-Wing 0.202∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.046) (0.016)
Wallonia -2.592∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.059)
Brussels -1.676∗∗∗ 0.121
(0.282) (0.097)
Constant 3.275∗∗∗ 3.256∗∗∗ 4.191∗∗∗ 4.535∗∗∗
(0.723) (0.937) (0.871) (0.246)
Observations 1,401 1,361 1,361 1,373
R2 0.040 0.091 0.214 0.114
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
5.3.3.1 Stability. . .
Several reasons explain the robustness of Belgium’s centralized social security system, most
related to elites and institutions. First, beyond public opinion, several political actors stand to lose
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from decentralization. These include the francophone parties, whose constituencies in Wallonia
may see lower benefits under a decentralized system (Dandoy, Matagne and Van Wynsberghe,
2013). Yet, decentralization is also opposed by national employer organizations and labor unions,
including the mostly-Flemish Catholic union, whose institutional power is rooted in the federal
system. Unlike the party system, these organizations did not split along regional lines and would
thus lose influence in a decentralized system (Be´land and Lecours, 2005). Indeed, regionally-
organized unions are much more open to social policy decentralization than their national counter-
parts (Bouteca, Devos and Mus, 2013).
Second, these actors have strong influence due to Belgium’s institutional design, which de-
mands high intergroup consensus on major legislation (Be´land and Lecours, 2005; Dandoy and
Baudewyns, 2005). Currently, to pass structural reforms, the constitution requires both a two-thirds
majority vote in parliament and an internal majority within each linguistic party bloc. Moreover, a
special provision enables 25% of members in a given linguistic party bloc to withhold any legisla-
tion that they claim would hurt their community’s interests. Finally, the government must include
an equal number of ministers from both groups (Deschouwer, 2006). In this institutional environ-
ment, therefore, comprehensive decentralization cannot pass without the support of francophone
politicians and other influential social actors.
Finally, there are organizational and regulatory issues that complicate decentralization in prac-
tice. First, devolution of such an organizationally and institutionally complex system can only
occur slowly and gradually. Furthermore, it must resolve the sensitive issue of Brussels, which
lacks a clear linguistic and regional affiliation and includes some of the country’s deepest pockets
of both prosperity and poverty (Cantillon, 2012). In addition, any reform that would separate wel-
fare programs by ethno-linguistic communities would need to accommodate EU free movement
regulations, which require provision of social security benefits to any foreign EU citizen regard-
less of nationality or territory of origin (Cantillon, Popelier and Mussche, 2011; Giubboni et al.,
2017).
122
5.3.3.2 . . . And Some Change
Taken together, these reasons produce a strong bias in favor of the status quo. Nevertheless,
as Belgium’s decades-long reform process exemplifies, this environment changes through small,
incremental steps. At least two such processes have indeed taken place in the past few years.
The first process involves Flemish efforts to add independent social programs on top of the
federal system rather than dismantle it. In 1999, the Flemish legislature passed an independent
welfare program providing cash benefits for long-term, non-medical care of dependents (Cantillon,
2011). The program is universal and financed by a special regional flat tax. More importantly, it
complements an already-existing federal program for dependency care that uses more selective
eligibility criteria. Thus, some Flemish recipients may be eligible for benefits from both programs.
The new program prompted a prolonged legal battle waged by francophone politicians, first
in the Constitutional Court of Belgium and later in the European Court of Justice. The Belgian
constitutional court ruled in favor of the Flemings, determining that the communities are allowed
to develop their own social programs as long as they are within their jurisdictions and do not
change the status of federal social security (Cantillon et al., 2006; Be´land and Lecours, 2008). The
European Court of Justice, meanwhile, determined that exclusion of non-Flemings breaks the EU
regulation of free movement, forcing the Flemish community to cover all EU migrants working in
Belgium under the plan. Ironically, this ruling now excludes only Walloons and Belgian Germans,
who, as native citizens, are not considered EU migrants (Cantillon, 2011; Velaes, 2011).
The sustainment of the Flemish long-term care program had two additional implications. First,
it created a race to the top: in reaction to the program, several francophone politicians proposed
in the early 2000s to expand the federal long-term care benefits in order to contest and curb the
effectiveness of the Flemish program (Be´land and Lecours, 2008; Cantillon, 2011). Second, The
precedent set with this program opened the door to similar proposals in Flanders. In 2009, for
example, the Flemish government promised communal programs for basic hospitalization insur-
ance and additional child allowances (Cantillon, 2012). These proposals, however, were eventually
abandoned in 2014 due to budgetary constraints.
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The second process toward decentralization has involved new francophone concessions as part
of the sixth state reform of 2011, reached by the two sides after the longest period of coalition
negotiations in Belgian history (Be´land and Lecours, 2018). While the reform mostly protected
the social security system, it nevertheless devolved family allowances as well as some old-age and
healthcare competencies to the communities. As noted before, these new capabilities were also
coupled with increased taxation autonomy at the region level (Deschouwer and Reuchamps, 2013;
Goossens and Cannoot, 2015; Be´land and Lecours, 2018). This development hints that enduring
political crises are another channel through which additional changes may come in the future.
In sum, the social security system remains centralized, mostly due to the lack of an institution-
ally required consensus among voters and political actors. Yet, the ongoing pressures to decen-
tralize the system, particularly form Flemish actors, gradually erode its centralized and exclusive
structure.
5.4 Conclusion: Lessons from the Belgian Case
In summary, despite Belgium’s relatively high investment in welfare programs, an in-depth
look finds similar processes to the ones outlined in my theoretical framework. Like in other coun-
tries with salient ascriptive identities, Belgium’s ethno-linguistic politics can be traced back to
historical power asymmetries that shaped and politically activated group boundaries. In these
processes, Belgium’s geographic context—the high regional segregation between Flemings and
Walloons—played a particularly significant role in reinforcing these identities, attaching them to
specific regions, and fostering two separate political communities with weak intergroup solidarity.
Indeed, the data show that the absence of regular contact and the separate cultural, social, and
institutional spheres that developed over time have exacerbated intergroup relations. At the same
time, I do not find evidence that these factors induce notable interclass conflict. Thus, geography,
and not class, has been a key social category in Belgium’s ethno-linguistic cleavage.
This context implicates redistributive policies in different ways than in the US. Belgians that
express stronger regional identification and out-group distance tend to support decentralization of
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social security, not more regressive welfare policies. Moreover, these positions are more common
in Flanders, where the regional identity has been historically stronger, more contentious, and more
mobilized. The fact that Flanders has grown richer also plays a part, a point to which I return later.
The actual outcomes in Belgium have been more complicated. At first glance, the country’s
relatively centralized social security system does not align with my theoretical expectations and
with the bottom-up pressures that I identify. However, a closer look at Belgium’s history, institu-
tional design, and gradual changes tells a different story. Belgium’s welfare state developed in a
fragmented and localized manner. It was centralized in a critical historical moment in which the
country’s ethno-linguistic politics and institutional veto points were temporarily diffused. Once
these forces reemerged, the centralized system faced growing pressures but was also locked in
amid insufficient intergroup and institutional consensus on reforms.
Nevertheless, the centralized system’s persistence is particularly useful to expose the under-
lying pressures for decentralization. A better alignment between institutions and preferences can
placate and obscure the latter, as may be the case in other geographically divided democracies. In
Belgium itself, as we have seen, the switch to federalism has eased some of the tensions between
regional identification and national pride. In the absence of a similar alignment in welfare poli-
cies, the agitation surrounding social security decentralization remains vocal and visible. Thus, I
find active pressures to devolve redistribution to the regions, particularly by Flemish voters and
elites, as well as incremental steps that consistently erode the existing system’s centralized nature.
Despite their inconclusive and dynamic outcomes, these processes in themselves corroborate my
theoretical argument and hint at the future paths to which the Belgian welfare state may be headed.
5.4.1 Mechanisms: Elites, Voters, and Institutions
Like in the American case study, the in-depth examination of Belgium provides additional
insights into the mechanisms that connect preferences and actual policy, particularly welfare de-
centralization. As before, both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms are at play. Belgium’s com-
plicated institutional landscape amplifies the influence of various political elites acting on their
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own interests. On one side of the debate, actors such as the national labor unions and employer
organizations, whose institutional power is embedded in the national system, oppose additional
decentralization. On the other side, nationalist and regional parties in Flanders refer to social secu-
rity decentralization and to interregional transfers to mobilize their voters electorally (Deschouwer,
2013). Like in the US, however, these cues succeed because they address existing grievances and
narratives.
In other instances, Belgian elites react more clearly to bottom-up pressures and public opin-
ion. For example, when negotiating the 2011 constitutional reform, the moderate Flemish parties
adopted more militant positions on devolution due to the growing popular support for the nation-
alist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) party. The francophone parties, meanwhile, were pressured to
compromise to convince their voters that, after 541 days without a government, federal institutions
were not irreparably broken (Be´land and Lecours, 2018). Hence, in Belgium, too, bottom-up pub-
lic opinion and top-down elite cues seem to operate in tandem. Both, moreover, seem to reflect the
same cleavage structures and intergroup tensions on which my argument focuses.
The Belgian case also emphasizes the importance of political institutions in the shift from pref-
erences to redistributive outcomes. The endurance of Belgium’s centralized social security owes
in large part to the country’s multiple veto points and the federal principle of exclusive competen-
cies. With more institutional flexibility, the Flemings could have either passed national reforms or
established overlapping regional programs more easily. Yet, in line with my theoretical argument
and quantitative findings, these institutional factors have slowed down but not diffused the pres-
sures for decentralization. Rather than comprehensive reforms, we see an ongoing erosion of the
central system through incremental steps. Furthermore, these Flemish actions, together with Bel-
gium’s continuous constitutional reforms, demonstrate that the country’s institutional constraints
are themselves endogenous to the bottom-up pressures that they channel. In this sense, they may
be better analyzed as contextual parameters that determine the pace and form by which preferences
translate to outcomes rather than as independent explanatory variables.
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5.4.2 Geography and Class
Finally, Belgium also illustrates the secondary role that class can play in highly segregated
democracies. First, economic differences can deepen intergroup tensions even as the latter develop
around regional identities. For example, the economic underdevelopment of Flanders during the
country’s early decades contributed to the region’s linguistic discrimination by francophone elites,
a grievance that became central in the Flemish national narrative. Second, class differences can
exacerbate redistributive tensions, even if not as deeply as in cases like the US. Hence, after the
economic tables turned, the nationalistic Flemish rhetoric has begun to emphasize Wallonia’s par-
asitic reliance on Flemish income. Moreover, the economic differences may partly explain the
lower support for social security decentralization in Wallonia, which would rely on a smaller pool
of income in this case.
At the same time, the evidence shows that class has remained secondary to geography. First,
the Flemish nationalist movement, as well as its reference to economic issues, emerged decades
before the region’s economic surge (Boehme, 2008). Second, the initial push toward federalization
preceded the current economic gap and expands beyond purely redistributive questions. Indeed, the
demands to decentralize Belgium’s institutions, including social security, have appeared as early
as the 1960s, when the regions were relatively equal economically and their members identified
in similar socioeconomic terms (McRae, 1986; Erk, 2003). Finally, as we have seen, there is no
evident backlash against the country’s welfare institutions or redistributive priorities, implying that
this did not become an interclass conflict.
Another approach to this question is through a counter-factual thought experiment (Fearon,
1991). We can imagine an almost-identical universe in which the economic gap between Flanders
and Wallonia would have remained low from the 1970s onward. It is hard to suppose that this
difference would have halted the schismatic processes that were already in motion: the decline of
the old cleavages of church and class, the ongoing formation of separate cultural communities, the
growing salience of ethno-linguistic politics since the interwar period, and the first steps that were
already taken toward institutional federalization. It is admittedly plausible that higher equality
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would have moderated some of the extremist rhetoric toward interregional transfers on the Flemish
side, though it may also have weakened francophone protection of centralized social security. In
fact, this scenario would have been closer to the perfect theoretical case of regional segregation
discussed in Chapter 2, which predicts mutually agreed upon devolution. Hence, it seems implau-
sible to argue that this conflict is driven primarily by the economic differences of the late-twentieth
century. The next chapter, which focuses on Spain, examines how these dynamics unfold given a
deeper and stabler interregional inequality between segregated identity groups.
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CHAPTER VI
Language, Interregional Inequality, and Redistribution in Spain
6.1 Introduction
The United States and Belgium highlight the redistributive implications of high intergroup in-
equality and regional segregation, each in turn, where the other factor plays a secondary role. In this
chapter I examine the case of Spain, where both intergroup inequality and segregation have been
historically intertwined with the country’s ethno-linguistic diversity. Similar to Belgium, Spanish
society comprises several ethno-linguistic communities concentrated in distinct geographical re-
gions. Yet, whereas the economic balance between Flemings and Walloons shifted and changed
over the past half-century, Spain has experienced enduring interregional inequality since its impe-
rial days. The country’s redistributive policies, meanwhile, combine above-average public spend-
ing with relatively high income inequality after taxes and transfers. Moreover, there are continuous
tensions and reforms related to interregional redistribution and welfare decentralization. What role
does the combination of ethno-linguistic diversity, intergroup inequality, and geography play in
these outcomes? In exploring this question, the Spanish case reinforces my previous findings and
adds important nuances.
Any discussion of ascriptive identities in Spain requires certain simplifications and boundary
setting. Spain is divided into seventeen administrative regions, known as Autonomous Communi-
ties (henceforth ACs), most of which are named after ancient kingdoms with rich local histories.1
1In addition to the seventeen ACs, Spain also has two autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla, which reside on the
129
Modern Spanish society, accordingly, consists of a spectrum of regional identities that vary by their
depth and distinctness. On this spectrum, however, language has consistently stood out as a funda-
mental ethno-cultural marker that runs deeper than other regional characteristics (Moreno, 2001b;
Moreno and Colino, 2010). Of the country’s seventeen ACs, six have their own co-official lan-
guages: the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, the Valencian Community,
and Navarre (which, unlike the previous five regions, accommodates only a minority of Basques).
Of these six regions, the first five have cultivated distinct linguistic, cultural, and in some cases
nationalistic, identities. Using Latinobarometer survey data from 2017, the left-side panel in Fig-
ure 6.1 depicts the share of respondents in each AC that are fluent in their communal language in
addition to official Castilian Spanish. The five regions mentioned above clearly stand out.
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Figure 6.1: Language and Wealth in Spain
Some of these ethno-linguistic communities are also marked by their relative wealth. The right-
hand panel in Figure 1 maps provincial GDP per capita in 2015 using Eurostat data. Spain’s North-
Eastern regions are notably richer than the rest of the country, with the exception of Madrid. These
patterns are historical: both Catalonia and the Basque Country have ranked among the country’s
Northern shores of Africa. Both cities have the right to declare themselves ACs, although neither had done so yet. My
analysis disregards both cities given their unique political status, geographical location, and size.
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most affluent regions as early as the mid-nineteenth century (Ramo´n Rose´s, Martı´nez-Galarraga
and Tirado, 2010). Valencia and Galicia, by contrast, did not experience similar economic devel-
opment. Galicia, in particular, was one of the country’s poorest regions until the second half of the
twentieth century. This twofold variation—separate ethno-linguistic identities versus no particu-
lar ones and rich versus non-rich regions—offer a good opportunity to test empirically how both
factors operate together in shaping redistributive policy.
Theoretically, I expect to find concurrent influences of both geography and inequality in cases
like Spain. First, due to regional segregation, groups with distinct ascriptive identities should
have a stronger preference to decentralize welfare programs to their respective regions. Second,
due to socioeconomic inequality, richer groups should prefer to minimize income redistribution to
poorer ones. As these two forces combine, I expect that ethno-linguistic groups in richer regions
would exert the strongest pressures to decentralize welfare provision and to limit interregional
income transfers. Poorer identity groups, by contrast, face conflicting pressures: they may prefer
to share their income only with in-group members but, at the same time, they benefit from increased
interregional transfers from richer groups. Accordingly, their support for welfare decentralization
should be weaker and less consistent.
My theoretical framework does not consider regional groups without separate ascriptive identi-
ties. Nevertheless, its logic implies that these groups should have more inclusive national solidarity
than the former two types, and, therefore, develop weaker preferences for welfare decentralization.
At the same time, regardless of ascriptive identities, the literature on interregional inequality tells us
that richer groups should attempt to minimize interregional transfers due to their economic interests
(Wibbels, 2005; Beramendi, 2012). My empirical analysis in this chapter combines and contrasts
this argument with the broader dynamics of identity politics. While I expect richer groups with-
out unique ascriptive identities to oppose interregional transfers more strongly than poorer ones,
their preferences should not stem from stronger in-group solidarity or from a desire to decentralize
service provision. Accordingly, I expect that the magnitude of their opposition to interregional
transfers would be weaker than richer groups for whom economic interests are reinforced by as-
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criptive identities. Hence, support for welfare decentralization and opposition to interregional
redistribution should be (1) strongest among richer identity groups, (2) medium among poorer
identity groups and rich non-identity groups, and (3) weakest among poor regions without distinct
ethno-linguistic identities.
The Spanish case corroborates these expectations. Like the previous two chapters, I begin with
a brief historical survey of the country’s intergroup relations, with a particular focus on the role
played by both geography and interregional wealth differences. I find that the high levels of eco-
nomic development in richer ethno-linguistic regions, especially Catalonia and the Basque Coun-
try, contributed to the development and robustness of their exclusive identities, their aspirations
for autonomy, and their tensions with the central government. Using recent public opinion data, I
show that members of richer ethno-linguistic communities express stronger regional identification
and weaker interregional and interclass solidarities than all other regions.
The second part of the chapter expands the discussion to redistributive outcomes and prefer-
ences. Spain’s welfare policies and control over regional tax revenues have been undergoing a grad-
ual and asymmetrical process of decentralization, often led by the actions of richer ethno-linguistic
regions. Furthermore, public opinion data find that members of these groups show the strongest
support for welfare decentralization and for limited interregional redistribution. By contrast, res-
idents of poorer regions with unique ascriptive identities express positive but weaker support for
welfare decentralization and do not oppose interregional redistribution as strongly. Richer regions
without unique identities, too, oppose interregional transfers more weakly than their ascriptively
unique counterparts. The actual policy outcomes, I find, are thus formed through a political tug of
war between these different actors and reflect their relative political leverage at different times, an
important nuance for cases with multiple minority groups.
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6.2 Intergroup Inequality, Segregation, and Group Relations in Spain
6.2.1 Historical Development
Spain is a relatively new democracy, having democratized in 1978 after a long period of military
dictatorship and an earlier imperial past. All three periods played a part in the construction of the
country’s multicultural composition and intergroup relations. Let us briefly consider each in turn.
6.2.1.1 Fragmentation and Unequal Economic Development under the Spanish Empire
The roots of Spain’s ethno-linguistic diversity derive from the political and economic structure
of the Spanish Empire, which reigned from the late fifteenth to the early twentieth century. The
Spanish crown united multiple medieval kingdoms and smaller territorial units in the Iberian penin-
sula, grating them high levels of administrative and cultural autonomy in the process. Over the
centuries, even as other European powers industrialized, centralized their institutions, and homog-
enized their cultures, the Spanish crown continued to direct most of its attention to colonization and
wars. Despite some institutional reforms in the eighteenth century, the empire remained admin-
istratively fragmented throughout most of its existence. This institutional environment provided
large spaces for peripheral ethno-linguistic identities to survive and thrive with little interruption
(Beramendi, 1999; Lecours, 2001; Moreno, 2001b; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007).
Economic inequality played a central part in the modern trajectories of these identities. By
the nineteenth century, the Spanish Empire was mired in a series of crises at home and overseas,
including the loss of its colonies. While the central government faced increasing political and eco-
nomic pressures, the country’s Northern periphery, particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country,
made significant economic strides (Ramo´n Rose´s, Martı´nez-Galarraga and Tirado, 2010; Dı´ez-
Minguela, Martı´nez-Galarraga and Tirado-Fabregat, 2016; Tirado, Dı´ez-Minguela and Martı´nez-
Galarraga, 2016). Catalonia, which was historically richer due to agriculture and trade, became a
center of industrialization in the nineteenth century, especially in textile production. The Basque
Country, meanwhile, developed a prosperous heavy metal industry based on the region’s iron ore
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reserves (Shubert, 1990; Beramendi, 1999; Moreno, 2001b). In both regions, economic growth
was accompanied by a network of local administrative, fiscal, and social institutions (Lecours,
2001).
The country’s asymmetrical economic development complicated these regions’ relations with
the central government. On the one hand, both regions remained aligned with the crown, which
provided helpful protectionist policies and relatively high levels of autonomy (Beramendi, 1999;
Moreno, 2001b; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007). On the other, the incongruence between the econom-
ically developed periphery and the political center in Madrid sowed continuous tensions. In cases
like France, where political and economic power overlapped, the rich political center successfully
integrated and homogenized the poor countryside (Weber, 1976). Catalan and Basque elites, by
contrast, were critical of the central government’s poor performance and protective of their po-
litical power, regional institutions, and ethno-linguistic identities. Moreover, both communities
formed nationalist movements to protect their autonomy, a common phenomenon in cases where
the periphery economically outperforms the political center (Gourevitch, 1979; Laitin, 1991). In
Catalonia, where economic growth developed more smoothly, the nationalist movement gained an
inclusive, cross-class following. In the Basque country, where industrial development was sudden
and drew an inflow of non-Basque workers, the national movement took a more defensive and
ethnically exclusive stance (Dı´ez Medrano, 1995; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007). Yet, despite their
differences, both movements reflected a similar effort to protect and extend regional autonomy in
the face of a seemingly backward central government.
The importance of economic development in these processes is further underscored by the
different path taken by Galicia and Valencia. Like the Catalans and the Basques, Galicians and
Valencians maintained unique languages and cultures over the centuries. However, neither region
experienced high levels of industrialization. Galicia remained underdeveloped and rural until the
second half of the twentieth century. Consequently, the region lacked a substantial middle class and
consisted mostly of peasants and landed elites aligned with the Catholic Church (Beramendi and
Nu´n˜ez, 1995; Losada, 1999). Valencia established local institutions and a short-lived silk industry
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in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but this progress was later reversed due to a series of
local and regional wars (Archile´s and Martı´, 2001). By the nineteenth century, neither Galicia nor
Valencia had robust local institutions, modern elites seeking larger autonomy, or mass nationalist
movements. Hence, despite their unique linguistic and cultural characteristics, both regions more
willingly accepted the leadership of Spain’s central government.
6.2.1.2 Oppression and Co-Optation under Franco
The eventual collapse of the empire provided short-term momentum for regional movements
of all kinds and sizes. In 1931, after several decades of monarchical restoration and military rule, a
new democratic constitution was adopted for what became the Second Spanish Republic. Written
by Spain’s republican and progressive camps, the new constitution recognized the right of regional
communities to gain subnational autonomy under the republic. The unified Catalan movement
was quick to exercise this right in 1932, followed by the slower but eventually successful Basques
(Dı´ez Medrano, 1995; Beramendi, 1999; Moreno, 2001b). Inspired by these advancements, a
budding Galician nationalist movement passed its own statute of autonomy in 1936 (Beramendi
and Nu´n˜ez, 1995; Losada, 1999). Other regional movements, albeit smaller and more fragmented,
made similar preparations as well (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007). This momentum, however, came
to a sudden halt in 1936 due to the Spanish Civil War and the eventual victory of the Nationalist
rebels led by Franco.
Franco’s totalitarian regime, with its conservative and fascist agenda, oppressed the regional
movements and imposed a single Castilian identity across the country. The results of this oppres-
sion, too, reflected interregional economic inequalities. The Catalan and Basque movements, both
richer and more developed institutionally, faced stronger persecution. At the same time, their eco-
nomic and social capital helped sustain local networks, civil society organizations, and active gov-
ernments in exile. Furthermore, both movements have become identified internationally with the
pro-democracy camp (Dı´ez Medrano, 1995; Beramendi, 1999; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007). Poorer
Galicia and Valencia, by contrast, integrated into the new order and formed useful clientelistic ties
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with the authoritarian government. Despite its advancement during the Second Republic, the Gali-
cian nationalist movement was disbanded after Franco took power and struggled to remain unified
(Beramendi and Nu´n˜ez, 1995; Losada, 1999; Archile´s and Martı´, 2001).
6.2.1.3 Asymmetrical Autonomy and Mimesis after Democratization
Franco’s death in the 1970s ushered in a new democratic era. The new Spanish constitution of
1978 attempted to balance national unity with recognition of the country’s subnational communi-
ties (Linz and Stepan, 1992; Martı´nez-Herrera and Miley, 2010). The result was open-ended and
asymmetrical. While the constitution refrained from setting up a formal federation, it established
the seventeen ACs and granted them the right to claim greater self-rule. The extent of this auton-
omy, however, was unspecified and left to be determined through political bargaining. At the same
time, the constitution specifically granted more powers to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Gali-
cia, whose statues of autonomy were approved under the Second Republic. In similar recognition
of past arrangements, the Basque Country and Navarre were given broader fiscal autonomy, a point
that I discuss in more detail later. The rest of the ACs, by contrast, were required to undergo longer
processes involving regional referenda and national legislation to gain similar powers (Moreno,
2001b; Moreno and Colino, 2010; Beramendi, 2012).
The following decades consisted of the gradual expansion of AC autonomy. Between 1980 and
the early–2000s, all ACs established regional governments and parliaments and were given more
authority over various domestic issues (Losada, 1999; Argullol and Bernadı´, 2006; Beramendi,
2012). This gradual decentralization unfolded asymmetrically and through mimesis, or imitation,
to borrow a term from Moreno (2001b). ACs with unique ethno-linguistic identities were typi-
cally the first to claim new authorities, often with the goal of aligning political power with their
ascriptive communities. Indeed, these ACs quickly used their expanded powers to embed their
particularistic languages, symbols, and cultures into their public spheres (Moreno, 2001b; Balfour
and Quiroga, 2007). Over time, their steps were copied by the other ACs, whose main motiva-
tion was to equalize resources and political power to the former. Moreover, despite their more
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functional motivation, local politicians in these regions have begun to invoke regional identities
to mobilize their voters, even when affiliated with the large national parties (Nu´n˜ez, 1999; Bera-
mendi, 1999; Moreno, 2001b; Flynn, 2004; Moreno and Colino, 2010). Thus, Spanish politics has
become more territorial over time, including stronger regional attachment even in the absence of
unique ethno-linguistic characteristics.
Yet, identity and wealth still carry substantive weight. Unlike most other ACs, large shares
of Catalan and Basque voters consistently support their regional parties in both local and national
elections. These richer regions, moreover, have broadened their demands for political and eco-
nomic autonomy in recent years, including unilateral steps that put them in direct conflict with the
central government and constitutional court (Colino, 2009; Moreno and Colino, 2010; Martı´nez-
Herrera and Miley, 2010). While Galicia’s and Valencia’s unique languages and cultures were re-
vitalized under the AC system, their regional parties have remained secondary to the national Con-
servative and Socialist parties, even in regional politics (Losada, 1999; Archile´s and Martı´, 2001).
Hence, despite the growing territorial nature of Spanish politics, the country’s ethno-linguistic and
economic division lines remain active to this day.
6.2.2 Implications for Group Relations
How does this context shape group identities and solidarities in Spain? My analysis of the
US and Belgium, which discussed cleavages with two primary groups, paid particular attention to
direct intergroup resentments. The Spanish case is different due to the multitude of ethno-linguistic
minorities and their historically complex relations with the central state. Consequently, rather than
a series of dyadic rivalries, Spain’s peripheral ethno-linguistic identities have evolved against the
dominant center and vice versa (Muro and Quiroga, 2005). Theoretically, I expect that ethno-
linguistic groups from richer regions would develop the most exclusive solidarities. As we shall
see, the data support this expectation.
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6.2.2.1 Regional, National, and Dual Identities
The tensions between Spain’s multiple peripheral identities and the political center do not mean
that there are no group-specific stereotypes. Yet, unlike in Belgium, these stereotypes do not seem
unusually toxic or unusual. A survey conducted in 1994 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociol-
gicas (CIS, survey 2123) asked Spanish respondents to pick several adjectives that best describe
members of various other communities. Residents of Madrid, the country’s rich and busy capital,
were expectedly described by others as insolent and arrogant but also as good people. Members
of more rural regions, conversely, were perceived by other groups as cheerful and friendly. Cata-
lans, Basques, and Galicians were all seen as having a strong connection to their lands, although
the richer Catalans were also described as industrious and stingy while the poorer Galicians were
perceived as good people (for similar findings, see Ros, Cano and Huici, 1987). Another survey
from 1996 (CIS survey 2228) asked respondents to rank each community on a 1–10 favorability
scale. Whereas all other communities received an average score between 6.66 and 7.48, the aver-
age number was 5.53 for Catalans and 5.82 for Basques. Hence, there indeed appears to be a more
fundamental tension between these minorities and the rest of Spain.
Overall, Spain’s institutional decentralization allowed most regional identities to complement
the national Spanish identity rather than threaten it (Lecours, 2001; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007;
Martı´nez-Herrera and Miley, 2010). Accordingly, when facing a choice between the two, a large
share of Spaniards assign equal weight to their regional and to their Spanish identities (Moreno,
2001b; Martı´nez-Herrera, 2002; Moreno and Colino, 2010). This pattern is shown in Figure 6.2,
which plots levels of regional versus national identification since 1980.2 The graph summarizes
answers to what is known as the Moreno question (e.g., Moreno, 2001b), which asks respondents
whether they identify exclusively with Spain, more with Spain than with their region, with both
equally, more with their region than with Spain, or exclusively with their region. I collapse this
5-point scale into three categories: stronger Spanish identification, equal identification, or stronger
2The data from 1996 onward is based on multiple CIS surveys, while earlier data are from Martı´nez-Herrera (2002).
I omit missing or inconclusive answers from the calculation.
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Figure 6.2: National versus Regional Identification, 1980–2018
The data show that dual identification grew during the early 1980s and has remained stable
since. In the past three decades, about half of Spaniards have defined their identity as such. The
prevalence of dual identification may explain two seemingly contrasting cross-sectional findings
from earlier chapters: Figure 4.6 in Chapter 4 shows that, on average, Spanish respondents express
relatively high regional identification compared to other countries, although Figure 5.4 in Chapter
5 finds that Spaniards, contrary to Belgians, are not less proud of their country than most other
foreign nationals.
The level of identification, however, varies by ethno-linguistic identity and regional wealth.
To consider these factors, I categorize Spain’s seventeen ACs based on their identity and income.
Using the data mapped in Figure 6.1, I code ACs as having a unique ethno-linguistic identity if they
have a second co-official language with a double-digit fluency rate. I then differentiate between
rich and poor ACs based on whether their regional GDP per capita is higher or lower than Spain’s
national GDP per capita (calculated using Eurostat averages from 2007–2015). The results of this
typology are summarized in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: A Typology of ACs by Identity and Wealth
Ethno-Linguistic Identity No Ethno-Linguistic Identity
Rich Balearic Islands Aragon
Basque Country La Rioja
Catalonia Madrid
Navarre
Poor Galicia Andalusia
Valencia Asturias
Canary Islands
Cantabria
Castilla and Leo´n
Castilla-La Mancha
Extremadura
Murcia
In what follows, I use the four regional categories as proxies for their local ethno-linguistic
communities (or lack thereof). In reality, the match between region and ethno-linguistic commu-
nity is imperfect. Indeed, Spain has experienced regular interregional migration over the years. A
recent survey conducted in Catalonia in 2017 (CIS survey 3202), for example, found that 22% of
respondents were born in other ACs and an additional 5.7% were born abroad. This matters: res-
idents whose native tongue is the regional language show stronger AC identification and are more
likely to define their communities as unique nations (Bollen and Dı´ez Medrano, 1998; Chernyha
and Burg, 2012). Yet, regions remain a useful unit of analysis for both theoretical and empirical
reasons. First, ACs with large ethno-linguistic communities embed their languages, histories, and
cultures in the education system and in the public sphere. Indeed, while new migrants to Catalo-
nia and the Basque Country express stronger national identification than native residents, the first
and second generations born in these regions show more exclusive regional identities (Martı´nez-
Herrera, 2002; Miley, 2008). Second, from a practical perspective, this measure is necessary since
most surveys do not ask respondents about their family origin or native tongue. Finally, the noise
added by outsiders should dilute the expected effect of in-group membership rather than inflate it.
Hence, meaningful regional variations along ethno-linguistic lines should be considered more, not
less, robust.
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With this caveat in mind, let us consider how respondents’ level of identification varies by the
four types of ACs. Using data from a recent survey (CIS survey 3217, June 2018), Figure 6.3
breaks down answers to the Moreno question by region type. The differences along identity and
wealth are clear. Regional identity is strongest only in regions that have both a unique ethno-
linguistic identity and above-average regional income. Respondents from poorer ACs show strong
dual identification regardless of whether they have a unique ethno-linguistic identity or not. Finally,
most respondents in richer ACs without distinct ascriptive identities pick Spain over their regions.
This pattern fits the historical landscape described earlier: a strong political center that promotes
the national Castilian identity, poorer regions that maintain unique identities but depend on the
state politically and financially, and richer and more independent ethno-linguistic peripheries that
push back against the center.
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Figure 6.3: National versus Regional Identification by Region Type, 2018
These findings should not imply that ethno-linguistic identities are only salient in richer re-
gions. A survey conducted in 2006 (CIS survey 2667) asked respondents whether they agree
that regional languages are just as Spanish as the primary Castilian dialect. The share of positive
agreement in ACs with unique ethno-linguistic identities was similar regardless of their wealth,
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reaching 80.3% in poorer regions and 82.9% in richer ones. By contrast, only 65.7% of respon-
dents from other regions agreed with this statement. Likewise, a survey conducted in 2012 (CIS
survey 2956) asked respondents to pick the most important aspect of Spain’s AC system. Com-
paratively high shares of Basques (22.7%), Catalans (29.2%), and Galicians (25%) mentioned the
defense of unique territorial identities as the AC system’s most important role. Only 14.8% of all
other respondents selected this option. Hence, ACs with unique ethno-linguistic identities share a
concern for their legitimacy and status regardless of their wealth. Their differences emerge once
we turn to tensions with the central Spanish identity. As I discuss next, these factors also shape
interregional and interclass solidarities.
6.2.2.2 Regional versus Class Solidarity
I consider how identity, geography, and wealth affect national and class solidarities using sur-
vey data from 2006 (CIS survey 2667). I focus on two different outcomes. The first dependent
variable gauges national solidarity by the level of agreement with the following statement: “Spain
must remain united to ensure equality between all citizens and solidarity between the different Au-
tonomous Communities”. The answers range on a 5-point scale between “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”. The second dependent variable measures the tension between regional and class
solidarity using the following binary question: “With which of these two people would you say
you have more in common: (1) a person from the rest of Spain and from the same class or social
stratum as you, or (2) a person from your community and from a different class or social stratum
than you”.
I use two primary explanatory variables based on my earlier discussion. First, I examine the
strength of regional identification using the Moreno question analyzed above. As explained before,
the answers range on a 5-point scale from exclusive Spanish identification to exclusive regional
identification. Second, I include dummy variables for three of the four AC types in my earlier
typology. The fourth type, poorer regions without unique ethno-linguistic identities, serves as
the omitted baseline category. Finally, I control for age group, gender, education level, church
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attendance, and full employment.
Table 6.2 presents OLS estimations of the first dependent variable, national solidarity. As
expected, weaker Spanish identification is correlated with lower feelings of national solidarity.
According to model 1, all else equal, a switch from exclusive Spanish identification to exclu-
sive regional identification should subtract 1.3 points of national solidarity (26% of the dependent
variable’s 5-point scale). The three AC types also produce their expected effects. Model 2 finds
that solidarity is weakest among respondents from rich ACs with unique ethno-linguistic identities
(0.93 fewer points, or 18.6% of the dependent variable’s scale, than poor regions without unique
identities). Respondents from poorer ethno-linguistic regions are also less solidary than regions
without such identities, although the difference is smaller in size (0.25 fewer points, or 5% of the
dependent variable’s scale). Finally, there is some statistically significant difference between rich
and poor regions without unique ascriptive identities, but its size is minuscule. Model 3 verifies that
the effects of regional identification and AC types remain substantively unchanged when estimated
together.
Table 6.3 shows logistic regression estimations of the second outcome of interest, the probabil-
ity that respondents prefer their class over their region rather than vice versa. As before, a stronger
regional identification has the expected effect: according to Model 1, an additional point closer to
the regional end of the Moreno scale lowers the probability of choosing class over region by an
average of 14.5%. According to Model 2, residence in either type of ethno-linguistic regions leads
to lower interclass solidarity compared to regions without such identities. Specifically, respondents
from richer and from poorer ethno-linguistic regions have, respectively, a 48% and a 53.8% prob-
ability of choosing their class over region. By contrast, this probability is estimated to be 62% and
70.3% for respondents from rich and from poor regions without unique identities. Model 3 finds
that the small probability gap between richer and poorer ethno-linguistic regions disappears once
we control for differences in regional identification. This outcome implies that stronger regional
identification may be one of the mediating mechanisms that differentiate the former from the latter
when it comes to interclass solidarity.
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Table 6.2: National Solidarity: OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Regional Identification -0.322∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Ethno-Linguistic Rich -0.930∗∗∗ -0.865∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.044)
Ethno-Linguistic Poor -0.254∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040)
Non Ethno-Linguistic Rich -0.093∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046)
Age Group -0.000 0.024∗ 0.020
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Female 0.019 0.017 0.034
(0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Education -0.072∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Religiosity 0.087∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Full Employment -0.040 0.058 0.039
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
Constant 5.251∗∗∗ 4.437∗∗∗ 5.258∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.079) (0.106)
Observations 2,838 2,973 2,838
R2 0.164 0.207 0.289
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
Taken together, these findings support my hypotheses. First, both types of regions with unique
ethno-linguistic identities express more exclusive forms of solidarity than regions without them.
Second, within ethno-linguistic regions, richer ones express more exclusionary and less solidary
preferences than poorer ones. In the next section, I find that these factors also correlate with
redistributive preferences and policies.
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Table 6.3: Interclass Solidarity: Logistic Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Regional Identification -0.653∗∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.053)
Ethno-Linguistic Rich -0.573∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗
(0.115) (0.123)
Ethno-Linguistic Poor -0.340∗∗ -0.414∗∗
(0.123) (0.129)
Non Ethno-Linguistic Rich 0.375∗∗ 0.196
(0.132) (0.140)
Age Group -0.078∗ -0.056 -0.071∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
Female 0.031 -0.020 0.026
(0.093) (0.088) (0.093)
Education -0.033 -0.033 -0.041
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
Religiosity -0.070 -0.061 -0.086∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.040)
Full Employment 0.087 0.134 0.126
(0.094) (0.090) (0.095)
Constant 2.720∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 2.737∗∗∗
(0.275) (0.215) (0.279)
Observations 2,126 2,220 2,126
Pseudo-R2 0.064 0.021 0.073
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
6.3 Intergroup Relations and Redistribution
6.3.1 Historical and Institutional Context
6.3.1.1 Welfare Development After Franco
Like the country’s broader democratic consolidation, Spain’s welfare state has had to catch up
with the rest of Europe since the late 1970s. Initial social insurance schemes (old-age, disability,
and unemployment) date back to the 1960s, still under Franco, when they were relatively limited
and served the regime’s paternalistic interests (Arriba and Moreno, 2005; Gallego, Goma` and Subi-
rats, 2005). In lieu of state-provided services, the middle class relied mostly on familial networks
and on cheap private services, while the poor received assistance from voluntary charities and other
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social organizations backed by the Catholic Church (Moreno, 2001a; Dubin, 2019).
Spain’s transition to democracy brought extensive changes. Starting in the 1970s, Spanish
authorities have continuously expanded public social spending, primarily on core social security
programs (Moreno, 2001a). The new welfare system had several key features found in other South-
ern European countries as well: (1) relatively generous old-age and unemployment benefits based
on payroll contributions, (2) universal healthcare funded by general tax revenues, and (3) underde-
veloped and narrow social assistance programs (Ferrera, 1996; Moreno, 2000; Gallego, Goma` and
Subirats, 2005). This system consolidated and expanded further during the 1980s and 1990s, in-
cluding broader old-age, disability, and unemployment coverage, means-tested supplements within
social security, and elimination of several clientelistic benefits (Guille´n and Matsaganis, 2000;
Moreno, 2001a; Arriba and Moreno, 2005). The responsibility for non-contributory social assis-
tance, however, was devolved to the ACs and as such developed more slowly and asymmetrically.
As this structure implies, Spain’s welfare policy has developed unevenly. In particular, core
social security programs were regularly expanded under the watch of the national government,
while other services were devolved to the AC level and remained more limited. This partial decen-
tralization has unfolded along two interrelated fronts: higher autonomy in welfare provision (the
expenditure side) and higher autonomy in taxation (the financing side). Let us consider each in
turn.
6.3.1.2 Decentralization of Welfare Provision
The devolution of welfare services is part of a broader division of labor that has been estab-
lished between the central government and the ACs. Generally, Spain’s institutional consolidation
after the 1970s created three levels of jurisdiction (Losada, 1999; Argullol and Bernadı´, 2006;
Beramendi, 2012). The first level is managed exclusively by the national government, including
issues such as foreign relations and national security, national economic policy and trade, immi-
gration policy, and core social security programs (old-age, disability, and unemployment). The
second level is co-managed by the national and regional governments, including certain elements
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of law and order, the media, the environment, education, and healthcare.3 The third and final
level is managed exclusively by the ACs, including urban development, agriculture, transportation,
culture, and social assistance programs. In this framework, then, contribution-based social secu-
rity programs are managed exclusively by the national government, while healthcare and social
assistance are managed by the ACs with varying degrees of freedom.
Like Spain’s broader institutional decentralization, welfare services were devolved gradually,
asymmetrically, and through ongoing political bargaining (Moreno, 2001a; Arriba and Moreno,
2005; Beramendi, 2012). Moreover, this process, too, was characterized by mimesis and inter-
regional competition. Healthcare is a case in point. Catalonia, the Basque Country, Valencia,
and Andalusia developed regional healthcare services as early as the 1980s, followed by Galicia,
Navarre, and the Canary Islands in the 1990s. By 2001, the central government transferred the au-
thority over healthcare to all ACs to promote better uniformity (Leo´n, 2010; Gallego and Subirats,
2012; Sole´-Olle´, 2015).
While the level of autonomy may have become more equal across ACs, there remain interre-
gional differences in service quality and in investment levels, particularly as a function of regional
wealth. Healthcare quality and supplementary coverage vary between ACs even as all have consis-
tently increased their spending (Gallego and Subirats, 2012). The interregional variation is more
pronounced in social assistance benefits. Given the high national investment in old-age and un-
employment benefits, most regions focus on social assistance for poor working-age populations.
The largest assistance program in most ACs provides means-tested supplemental income, while
other assistance includes active labor services with or without small-scale cash transfers (Moreno,
2001a; Arriba and Moreno, 2005; Gallego and Subirats, 2012; Dubin, 2019). In practice, wealthier
ACs tend to provide better social assistance coverage and benefit rates, a gap that has consistently
grown since the early 2000s (Ayala Can˜o´n, 2012; Arriba, 2014). According to 2012 data, the
Basque Country, in particular, spent about three times on these programs than other ACs (Arriba,
3Shared authority typically takes one of two forms. In some issues, the central government sets concrete policies
and the AC execute them. In others, the central government determines broad guidelines and leaves the ACs room for
additional policymaking. Healthcare falls under the latter category.
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2014). This difference also reflects the Basque Country’s extended control over regional tax rev-
enues, the second aspect of welfare decentralization.
6.3.1.3 Decentralization of Tax Revenues
Interregional tax transfers are one of the primary mechanisms for national solidarity in Spain,
a stated principle in the country’s constitution. Nevertheless, the constitution also established two
separate fiscal systems. The first sets a shared tax pool for all but two ACs. Among its purposes,
this pool is used to fund interregional transfers from rich to poor ACs. The second system, which
applies only to the Basque Country and Navarre due to past historical arrangements, provides broad
fiscal autonomy: both ACs collect regional taxes on their own and then transfer a certain share,
determined through political bargaining, to the central government. Unsurprisingly, the two ACs
have used this autonomy to their advantage through tax breaks for regional investments and lower
income tax (Moreno, 2001b; Moreno and Colino, 2010; Beramendi, 2012; Lago-Pen˜as, Xoaquı´n
Ferna`ndez-Leiceaga and Vaquero-Garcı´a, 2018).
This arrangement was contested by some rich regions, especially the Catalans. Catalan na-
tionalists have repeatedly used Catalonia’s net transfers to the rest of Spain in their arguments for
greater independence (Moreno, 2001b). These pressures bore fruit in the 1990s and 2000s when
the Catalan and Basque parties gained additional leverage in national politics due to a series of
minority governments (Beramendi, 2012). Under their pressure, the central government allowed
ACs to keep a growing share of the taxes levied in their borders, starting with 15% of income taxes
and VAT in the mid–1990s and shifting to 33–35% in 2002. In 2006, a new Catalan statute of
autonomy declared that the region will now keep 50% of its taxes and will limit its contribution
to interregional equalization (Colino, 2009).4 The national government accepted and expanded the
50% share to all ACs in 2009, alongside new limitations on interregional transfers and additional
powers to set regional taxes (Beramendi, 2012; Sole´-Olle´, 2015; Dubin, 2019). Between 2008 and
2012, accordingly, the average share of own tax revenues increased from 37.4% to 53% of total
4Specifically, the Catalan statute declared that interregional transfers must not change Catalonia’s relative position
in GDP per capita compared to other regions.
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AC revenues (Lago-Pen˜as, Xoaquı´n Ferna`ndez-Leiceaga and Vaquero-Garcı´a, 2018).
The conflict over fiscal decentralization is far from over, however. In 2010, after several years of
deliberations, Spain’s constitutional court struck down several articles in the 2006 Catalan statute,
including its mechanism to limit interregional equalization. Many Catalans interpreted the deci-
sion as a fundamental rejection of the region’s economic and political aspirations, shifting Catalan
public opinion further in favor of independence. These sentiments culminated in a successful refer-
endum vote for independence in 2017, which was immediately annulled by the central government
and threw the country into a political crisis (Basta, 2018; Lecours and Dupre´, 2018).
6.3.1.4 Continued Centralization of Social Security
While both welfare provision and control over regional income gradually decentralized in the
past few years, the core social security programs—contribution-based old-age, disability, and un-
employment benefits—have remained under the exclusive authority of the central government.
Although social security faces fewer pressures to decentralize compared to Belgium, this status
quo is not obvious. In 1998, some of the nationalist movements made a joint demand to devolve
parts of social security. This request, however, was rejected by the two large national parties from
the left and from the right. According to Beramendi (2012), this rejection represents a shared un-
willingness of the two large parties to upset elderly voters, a critical and geographically dispersed
constituency. Moreover, Beramendi (2012) hypothesizes that these pressures may have convinced
the government to make concessions in taxation autonomy instead. While social security decen-
tralization remains off the table, then, its prospects nevertheless exert indirect influence as part of
this political tug of war. Moreover, it demonstrates that the different interests of various commu-
nities and regions depend on their political leverage or lack thereof. Spain’s centrifugal electoral
system, which favors the two large parties at the expense of smaller and regional ones, is particu-
larly instrumental in facilitating this balance of power (Beramendi, 2012), a point to which I return
in the chapter’s conclusion.
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6.3.2 Redistributive Preferences: Welfare Decentralization and Interregional Redistribu-
tion
How do most Spaniards feel about these redistributive issues, particularly given their intrare-
gional variation in identity and wealth? Theoretically, I expect that members of richer ethno-
linguistic communities would show the strongest preferences for decentralized services and for
low interregional revenue-sharing. Poorer ethno-linguistic groups may want more autonomy in
service provision, but they also benefit from interregional transfers. Therefore, they should ex-
press weaker support for welfare decentralization and interregional redistribution than the former.
Rich regions without distinct ascriptive identities should not have a particular interest in welfare
decentralization, but they should oppose higher interregional transfers compared to poorer regions.
Finally, poor regions without unique identities should be the most supportive of a centralized sys-
tem with high intergroup transfers. As I show next, the data largely support these expectations.
6.3.2.1 General Preferences on Redistribution
Before turning to welfare decentralization, I briefly consider the broader redistributive pref-
erences common in Spain. Theoretically, high intergroup inequality should produce conflicting
redistributive priorities based on class, as we have seen in the US. This is not the case in Spain,
however. As the cross-sectional analysis in Figure 4.8 in Chapter 4 showed, the average Spaniard
expresses comparatively strong support for all aspects of redistribution. Moreover, surveys con-
ducted in Spain from the 1980s to the mid–2000s show a stable majority in favor of universal
redistribution, i.e., policies that help all citizens and not just those in dire need (Moreno, 2008).
These broad preferences also cross party lines: most Spanish voters do not perceive noteworthy
differences between the redistributive agendas of the two largest national parties in the left and in
the right (Ferna´ndez-Albertos and Manzano, 2012).
The lack of substantive interregional variation in redistributive priorities is illustrated in Table
6.4. Using survey data from 2008 (CIS survey 2765), the table presents the share of respondents
in each type of AC who agree that: (1) it is without a doubt the government’s responsibility to take
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care of [a certain need or population], and (2) the government currently does not provide enough
protection for [a certain need or population]. Regardless of AC type, large majorities support gov-
ernment responsibility for all types of social needs and are unhappy about current levels of public
investment in them. There are some nuances: in particular, support for unemployment and housing
assistance, both addressing lower-class needs, are somewhat less popular than broader programs
targeting old-age, disability, and universal healthcare. Yet, these differences are relatively small
considering the large majorities in their favor.
Table 6.4: Redistributive Preferences by Type, 2008
No Unique Identity Unique Identity
Poor Rich Poor Rich
Government should be responsible for...
Lower income inequality 78.0% 71.8% 69.7% 74.5%
Old-age pensions 94.0% 95.5% 91.8% 95.4%
Unemployment benefits 80.4% 82.6% 78.6% 78.1%
Universal healthcare 92.4% 88.1% 86.4% 91.4%
Housing for low-income families 83.2% 85.3% 76.4% 84.7%
Not enough protection currently for...
Pensioners 82.6% 82.3% 75.7% 90.7%
Disabled 82.9% 84.8% 80.2% 89.1%
Unemployed 71.8% 71.1% 70.4% 75.4%
Families with Children under Care 79.6% 85.6% 76.6% 88.6%
Why is this so? The lack of strong regional differences may be related in part to Spain’s
economic situation. Despite the large absolute size of Spain’s economy and its impressive growth
since democratization, the country still underperforms OECD averages in terms of GDP per capita,
unemployment rate, and poverty rate. Indeed, between the 1990s and the mid–2000s, support for
redistribution increased with cynicism about the odds of economic mobilization through hard work
rather than luck (Iglesias, Pena Lo´pez and Sa´nchez Sa´ntos, 2013). Moreover, Spain was hit par-
ticularly hard by the 2008 economic recession. All ACs are still experiencing double-digit unem-
ployment rates in 2018, a decade after the crisis, especially among younger cohorts. Hence, unlike
in the US, relative intergroup inequality in Spain does not create wholly different socioeconomic
needs within each community. Rather, even as residents of all ACs support interpersonal redistri-
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bution in principle, their tensions emerge once we consider relative income transfers between the
different communities.
6.3.2.2 Interregional Redistribution
Past research on Spain finds that ascriptive identities and wealth both influence preferences for
interregional redistribution, although this literature considers identity and class independently of
one another. Overall, most Spaniards have increased their support for institutional decentralization
since the late 1970s (Martı´nez-Herrera, 2002). Nevertheless, higher AC autonomy has been sup-
ported more strongly by Spaniards with higher regional identification, especially in regions with
unique ethno-linguistic identities. This support is also higher among respondents from richer ACs
that transfer more resources than they receive (Guinjoan and Rodon, 2014).
Stronger regional identification and residence in richer ACs, again tested independently of
one another, also decrease support for income transfers between regions (Amat, 2012; Balcells,
Ferna´ndez-Albertos and Kuo, 2015). Support for interregional redistribution is also mediated
by knowledge, especially given the common tendency to exaggerate the extent of interregional
transfers (Gallego and Subirats, 2012). Respondents who are informed about their AC’s relative
economic position increase their self-interested attitudes: residents of poorer ACs express stronger
support for interregional redistribution while residents of richer ACs increase their opposition (Bal-
cells, Ferna´ndez-Albertos and Kuo, 2015).
How do ethno-linguistic identities and regional wealth influence preferences for interregional
redistribution in combination? To consider this question, I analyze Spanish survey data from 2009
(CIS survey 2799) that gauge both regional identification and welfare preferences. I examine two
dependent variables. The first variable measures preference for decentralization of welfare pro-
vision. Specifically, respondents are asked which level of government should have the primary
responsibility for social services: the national government, the ACs, or both jointly. I recode the
answers into a dummy variable indicating support for AC responsibility rather than the other two
152
options.5 The second dependent variable measures opposition to interregional redistribution us-
ing answers to the following question: “The autonomous financing system distributes wealth from
richer Autonomous Communities to poorer Autonomous Communities. Do you believe that there
should be a greater distribution of wealth between the territories, the same as now, or decreased
distribution of wealth?” Higher values on this 3-point scale indicate a stronger objection to inter-
regional redistribution.
I use the same explanatory variables as before: (1) dummy variables for each AC type, with
poor ACs without unique ethno-linguistic identities as the omitted baseline category, and (2) re-
gional identification measured by the Moreno question. I add two sets of control variables. The
first includes standard sociodemographic variables: age group, gender, education level, church at-
tendance, and full employment. The second set controls for broader ideological preferences and
knowledge: ideological self-identification (measured using a 0–10 scale between left and right),
economic preferences (measured using a 0–10 scale between “more public services at the cost of
higher taxes” and “fewer taxes at the cost of reduced public services”), general support for insti-
tutional decentralization (measured using a 5-point scale between “a central state without ACs”
and “a state where the ACs can declare independence”), and subjective perception of actual in-
terregional equality levels (measured using a 5-point scale between “there is high inequality” and
“there is high equality” between the different ACs).
The results are presented in tables 6.5 and 6.6. The first three models, shown in Table 6.5,
present logistic regressions estimating the probability to support social-service management at the
AC level. As I expect, support for exclusive welfare decentralization is notably stronger in regions
that combine unique ethno-linguistic identities and high regional wealth. According to Model
1, there is a 53.7% probability that respondents from these regions would support full welfare
decentralization. Respondents from poorer ethno-linguistic regions also express stronger support
for welfare decentralization than regions without such identities, but the offset is smaller in size
(32.2% probability of support). Finally, Respondents from ACs without unique identities show the
5I reran all my estimations with the full 3-point scale after recoding “jointly” as the middle category. The results
are substantively identical, although their interpretation is less straightforward.
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weakest support for exclusive welfare decentralization regardless of their regional wealth (26.5%
probability of support among richer regions and 24.8% among poorer ones). Model 2 demonstrates
that these findings are robust to the inclusion of regional identification, which, as expected, is
positively associated with support for welfare decentralization. Finally, Model 3 shows that these
findings remain unchanged when controlling for ideological and policy preferences.
Table 6.5: Support for Social-Service Decentralization: Logistic Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Regional Identification 0.392∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.051)
Ethno-Linguistic Rich 1.281∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.111) (0.125)
Ethno-Linguistic Poor 0.370∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗
(0.119) (0.122) (0.131)
Non Ethno-Linguistic Rich 0.088 0.259∗ 0.237
(0.122) (0.130) (0.144)
Age Group -0.056 -0.041 0.011
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035)
Female 0.093 0.064 0.059
(0.086) (0.089) (0.098)
Education 0.107∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.072∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.035)
Religiosity -0.103∗∗ -0.062 -0.043
(0.035) (0.037) (0.044)
Full Employment 0.090 0.080 -0.016
(0.092) (0.096) (0.104)
Right-Wing 0.039
(0.025)
Fewer Taxes and Services 0.014
(0.019)
General Decentralization 0.404∗∗∗
(0.053)
Perceived Regional Equality -0.011
(0.056)
Constant -1.304∗∗∗ -2.469∗∗∗ -3.400∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.258) (0.359)
Observations 2,862 2,773 2,279
Pseudo-R2 0.067 0.094 0.104
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.6 presents OLS regressions estimating opposition to interregional redistribution us-
ing the same covariates. Once again, respondents from richer ACs with unique ethno-linguistic
identities show the strongest objection to interregional transfers. According to Model 1, all else
equal, respondents from these ACs oppose interregional redistribution by an average of 0.38 points
(12.7% of the dependent variable’s 3-point scale) more than respondents from poor regions without
unique ascriptive identities. Respondents from poor ethno-linguistic ACs show greater objection to
interregional redistribution than poor regions without such identities, but the difference is notably
smaller (0.08 points, or only 2.5% of the dependent variable’s 3-point scale). According to models
2 and 3, it is statistically indistinguishable from members of rich regions without unique identities.
Models 2 and 3 demonstrate that these patterns are robust to the inclusion of regional identifica-
tion, ideological and economic preferences, broader support for institutional decentralization, and
perceptions of actual interregional equality, most of which perform as expected.
Together, these findings support my hypotheses. Members of rich ethno-linguistic regions stand
out in their support for larger welfare and fiscal autonomy. Residents of poorer ethno-linguistic
communities, by contrast, show some support for autonomous service provision but not as much for
interregional transfers. While members of richer regions without unique identities show stronger
opposition to interregional transfers compared to poorer ones, they do not show greater interest in
decentralization. Moreover, their objection is consistently weaker than richer regions with ethno-
linguistic identities, implying, contrary to the literature, that interregional inequality in itself is an
insufficient explanation in diverse societies.
6.4 Conclusion: Lessons from the Spanish Case
In summary, the data from Spain largely corroborate my theoretical hypotheses and the empiri-
cal patterns found in previous chapters. In particular, the interregional variation in ethno-linguistic
identities and in regional wealth illustrate that geography and inequality can operate concurrently.
On the one hand, the territorial nature of Spain’s ethno-linguistic identities reinforces regional sol-
idarities, and, where they are stronger, preferences for regional welfare provision. Indeed, even
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Table 6.6: Opposition to Interregional Redistribution: OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Regional Identification 0.055∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
Ethno-Linguistic Rich 0.380∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.031)
Ethno-Linguistic Poor 0.076∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.073∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031)
Non Ethno-Linguistic Rich 0.039 0.063∗ 0.074∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.035)
Age Group 0.014∗ 0.016∗ 0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Female -0.039 -0.043∗ -0.046
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Education 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Religiosity -0.021∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.018
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Full Employment 0.025 0.023 0.008
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
Right-Wing 0.015∗∗
(0.006)
Fewer Taxes and Services 0.008
(0.004)
General Decentralization 0.047∗∗∗
(0.012)
Perceived Regional Equality 0.105∗∗∗
(0.015)
Constant 1.049∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.065) (0.091)
Observations 3,045 2,946 2,345
R2 0.106 0.119 0.156
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
poorer ethno-linguistic regions, which depend on income transfers from other regions, show rel-
atively strong in-group solidarity and some support for regional service provision. On the other,
Spain’s interregional economic inequalities have deepened in-group identification and opposition
to interregional redistribution among richer minorities.
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As I expect, the combination of geography and wealth singles out ethno-linguistic groups from
rich regions as the primary advocates of decentralized and insular redistribution. Poorer identity
groups, by contrast, are conflicted: despite their unique identities and stronger preference of region
over class, their dependence on the central government and on other regions has attenuated their
exclusive solidarity and their opposition to interregional redistribution. Finally, residents of regions
without unique ethno-linguistic identities express broader solidarity with other Spaniards and lower
interest in welfare decentralization, although they differ on interregional redistribution depending
on their economic situation. As we have seen, these patterns reflect long-term historical dynamics
between the Spanish political center, poorer ethno-linguistic regions that are dependent on the
state, and richer ethno-linguistic regions with more economic and political capital to push back.
Spain does not conform to one key theoretical expectation: whereas I generally expect richer
and poorer groups to maintain different redistributive priorities, a majority across all Spanish re-
gions support a wide variety of welfare programs. As I speculated earlier, this result may reflect
broadly shared risks due to Spain’s economic problems. Despite interregional differences in rel-
ative terms, members of all regions may be concerned about access to healthcare, unemployment
compensation, and housing assistance, especially after the economic crisis of 2008. Further re-
search into the roots of Spanish welfare preferences is required to asses whether this explanation
is sufficient.
These preferences have contributed to a welfare system that is partly devolved, although core
social security programs, most of which protect against shared risks, remain centralized. Social
assistance, meanwhile, is supplied regionally and has low investment levels that vary by each AC’s
resources. Nevertheless, I do not find evidence that this outcome stems from differential redis-
tributive priorities. Instead, it may reflect Spain’s traditional reliance on communal and voluntary
networks of support and the late development of its welfare state. While social security remains
centralized, intergroup tensions have been focused on interregional transfers, where there has been
continuous decentralization following bottom-up pressures and political crises initiated by richer
ethno-linguistic groups. This outcome emphasizes a key difference between Spain and Belgium:
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Belgians, and particularly Flemings, have been preoccupied with greater devolution of program
management, while richer minorities in Spain have focused on gaining greater control of their in-
come. This difference corroborates my core argument about the relative importance of income and
geography in each of the cases.
6.4.1 Mechanisms: Mass Movements, Elite Interests, and Institutions
The mechanisms that drive these outcomes resemble the ones identified in the US and in Bel-
gium. Like in previous cases, group sentiments in Spain exert political pressures both through
bottom-up and through top-down channels. Historically, Catalan and Basque nationalism have
been supported by mass movements and grassroots networks, especially under political oppres-
sion. The data show that regional identification with ethno-linguistic regions is driven first and
foremost by personal ties such as place of birth and fluency in the regional language (Bollen and
Dı´ez Medrano, 1998; Martı´nez-Herrera, 2002; Miley, 2008). These bottom-up factors, moreover,
were shown to causally precede support for institutional decentralization and regional party vote
(Chernyha and Burg, 2012).
At the same time, the nationalist movements have been led historically by local elites seeking
to broaden their political and economic power. The same elites have promoted the entrenchment
of regional symbols and language into everyday life and maintained their popular appeal. Further-
more, Spain’s institutional decentralization created a set of regional institutions, politicians, and
bureaucrats that often invoke regional identities to mobilize voters in their interest. This process,
moreover, has gradually proliferated to regions without unique ethno-linguistic identities as well
(Nu´n˜ez, 1999; Moreno, 2001b; Martı´nez-Herrera, 2002; Lecours, 2001). This tactic, nevertheless,
has had more limited success in the absence of deep ascriptive identifications among local voters
(Nu´n˜ez, 1999), implying again that elite cues require a receptive audience.
Like in Belgium, the Spanish case also underscores the importance of political institutions in
the nexus of preferences and policymaking. In the Spanish case, the electoral system benefits the
two large national parties at the expense of smaller ones with dispersed electorates. Regional par-
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ties are in a weaker position in this system, unless, like in the Basque Country and Catalonia, they
rally a sizable majority of voters across most of their districts (Moreno and Colino, 2010; Bera-
mendi, 2012). Even the Catalan and Basque parties, however, have remained small and never took
part in the governing coalition. Their largest leverage has been in periods with national minority
governments and using regional referenda and legislation, some of which were vetoed by national
actors. Many of their achievements, therefore, were made through pressures on and negotiations
with the central government. For the same reason, the staunch opposition by both national parties
has prevented serious challenges to the centralized nature of social security. Healthcare and so-
cial assistance, by contrast, were successfully devolved through negotiations and agreements with
the central government, often after autonomic regional moves. Like in Belgium, then, these in-
stitutions neither cause nor prevent group preferences and conflict over intergroup redistribution.
Their effect, instead, shapes the political channels, volatility, and pace at which these conflicts have
progressed.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
Almost twenty years ago, political scientist Keith Banting stated that “contemporary politics is
multicultural politics” (Banting, 1999, 108). Today, as most developed democracies wrestle with
migrant integration, the crisis of globalization, and the growing popularity of nativist and regional-
ist movements, few would argue with this assertion. Yet, our understanding of the political implica-
tions of ascriptive diversity is far from complete. In this dissertation, I have explored one particular
yet significant aspect of this issue: the structural influence that ascriptive identity cleavages wield
on income redistribution in democratic societies. Interpersonal redistribution is a central policy
arena in which modern democracies determine who gets what, when, and how, to use the classic
definition of politics coined by Lasswell (1950). As such, a better understanding of the causes
of redistributive outcomes can improve our future advancement of the wellbeing, social rights,
and integration of different members and groups in society. In this final chapter, therefore, I take
a step back and briefly consider from this broader perspective my main findings, their scholarly
contributions, and the avenues that they open for further research.
7.1 Summary of Main Findings
How does ascriptive diversity influence income redistribution in developed democracies? Macro-
comparative research from the past few years has cemented the notion that diverse societies are
more fragmented and thus redistribute less income between their members than homogeneous
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ones. My theoretical framework and empirical findings have shown that this conclusion is in-
complete. While higher ascriptive diversity can suppress redistribution levels, the manifestation
and strength of this effect depend on the national contexts within which it operates, particularly
socioeconomic and geographical structures. When identity groups have different socioeconomic
status or live in separate regions, national solidarity is replaced with narrower “solidarity circles”
that combine ascriptive identity with class and/or region. Each of these contexts, however, fractures
national solidarity along different social categories and consequently fosters different redistributive
preferences and outcomes. When identity groups are highly unequal socioeconomically, better-off
identity groups can minimize intergroup redistribution through regressive and exclusionary welfare
policies. By contrast, when identity groups cluster in different parts of the country, their members
can minimize intergroup redistribution by decentralizing national welfare programs to the regional
level. Hence, these factors determine both the extent to which ascriptive diversity dampens redis-
tribution and the types of redistributive outcomes that it produces.
My empirical analyses corroborate these expectations. Contrary to the common argument,
cross-sectional time-series data from 22 democracies over 31 years show that ascriptive diversity
alone does not consistently predict lower investment in redistribution or less inequality reduction.
However, its dampening effects appear strongly when either intergroup inequality and/or regional
segregation is higher. Each mediating context, however, is correlated with different outcomes. All
else equal, greater ascriptive diversity with higher intergroup inequality is associated with stronger
public perceptions of class conflict, weaker investment in lower-class needs, and more exclusionary
cross-class programs. Investment levels in programs that serve stronger groups, however, remain
unconstrained regardless of intergroup tensions. The American case, where the primary racial
cleavage is characterized by deep socioeconomic inequalities, demonstrates how these findings
connect together. In the US, white racial resentment has indeed become interlaced with negative
stereotypes of black poverty, lower solidarity with the poor, and weaker support for the redistribu-
tive programs that serve them. These preferences, in turn, have facilitated a myriad of policies that
prioritize the redistributive interests of middle and upper class whites and underplay the needs of
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poorer blacks.
My quantitative analysis also supports the second expectation: greater ascriptive diversity with
higher regional segregation correlates with stronger regional identities, lower investment in almost
all types of national programs regardless of need, and greater devolution of redistributive authority
to subnational units. The case of Belgium illustrates how these processes unfold in practice. High
intergroup segregation between Flemings and Walloons has fostered two insular communities with
intergroup tensions and a thin shared identity. Furthermore, the Flemish community, which has
historically mobilized more strongly around its ethno-linguistic identity, has consistently pushed
for greater decentralization of social policy. While Belgium’s historical legacy and institutional
structure have prevented the swift devolution of key social security programs, these pressures nev-
ertheless incrementally erode the national system’s standing.
Similar dynamics are found in Spain but with a stronger simultaneous influence of intergroup
inequality. Like in Belgium, the regional segregation of ethno-linguistic groups in Spain has cul-
tivated separate linguistic and cultural communities with strong regional identities. Yet, unlike
in Belgium, the different communities in Spain have developed along unequal economic paths.
As a result, the strength of their identities and their support for devolved redistribution varies
based on each community’s economic interests. In particular, ethno-linguistic communities from
poorer regions depend on, and show more support for, centralized redistribution that transfers in-
come from richer regions. By contrast, ethno-linguistic groups from richer regions tend to be
more autonomous and supportive of separate redistributive systems. The Spanish case, therefore,
demonstrates that both inequality and geography can operate side by side, a pattern that is also
corroborated by my broader quantitative analysis.
The three case studies add several important insights to my theoretical framework and large-
n analysis. First, they substantiate several of my core theoretical and methodological premises.
In all cases, the different types of ascriptive identities—racial in one case and ethno-linguistic
in the others—create comparable intergroup tensions, frayed solidarities, and redistributive im-
plications. In all three cases, moreover, these identities have remained salient since their initial
162
activation. Their socioeconomic and geographical contexts, too, have changed quite slowly, if at
all. While there were some changes—e.g., the reversal of economic fortunes in Belgium or the
Great Migration of blacks in early twentieth century America—they were rare and seem at least
broadly exogenous to redistributive policy. Further, notable changes in redistributive policies, such
as the War on Poverty in the US or the establishment of Belgium’s social security system, have not
reshaped the cleavage structure in meaningful ways. Finally, all cases find a direct connection be-
tween group preferences and actual policymaking, brought about by the actions of voters, activists,
political entrepreneurs, and electoral representatives.
Second, the case studies shed more light on the mechanisms that translate redistributive pref-
erences into policy outcomes, an often-neglected aspect in the micro-behavioral literature. Specif-
ically, all three cases find contemporaneous pressures from below and from above that feed off of
each other. In all three countries, politicians have reacted to and were constrained by popular sen-
timents toward other groups and by preferences on redistribution. At the same time, all three cases
demonstrate that politicians, social actors, and media outlets often mobilize and cue these senti-
ments to serve their own interests. The complex interrelations of bottom-up public opinion and
top-down elite mobilization are well beyond the scope of this project, but they serve as a reminder
of the various ways by which group sentiments prevail and influence actual policymaking. A third
mechanism that arises in the case studies is political institutions. As discussed more in length in
chapters 2, 5, and 6, existing institutions can expand or constrain the ways by which social groups
can act on their collective inclinations. However, all three cases illustrate that institutions are often
designed and reformed endogenously to accommodate group preferences better. As such, they are
important parameters that set the pace, political leverage, and specific policy tools through which
preferences influence redistributive policies but they do not stand out as exogenous or sufficient
explanans on their own.
Third, the three case studies add a dynamic dimension to my otherwise static theoretical frame-
work. In particular, each case presents a different type of long-term transformation that affected the
concrete manifestation of my predictions but also demonstrated their sustained relevance. In the
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American case, the cleavage structure and racial resentments remained stable and salient for cen-
turies but the norms and legal constraints changed over time. Accordingly, by the Civil Rights era,
new policy tools were used to exclude poorer blacks less overtly than before. Hence, the goals re-
mained the same even as the tactics shifted. In Belgium, by contrast, the ethno-linguistic cleavage
itself grew in salience, particularly after the old division lines of church and class dissipated. As a
result, the pressures on redistributive policies themselves increased and focused on the reconstruc-
tion of older institutions built under a different social context. Finally, in Spain, the change was
not in the ethno-linguistic cleavage or in group preferences but in the regime itself. Spain’s late de-
mocratization shifted older battle lines around autonomy and repression to new, and still changing,
institutional and political platforms. Moreover, Spain’s late economic development and welfare
state formation have contributed to relatively uniform popular support for redistributive policies
across all groups, a finding that diverges from my theoretical expectations and demonstrates that
reality is often noisier than ceteris paribus models.
7.2 Contributions
The argument and findings presented in my dissertation advance our understanding of ascrip-
tive identity politics and redistribution in several ways. My first set of contributions are substan-
tive. My argument provides a single, empirically corroborated framework to analyze how complex
social structures shape resource redistribution between different identity groups in democratic set-
tings. My analysis tells us, for example, that the American welfare state and the current politics
around it would have looked differently if blacks were concentrated in a particular set of states.
Similarly, Belgium or Spain would have developed different policies and tensions if their groups
were more intermixed or their economic discrepancies different. More importantly, my analysis
also points at the future implications of current decisions about the spatial and economic inte-
gration of new immigrants and minority groups. Isolating immigrants in specific areas or raising
economic barriers that hold them back may play important roles in the redistributive politics of
future generations. Similarly, my argument helps anticipate future redistributive battlefronts in
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developing countries where ascriptive identities, cleavage structures, and social policies are still
taking shape.
These conclusions, in turn, update and shift the disciplinary discussion of identity and redistri-
bution. In particular, my dissertation ties together and fills the gap in the three incomplete answers
that we currently have. First, I show that the common macro-comparative argument associating
ascriptive diversity and low redistribution is theoretically and empirically insufficient. Yet, con-
trary to some critiques on the validity of this claim (e.g., Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Mau and Burkhardt,
2009), I also detail the conditions under which it applies and the exact outcomes it produces. My
conclusions thus compel macro-comparative researchers to pay closer attention to the broader so-
ciodemographic structures and subnational contexts that constrain dynamic explanations of social
policy. Furthermore, students of redistributive politics should be more attentive to the different
components of aggregate redistributive outcomes. As my research shows, social policy can vary in
its internal composition, priorities, and institutional design even as it is rolled back on the whole.
Second, I show that many micro-behavioral insights on preferences do extend to broader policy
outcomes. Similar to macro-comparative research, micro-behavioral studies, too, should pay more
attention to the ways that different local contexts influence preferences for specific types of redis-
tributive policies and not others. My research calls for such work to be particularly cognizant of the
social categories that underly in-group solidarity and out-group resentments and the redistributive
policies that speak to each.
Third, my research also underscores the often-neglected importance of regional geography for
both the macro-comparative and the micro-behavioral discussions about redistributive preferences
and policy. The impact of geography has often been studied in local settings and with focus on in-
tergroup relations. My findings, nevertheless, emphasize the macro-comparative and redistributive
importance of such factors as intergroup contact, regional segregation, and interregional wealth
differences. By the same token, political-economic models about interregional inequality and sub-
national institutions would benefit from a deeper examination of ascriptive identities. My analysis
of Spain, for example, demonstrates that these identities are not just a background attribute to hold
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constant but a mediating and moderating variable that creates internal variation within richer and
poorer regions.
Hence, beyond their substantive lessons, my findings emphasize a larger disciplinary lesson:
we can and should further break down the intra-disciplinary silos between macro-level and micro-
level discussions about identity politics and social policy. Studies on individual-level behavior offer
rich and nuanced insights about the causal mechanisms that underly interpersonal relations and
individual policy preferences, but they often stop short of discussing concrete policy implications.
Macro-comparative studies, by contrast, often overlook these insights and seek national-level and
institutional explanations. My research demonstrates that picking one over the other limits our
ability to paint a fuller picture of social structures, identity politics, and policy outcomes, and may
subsequently lead to faulty conclusions and policy decisions.
My final set of contributions is methodological. While I use largely available data, my quan-
titative analysis highlights several practices that could be used in future research of similar ques-
tions. First, I introduce a new measure of ascriptive diversity that aggregates multiple ascriptive
identities into a single score. This measure has its weaknesses, particularly for studies that are
interested only in a particular type of ascriptive identities, yet it is especially useful for quantita-
tive research that wishes to disaggregate ascriptive diversity and the various contexts that activate
it. For the purposes of this dissertation, this measure enabled me to differentiate the distinct re-
distributive implications of intergroup inequality and regional segregation, two factors that have a
similar mobilizing power but different implications. Second, my empirical analysis suggests that
future research about the redistributive implications of intergroup inequality should use cleavage
reinforcement/cross-cuttingness measures rather than common indices of between-group inequal-
ity. The latter, I have argued, capture relative income gaps and may thus be more endogenous to
redistribution. As I have shown in Chapter 3 and in the appendices, the former measures remain
stable over several decades and perform as well as alternative measures that are strictly exogenous
to redistribution levels.
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7.3 Avenues for Future Research
Finally, my dissertation opens several avenues for future research. Three directions stand out
in particular. The first type of research should dig deeper into the behavioral premises that underlie
my argument. My empirical analysis provides evidence of correlations and specific case devel-
opments, but more work is needed to identify and show the exact causal path leading from social
structures, to intergroup relations, to concrete policy preferences. Experimental work would be
particularly fitting to test how these factors shape different group members’ support for concrete
types of policies, target audiences, and redistributive priorities (for a recent step in this direction,
see Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2016).
A second avenue for future research should extend the scope conditions that bound my current
discussion. First, additional research should theorize about the distributive implications of cleav-
age structures in newer democracies with shorter-lived welfare states. Eastern Europe and Latin
America, in particular, could be interesting regions around which to examine, adjust, and expand
my theoretical framework. Indeed, recent research finds that intergroup inequality dampens pop-
ular support for redistribution in Latin American countries too (Morgan and Kelly, 2016) even
as their welfare policies developed along different historical, economic, and institutional paths
than most Western democracies (Huber and Stephens, 2012). Second, future research can expand
the theory’s time horizons and examine the long-term feedback loops between ascriptive identity
salience, cleavage structures, and income redistribution over decades and centuries. To do so, ad-
ditional data collection is required on historical social structures, migration patterns, and social
policy. The theory, too, could be expanded to include older cleavages surrounding religion and
church, border swaps due to imperial wars, and state formation processes.
Finally, a third avenue for future research should go beyond class and geography and examine
the redistributive implications of other social categories that define intergroup relations, redistribu-
tive preferences, and actual policies. Two particular examples come to mind, each merit a deeper
investigation. The first category is citizenship, especially given the recent increase of immigration
inflows to Western democracies. Indeed, recent research finds instances of welfare chauvinism,
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i.e., public support for generous redistribution only for natives but not immigrants (Reeskens and
Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Der Waal, De Koster and Van Oorschot, 2013). Policy-wise, such exclu-
sion is often manifested through stricter requirements for citizenship, longer periods of residence,
duration in the labor market, and past payroll contributions—all markers that differentiate natives
from immigrants (Sainsbury, 2012; Koning and Banting, 2013). This research can use my the-
oretical framework to sketch the full causal map from immigration, to bounded solidarities, to
policymaking using these social categories as means of exclusion, to the eventual redistributive
patterns that they produce.
The second social category that can overlap with ascriptive identities is contribution to the
general good. In such cases, the government can provide higher benefits for certain acts of
contribution—e.g., military service, personal sacrifice for certain goals, or membership in a sym-
bolic religious or ethnic group—that are more common among certain ascriptive identity groups. In
Israel, for example, about 20–25% of transfer payments use eligibility criteria that are tied directly
with contribution to the Jewish majority’s identity and Zionist project. These criteria, accordingly,
exclude or minimize benefits to non-Jewish minorities. These include, among others, higher pen-
sions for elderly Jewish immigrants (“Olim”), special benefits for Holocaust survivors, stipends
for Ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, and welfare benefits for military service, a duty form which
Arab citizens are collectively exempt (Shalev, 2010; Yakter and Shalev, 2013). Future research can
look for similar programs from a comparative perspective, dig deeper into the public preferences
and bounded solidarities that justify them, and study the politics behind their establishment and
sustainment.
Together, these avenues constitute a research agenda that seeks to better understand how social
structures in diverse democracies shape intergroup relations, divide society to different circles of
solidarity, and influence the ways by which resources are redistributed between different people
and groups. These questions are becoming all the more important given the current challenges
facing the democratic world, the increasing diversity of Western societies, and the growing political
influence of nativist and exclusionary ideologies.
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APPENDIX A
Test for Stability of Intergroup Inequality Over Time
The quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 3 assumes that intergroup income inequality, mea-
sured as the cleavage reinforcement of ascriptive identity and income, remains relatively stable
over the sample period. To corroborate this assumption, I look for patterns of stability or change
in specific survey dyads that gauge this measure over different periods of time.
The measures that I use rely on data from the Cross-Cutting Cleavages Dataset developed by
Joel Selway (2011). Selway’s cross-cuttingness measures are calculated as the average score of
country-level surveys from multiple years, the number and distribution of which vary by coun-
try. To support the assumption that intergroup income inequality remains relatively stable for the
sample’s duration, I examine the annual rates of change in intergroup inequality scores among all
comparable country surveys. If my stability assumption is wrong, the annual rate of change in
comparable survey dyads should follow a consistent pattern. Conversely, the stability assumption
will be corroborated if intersurvey changes resemble random noise.
I calculate the intersurvey annual change rate by the following steps:
1. Identification of comparable surveys: First, I revisited the original list of surveys used by
Selway1 and identified comparable surveys that meet all the following criteria:
1Courtesy of Joel Selway, the data is available in: Selway, Joel S. 2010, ”Replication data for: The Measure-
ment of Cross-cutting Cleavages and Other Multidimensional Cleavage Structures”, hdl:1902.1/15162, Harvard
Dataverse, V3.
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• The same country
• The same research project (e.g., World Value Survey)
• The same question wording
• Identical list of answers (with or without collapsing categories)2
• Different years
2. Calculation of survey-specific inequality scores: Next, I calculated the intergroup inequal-
ity score for each specific survey using Selway’s method (Cramer’s normalization of the
chi-square statistic).
3. Calculation of Compound Annual Growth Rate: Finally, I calculated the compound an-
nual growth rate (CAGR) for every dyad of comparable surveys. The CAGR formula calcu-
lates the constant rate of change per year between two values based on the start value, the end
value, and the number of years between them.3 It thus creates a comparable annual change
rate regardless of the number of years that passed between every survey dyad. Following
this process, I have a total of 97 dyadic CAGR scores.
I use two tests to examine whether there is a consistent pattern of change in intergroup inequal-
ity. First, Figure A.1 presents the density plot of the CAGR score distribution. Panel A showcases
the density plot of all CAGR values, while panel B breaks them apart by identity type. All plots
resemble a Gaussian curve with a mean around zero, just as we would expect after multiple ran-
dom draws from a normal distribution. Specifically, the mean CAGR value for all identity types
(panel A) is µ = −0.0002 and the variance is σ2 = 0.002. In other words, in line with the stability
assumption, the rate of annual change in intergroup inequality scores is almost zero on average
2For example, a second wave of the same survey in the same country may expand the list of religious denominations
available for respondents compared to the first wave. However, in some surveys, the former can be collapsed perfectly
to the latter, e.g., by bundling all new options under an ”other” category that appeared in the first survey. In such cases,
I calculated the intergroup inequality score after collapsing the list of answers where necessary.
3Formally, the CAGR formula is (V (tn)V (t0) )
1
tn−t0 − 1, where V (t0) is the start value, V (tn) is the end value, and
tn − t0 is the number of years between them.
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and has no clear positive or negative skew. Furthermore, Panel B demonstrates that this Gaussian
distribution repeats across identity types.
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Figure A.1: Density Plots of CAGR Values for Intergroup Inequality
Second, I examine trends in CAGR over time using sequences of comparable surveys. In many
cases, survey dyads were part of longer chains: the first dyad was between period 1 and period
2, the second was between period 2 and period 3, and so on. For instance, a country that had
comparable surveys in 1981, 1995, 2005, and 2010 produced a chain of three connected dyads.
Accordingly, there is a different CAGR score for each dyad in the sequence, i.e., an annual change
rate for 1981–1995 (dyad 1), a second annual change rate for 1995–2005 (dyad 2), and a third one
for 2005–2010 (dyad 3). These sequences can be helpful to examine whether the rate of change
moves in a consistent direction over time in the same country. If my stability assumption is wrong,
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we would expect either or both of the following patterns: (1) all periods in the same sequence
would share a positive (or negative) change, i.e., locate consistently above or below zero CAGR,
and/or (2) sequences from different countries would follow a similar pattern. Figure A.2, which
plots CAGR scores over time period by sequence, finds neither. Instead, the multiple trend lines
(and single dyads, marked by a sole circle) go up and down irregularly and cut across one another,
resembling a Chinese finger trap rather than moving together or locating consistently below or
above zero. The same is true when each identity type is examined separately in panels B, C, and
D.
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Figure A.2: CAGR Trend over Multiple Periods
In summary, both the distribution of change in intergroup inequality scores and their temporal
trend lack consistent patterns over time. This null result supports the assumption that the reinforce-
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ment of identity and income is relatively stable over my sample period.
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APPENDIX B
Full Presentation of Truncated Models
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Table B.1: Public Social Spending by Program Type: Cross-Class Needs
Old-Age Spending Years for Full Pension Incapacity Spending
(1) (2) (3)
Structural Relationships
AIF -0.520∗∗∗ (0.139) -0.512 (1.344) 0.047 (0.099)
Inequality -0.380∗∗ (0.158) 0.255 (1.315) 0.260∗∗ (0.123)
AIF × Inequality 0.728 (0.508) -1.874 (5.719) -0.343 (0.442)
Segregation 0.137 (0.276) -1.641∗∗ (0.754) 0.580∗∗∗ (0.207)
AIF × Segregation -0.068 (0.723) 5.606∗∗∗ (2.010) -1.214∗∗ (0.591)
Veto 0.007 (0.009) -0.067∗∗ (0.033) 0.004 (0.005)
Short-Term Relationships
∆Left 0.000 (0.001) -0.004∗∗ (0.002) 0.001∗∗ (0.000)
∆ChristDem 0.003∗ (0.001) -0.007∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.002∗∗ (0.001)
∆CWB 0.043∗∗ (0.020) -0.053 (0.105) -0.006 (0.011)
∆Unemployment 0.029∗∗ (0.014) -0.002 (0.054) 0.003 (0.007)
∆LogGDP -7.358∗∗∗ (0.637) 2.930 (2.496) -2.135∗∗∗ (0.315)
Long-Term Relationships
Leftt−1 -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
ChristDemt−1 -0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000)
CWBt−1 0.022∗ (0.012) -0.090 (0.090) 0.006 (0.006)
Unemploymentt−1 -0.004 (0.004) -0.030 (0.023) -0.007∗∗∗ (0.002)
LabForcet−1 -0.003 (0.003) 0.021∗∗ (0.010) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.002)
FemLabForcet−1 0.002 (0.004) -0.017 (0.029) 0.002 (0.002)
Pop65t−1 0.010 (0.008) 0.017 (0.039) 0.001 (0.004)
LogTradet−1 -0.060∗∗ (0.027) 0.013 (0.197) 0.020 (0.017)
LogGDPt−1 -0.062 (0.044) -0.142 (0.253) -0.073∗∗ (0.029)
Error-Correction Term
Aget−1 -0.015∗ (0.008)
AgeQualt−1 0.000 (0.003)
Incapacityt−1 -0.039∗∗∗ (0.010)
Lagged Difference
∆Aget−1 0.104∗ (0.060)
∆Incapacityt−1 0.163∗∗ (0.069)
∆LogGDPt−1 2.493∗∗∗ (0.638) 0.865∗∗∗ (0.277)
R2 0.382 0.533 0.314
Observations 68 85 68
Countries 19 18 19
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.2: Public Social Spending by Program Type: Lower-Class Needs
Unemp. Spending Assitance Spending Healthcare Spending
(1) (2) (3)
Structural Relationships
AIF 0.558∗∗∗ (0.175) 0.564∗∗∗ (0.153) 0.661∗∗∗ (0.170)
Inequality 0.655∗∗∗ (0.211) 0.804∗∗∗ (0.213) 0.554∗∗ (0.247)
AIF × Inequality -1.815∗∗∗ (0.629) -2.067∗∗∗ (0.583) -1.656∗∗ (0.734)
Segregation 0.703∗∗ (0.277) 0.485∗∗∗ (0.174) -0.075 (0.319)
AIF × Segregation -1.375∗ (0.764) -1.106∗∗ (0.470) 0.149 (0.917)
Veto 0.016∗ (0.009) -0.004 (0.007) -0.015∗ (0.009)
Short-Term Relationships
∆Left -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001∗∗ (0.001)
∆ChristDem -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)
∆CWB 0.029∗ (0.016) -0.005 (0.011) -0.006 (0.019)
∆Unemployment 0.072∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.009 (0.008) -0.002 (0.013)
∆LogGDP -4.117∗∗∗ (0.723) -2.594∗∗∗ (0.428) -4.928∗∗∗ (0.610)
Long-Term Relationships
Leftt−1 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
ChristDemt−1 -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 0.002∗∗ (0.001)
CWBt−1 0.023∗∗ (0.010) 0.005 (0.008) 0.005 (0.011)
Unemploymentt−1 -0.011∗∗ (0.005) -0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.007∗ (0.004)
LabForcet−1 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) -0.005∗ (0.003)
FemLabForcet−1 0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.004 (0.004)
Pop65t−1 0.001 (0.006) 0.000 (0.004) 0.007 (0.007)
LogTradet−1 0.049 (0.034) 0.026 (0.019) -0.077∗∗ (0.032)
LogGDPt−1 -0.175∗∗∗ (0.056) -0.041 (0.035) 0.108∗∗ (0.043)
Error-Correction Term
Unemploymentt−1 -0.041∗∗∗ (0.013)
Assistancet−1 -0.041∗∗∗ (0.013)
Healthcaret−1 -0.068∗∗∗ (0.016)
Lagged Difference
∆Unemploymentt−1 0.258∗∗∗ (0.068)
∆Assistancet−1 0.150∗∗ (0.060)
∆Healthcaret−1 0.129∗∗ (0.053)
∆LogGDPt−1 1.267∗ (0.680) 0.751∗∗ (0.368) 2.607∗∗∗ (0.532)
R2 0.473 0.213 0.289
Observations 620 627 637
Countries 22 22 22
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.3: Unemployment and and Sick-Pay Coverage
Unemployment Coverage Sick-Pay Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Structural Relationships
AIF 0.00 (0.01) 0.09∗∗ (0.04) -0.01 (0.01) 0.10∗∗ (0.04)
Inequality 0.08∗∗ (0.03) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.04)
AIF × Inequality -0.26∗∗ (0.12) -0.36∗∗ (0.14)
Segregation -0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
AIF × Segregation 0.01 (0.06) -0.00 (0.04)
Veto -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Short-Term Relationships
∆Left 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
∆ChristDem -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
∆CWB 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00∗ (0.00)
∆Unemployment -0.00 (0.00) -0.00∗ (0.00) -0.00∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.00∗∗∗ (0.00)
∆LogGDP 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Long-Term Relationships
Leftt−1 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
ChristDemt−1 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
CWBt−1 0.00 (0.00) 0.00∗ (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00∗ (0.00)
Unemploymentt−1 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
LabForcet−1 0.00 (0.00) 0.00∗ (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
FemLabForcet−1 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Pop65t−1 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
LogTradet−1 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
LogGDPt−1 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01∗ (0.00) 0.01∗ (0.00)
Error-Correction Term
UnempCovert−1 -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01)
SickCovert−1 -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗∗∗ (0.01)
Lagged Difference
∆UnempCovert−1 0.16∗∗ (0.07) 0.16∗∗ (0.07)
∆LogGDPt−1 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
R2 0.110 0.129 0.144 0.177
Observations 539 539 535 535
Countries 20 20 20 20
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.4: Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
AIF -19.924∗ (6.707)
Inequality -11.582∗ (4.657)
AIF × Inequality 51.867∗ (18.148)
Segregation 2.474 (6.551)
AIF × Segregation -7.596 (18.838)
Veto 0.258 (0.294)
Left 0.006 (0.010)
ChristDem 0.016 (0.029)
CWB -0.139 (0.368)
Unemployment 0.040 (0.143)
LabForce -0.026 (0.073)
FemLabForce 0.155 (0.075)
UnionDensity -0.012 (0.013)
Pop65 0.049 (0.184)
LogTrade 0.730 (1.059)
LogGDP -1.181 (1.198)
∆LogGDP 4.448 (42.663)
R2 0.950
Observations 562
Countries 21
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table B.5: Relative Income Inequality Reduction after Taxes and Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Structural Relationships
AIF 0.009 (0.063) 0.173∗∗ (0.087) 0.093 (0.101) 0.169∗ (0.102)
Inequality 0.091 (0.061) 0.087 (0.063)
AIF × Inequality -0.435∗∗∗ (0.157) -0.373∗ (0.195)
Segregation 0.029 (0.149) -0.006 (0.169)
AIF × Segregation -0.208 (0.392) -0.030 (0.497)
Veto -0.006 (0.005) -0.005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004)
Short-Term Relationships
∆Left -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
∆ChristDem 0.001∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗ (0.000)
∆CWB 0.014∗ (0.008) 0.009 (0.008) 0.010 (0.009) 0.010 (0.009)
∆Unemployment 0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.003)
∆LogGDP 0.180∗∗ (0.078) 0.145∗∗ (0.072) 0.162∗∗ (0.073) 0.147∗ (0.076)
Long-Term Relationships
Leftt−1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
ChristDemt−1 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
CWBt−1 0.020∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.016∗∗ (0.007) 0.017∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.017∗∗ (0.007)
Unemploymentt−1 0.004∗∗ (0.002) 0.003∗ (0.002) 0.004∗ (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
LabForcet−1 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
FemLabForcet−1 0.007∗ (0.004) 0.007∗∗ (0.003) 0.007∗∗ (0.003) 0.007∗∗ (0.003)
Pop65t−1 0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004)
LogTradet−1 0.019 (0.017) 0.023∗ (0.014) 0.026∗ (0.015) 0.022 (0.015)
LogGDPt−1 0.015 (0.029) 0.009 (0.026) 0.004 (0.024) 0.008 (0.025)
Error-Correction Term
GiniReductiont−1 -0.598∗∗∗ (0.125) -0.471∗∗∗ (0.109) -0.481∗∗∗ (0.114) -0.480∗∗∗ (0.109)
R2 (Overall) 0.404 0.451 0.443 0.452
Observations 88 88 88 88
Countries 19 19 19 19
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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APPENDIX C
Alternative Model Specifications
To verify that the findings presented in Chapter 3 are not driven solely by my error-correction
model, I reran the primary analyses using several alternative model specifications:
• Error-Correction Model with 3-Year Moving Averages: This model is identical to my
original ECM, but, to accommodate the possibility that the dynamic short- and long-term
relationships operate gradually rather than annually, I replace all yearly control variables
with their 3-year moving average (the average of lags 1 to 3).
• Error-Correction Model without Institutional and Political Variables: This model is
identical to my original ECM, but the institutional and political variables, which could be
suspected as endogenous to cleavage structures, are omitted. These include the veto points
index, the share of cabinet portfolios held by the left and by the Christian-democratic parties,
and centralization of wage bargaining.
• Standard Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) Model: This model estimates a time-series
cross-sectional regression in which the dependent variable is regressed on my key explana-
tory variables, the first lag of all control variables, on the dependent variable’s own first
lag.
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• LDV with 3-Year Moving Averages: The same LDV model is estimated with the 3-year
moving averages of all control variables instead of their first annual lag.
• Minimal Cross-Sectional Model with a Between-Effects Estimator: The between-effects
estimator omits the temporal dynamics and runs a simple cross-sectional regression with
sample averages of all variables per country. Due to the small number of observations and
degrees of freedom, the model includes only the explanatory variables, as well as GDP
and GDP growth (controlling for its mechanical effect as the denominator of public social
spending). For the same reasons, I also estimate each interaction separately and expect
cruder levels of statistical noise.
Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3 present the results. For ease of presentation, each cell indicates
whether a given specification replicates the respective model’s primary coefficients of interest:
(1) the interaction of diversity and intergroup inequality and (2) the interaction of diversity with
intergroup segregation. If each coefficient retains the same sign and statistical significance as the
original model, it is marked as ”Yes” in the table. If the coefficient retains its correct sign but loses
its statistical significance, I mark it as ”No sig.” (the p-value is noted specifically if it is very close
to the threshold of p < 0.1). Finally, if the coefficient switches to the wrong sign, with or without
statistical significance, I mark it as ”No”. Thus, an inspection of the columns indicates how well
each specification performs across all models and an inspection of the rows indicates how well
each model performs across specifications. The results demonstrate that my findings are robust in
both respects. The few exceptions do not repeat systematically across specifications and variables
and likely reflect the lower fit of certain models to the data.
Finally, as noted in Chapter 3, I also reran my analyses with two alternative measures of in-
tergroup inequality and of regional segregation to dispel concerns of endogeneity or measurement
validity. The two variables, one from Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) and the
other from Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), are reviewed in the chapter. As I explain there, the
alternative inequality measure, which is based on nighttime satellite imagery by ethnic groups’
historic homelands, is estimated without my segregation measure due to potential confounding.
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The alternative segregation measure, by contrast, is estimated together with my original intergroup
income inequality measure. The results are summarized in table C.4 using the same abbreviations
as in tables C.1–C.3. These estimations, too, corroborate my findings.
Table C.1: Alternative Specifications: Error-Correction Model Adjustments
3-Year MA No Pol./Inst. Vars
Model by Outcome Inequality Segregation Inequality Segregation
Overall Spending Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Qualification, Age Yes No Sig. Yes No
Spending, Incapacity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending, Unemployment Yes No Sig. Yes No Sig.
Spending, Assistance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending, Healthcare Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coverage, Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coverage, Sick-Pay Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes: reproduces ECM findings in sign and in statistical significance (p < 0.1);
No sig.: reproduces ECM findings in sign but not in statistical significance;
No: reproduces ECM findings in neither sign nor significant.
Table C.2: Alternative Specifications: Lagged-Dependent Variable (LDV) Model
Standard 3-Year MA
Model by Outcome Inequality Segregation Inequality Segregation
Overall Spending Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Qualification, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending, Incapacity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending, Unemployment Yes Yes Yes No Sig.
(p = 0.126)
Spending, Assistance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending, Healthcare Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coverage, Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coverage, Sick-Pay Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes: reproduces ECM findings in sign and in statistical significance (p < 0.1);
No sig.: reproduces ECM findings in sign but not in statistical significance;
No: reproduces ECM findings in neither sign nor significant.
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Table C.3: Alternative Specifications: Cross-Sectional Model (Between-Effects Estimator)
Model by Outcome Inequality Segregation
Overall Spending Yes No Sig.
Spending, Age Yes Yes
Qualification, Age Yes No Sig.
Spending, Incapacity Yes No Sig.
Spending, Unemployment Yes No Sig.
Spending, Assistance Yes No Sig.
Spending, Healthcare Yes No Sig.
Coverage, Unemployment Yes Yes
Coverage, Sick-Pay Yes Yes
Yes: reproduces ECM findings in sign and in statistical significance (p < 0.1);
No sig.: reproduces ECM findings in sign but not in statistical significance;
No: reproduces ECM findings in neither sign nor significant.
Table C.4: Alternative Measures of Intergroup Inequality and Regional Segregation
Model by Outcome Inequality Segregation
Overall Spending Yes No Sig.
Spending, Age Yes Yes
Qualification, Age Yes No Sig.
Spending, Incapacity Yes Yes
Spending, Unemployment Yes Yes
Spending, Assistance Yes Yes
Spending, Healthcare Yes Yes
Coverage, Unemployment No Sig. Yes
Coverage, Sick-Pay No Sig. Yes
Decentralization No Yes
Yes: reproduces ECM findings in sign and in statistical significance (p < 0.1);
No sig.: reproduces ECM findings in sign but not in statistical significance;
No: reproduces ECM findings in neither sign nor significant.
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